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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Attorneys-Unauthorized Practice of Law by Corporations
In State v. Pledger- the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that an employee of a shell homes corporation, who had prepared
either directly or indirectly deeds of trust by filling in the blanks of
printed forms in the course of the corporate business, was not guilty
of the unauthorized practice of law.2 The decision rested on the
ground that the defendant did not prepare legal documents "for
another person, firm or corporation" within the intent and meaning
of G.S. § 84-4. The court interpreted this statute to mean that
"a person, firm or corporation having a primary interest, not mnerely
an incidental interest, in a transaction, may prepare legal documents
necessary to the furtherance and completion of the transaction without violating G.S. § 84-4."'
The court was quite correct in reversing conviction for violation
of G.S. § 84-4 prohibiting the practice of law by individuals for
another. The indictment in this case was against the individual
defendant who was an agent of the corporation acting in the course
257 N.C. 634, 127 S.E.2d 337 (1962).
2 Generally, the practice of law is not confined to performing services in
court, but includes conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, advice given to clients, and all actions taken for another in legal
matters. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-2.1 (1958) ; In re Duncan, 83 S.C.
186, 187, 65 S.E. 210, 211 (1909) ; 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 3(g) (1937).
8257 N.C. at 637, 127 S.E.2d at 339 (1962). (Emphasis added.) In
preparing deeds of trust for. a finance company, defendant was held guilty
of violating G.S. § 84-4 because "as to the defendant, this corporation was
'another ...corporation' within the meaning of the statute.. .

."

Id. at 638,

127 S.E.2d at 340.
The defense used by some corporations who rely on the "incidentto-business" theory is the claim that no separate charge is made for the
services. E.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n,
135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957); Cooperman v. West Coast Title
Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954). However, other cases hold this defense
to be invalid because there is still an indirect compensation to the corporation in the way of business. E.g., State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J.
Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960). In still others
the court found that there was an unauthorized practice of law because the
total services for which the customer paid was so high as to include a fee
'for the legal services rendered. E.g., Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar
Ass'n, 230 Ark. 494, 326 S.W.2d 900 (1959); In re Gore, 58 Ohio App.
79, 15 N.E.2d 968 (1937) ; Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm.,
142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944); Grievance Comm. v. Dean, 190
S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
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of his employment; but since a corporation can act only through its
agents, the corporation was, in effect, the defendant. However,
G.S. § 84-5 prohibits the practice of law by corporations.4 The court
made no reference to this statute and expressed no opinion as to
whether the defendant's acts were in violation of its command. It is
clear, therefore, that Pledger does not preclude an indictment and
conviction in North Carolina of persons who prepare deeds of trust
in the course of their employment by a real estate corporation, unless
the court's construction of G.S. § 84-4 be taken as a gloss on G.S.
§ 84-5 as well. Under G.S. § 84-4 as now interpreted a corporation
may perform legal services so long as they are incidental to its
usual course of business. If the two statutes are now construed
in pari materia it may well be that the court has, perhaps inadvertently, laid the groundwork for a holding that G.S. § 84-5
also permits a limited practice of law by corporations "incident to
business." This approach may be necessary to resolve the dilemma
propounded when one statute confers a privilege which another
purports to take away. 5
The purpose of all suits to enjoin corporations from preparing
legal documents allegedly constituting an unlawful practice of law is
to protect the licenses, privileges and franchises granted to
attorneys from encroachment and damage by reason of the
alleged unauthorized acts of the defendant ... [and] to protect the public and particularly those persons participating in
'"[N]o corporation shall . . . draw agreements, or other legal documents
•.,or practice law, or give legal advice ... by or through any person .... "
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-5 (1958). The only corporations excepted from
this statute are banks, and then only in specified circumstances. One cannot
help but wonder why the indictment was drawn under G.S. § 84-4. It is
a well known rule of criminal procedure that the indictment must state
a crime. Even though the defendant may in fact be guilty under the facts
of some crime, unless that crime is charged specifically in the indictment he
must be found innocent. State v. Law, 227 N.C. 103, 40 S.E.2d 699 (1946) ;
42 C.J.S. Indictmzents & Informations§§ 137, 261 (1944). If the complexities
of indicting corporations are insurmountable in a particular case it should
be possible to obtain an injunction against further violations of the law.
See Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 3, where
injunction was used instead of indictment.
'The answering argument is that G.S. § 84-4 does not conifer a right on
corporations to practice law incident to their business, but merely does not
prohibit it. Construed in this way G.S. § 84-4 as interpreted in the principal
case and G.S. § 84-5 are corollary; that which is omitted from G.S. § 84-4 is
prohibited by G.S. § 84-5. This would seem to be the best argument, but
the language of the case gives the impression that the court would be inclined
to the other line of reasoning.
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real estate transactions through brokers, from the dangers
inherent in the preparation of legal documents by persons un-skilled in the intricacies of the law rather than by lawyers.'
Nearly all states, either by statute7 or judicial decision,' forbid a
corporation to practice law under any circumstances. Due to the
nature of corporations it necessarily follows that "acts of officers of
a corporation who are regular, salaried employees, performed in the
course of their employment, are acts of the corporation as affecting
the determination as to whether the corporation is engaged in the
practice of law." 9 In spite of the flat prohibition of their statutes,
several states allow certain corporations to transact their own legal
business and to perform certain acts necessarily incident to the proper
performance of their authorized business function, even though these
very acts would constitute the unauthorized practice of law were they
not so permitted."0 These jurisdictions have avoided statutes similar
to G.S. § 84-5 on two grounds: (1) such acts do not constitute the
practice of law,'1 (2) public policy favors such activities by corpora' Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 413,
312 P.2d 998, 1006 (1957).
7E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, §46 (1955); N.C. GE-. STAT. §84-5
(1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:170-78 (1953); N.Y. PENAL LAWS §280
(1944); OHiO REV. CODE §§ 1701.03, 4705.01 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,

§ 1608 (1930); S.C. CODE §§ 56-141, -142 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-303
(1955); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 3 (1959) (see note 16,
infra).
'E.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366
P.2d 1 (1961); State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn.
222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958) ; Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d
914 (1942). In State ex rel. Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, Inc., 209
N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 504 (1936), the court held that the right to practice law
is personal and, therefore, a corporation cannot do it either directly or
indirectly by employing lawyers to practice for it.
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 956, at 404 (1940).
"0See generally cases and statutes cited notes 11 & 12, infra; Annot., 157
A.L.R. 285 (1945) ; 19 C.J.S. Corporations§ 956, at 406 (1940).
" Bar Ass'n v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326
S.W.2d 767 (1959) held that even though activities of the title guaranty
company constitute practice of law within the meaning of TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-303 (1955) forbidding a corporation to practice law, they will not be
declared unlawful if incidental to the main business of the corporation.
Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 428, 312 P.2d 1011, 1014
(1957), decided on CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1-17 (1953), held that "a
layman or a corporation may prepare instruments to which he or it is a party
without being guilty of the unauthorized practice of law." In the Colorado
case the corporation as mortgagee was allowed to prepare mortgages, but not
to fill in blanks affecting conveyancing 'of property. State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 248; 264, 131 A.2d 646, 655
(Sup. Ct. 1957), relying on CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-88 (1960),' held
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The New York Penal Law § 280 provides that no corporation
shall itself or by or through its officers, agents, or employees render
legal services. A corporation, under this statute, is not to receive
compensation directly or indirectly for preparing legal instruments.
It excepts corporations lawfully engaged in examining and insuring
titles to real property from its provisions in so far as preparation
of legal instruments is necessary to the examination and insuring
of titles and necessary or incidental to loans made by the corporation.
Up to this point the New York statute appears very liberal. However, it further provides that no corporation may render any legal
services which may not be rendered by a layman. The purpose of
the statute, as expressed in subsequent New York decisions, 3 is to
that a bank which had given information on tax law and prepared legal documents pertaining to estates and trusts, had not violated the statute because in
performing such acts they "are acting primarily for themselves in the proper
exercise of their functions as fiduciaries . . . and are not engaged in the
practice of law." Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich.
214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955), perrmitted conveyancing as incidental to a
broker's business. See Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818
(Fla. 1954). LaBrum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d
246 (1948), construing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608 (1930), did not consider the gratuitous preparation of legal papers in question to be the practice
of law. Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883 (1934) held that the
drafting of legal instruments is prohibited only when not connected with
the immediate business of the person preparing them.
"2State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685
(1961), Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 227.014, 256.30 (1957). New Jersey State Bar
Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Ass'n, 32 N.J. 430, 445, 161 A.2d 257, 265
(1960), interpreting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-78 (1953) which forbids
corporations to practice law, said that a corporation can "in pursuance of its
lawful- business activities, insure titles and cause searches and abstracts
to be made . . . ." In this case the title company as mortgagee was allowed
to draw the bond and mortgage provided no charge was made; if the fee
charged for the services is so high as to imply the inclusion of a separate
fee for the legal services it will be held to constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo.
398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957), having considered CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-1-17 (1953) which is similar to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-4 (1958), held
that a licensed real estate broker could, without separate charge, prepare
deeds and related instruments at the request of his customers in connection
with a bona fide real estate transaction. The court in this case while rejecting
the "incident-to-business" theory allowed such corporate activities because it
was the custom for brokers to render such legal services incidental to their
business and, therefore, they were acting in the public interest. Cowern v.
Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 209 N.W. 795 (1940), involved MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 481.02 (1958) prohibiting a corporation to practice law.
" People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919), where defendant
who drew legal instruments was held to have violated N.Y. PENAL LAW § 270
requiring a license to "practice as an attorney at law." People v. People's
Trust Co., 180 App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1917) ; People v. Purdy,
174 App. Div. 694, 162 N.Y. Supp. 70 (1916).
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prevent corporations from performing legal services which can only
properly be done by licensed attorneys, under direct supervision of
the court, whose interest is in their clients rather than the corporation. In later cases,' 4 however, the New York courts held that the
statute did not prohibit an employee of a corporation authorized to
guarantee mortgages from filling in the blanks of a form mortgage
and charging a fee for the service. Considering the public convenience and long-standing practice involved, the court said that
such single occurrences did not constitute the practice of law or
violate the penal code since no legal advice was given, and a layman
could lawfully perform such acts. Subsequent New York decisions 5
apparently overruled these cases by holding a title insurance company which drafted mortgages to have practiced law in violation of
the penal law.
The Texas statute"8 has been strictly construed to hold that
", Wollitzer v. National Title Guar. Co., 148 Misc. 529, 266 N.Y. Supp.
184 (Sup. Ct. 1933), af'd, 241 App. Div. 757, 270 N.Y. Supp. 968 (1934);
People v. Title Guar. Co., 191 App. Div. 165, 181 N.Y. Supp. 52, a'd,230
N.Y. 578, 130 N.E. 901 (1920). The dissent in the appellate division, in
the latter case said that the corporation through its employees went beyond
191 App. Div. at 167,
its chartered powers in advising on legal matters.
181 N.Y. Supp. at 53 (1920) (dissent). In People v. Title Guar. Co., 227
N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919), the court held that although the legislature
has allowed the defendant to search and insure titles, such work being between
the corporation and its employees, the drawing of legal instruments is legal
work which though it relates to insurance of titles affects individuals in
other ways also and, therefore, such legal service should be performed by
lawyers.
" People v. Lawyer's Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 520, 27 N.E.2d 30, 33,
reversing 258 App. Div. 916, 16 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1940), held that "the defendant is not protected by the provisions of section 280, which exempt a
corporation engaged in the examination and insuring of titles to real property. That exemption has no application whatever to services which cannot
be lawfully rendered by a person not admitted to practice law in the state
of New York ....

Nor may the defendant protect itself behind the claim

that the services rendered were necessary to the examination of titles and the
issuance of its policies of insurance." See also Application of N.Y. County
Lawyers' Ass'n, 181 Misc. 632, 43 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1943), in which
a tax and management corporation which gave legal advice to and prepared
legal documents for its subscribers was -held to have engaged in the "illegal
practice of law" even though it told its clients to consult private attorneys.
"' Tax. Rav. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 3 (1959) prohibits all persons who are not members of the bar from practicing law in Texas. Tex.
Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 238, § 62, repealed by Tex. Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 301,
§ 62, prevented any corporation, person, firm or association from practicinglaw. The reason given for the repeal of this statute was that it had no
practical value since the State Bar Act subsequently enacted (Tax. Rav.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1 (1959) prohibits all persons not members of
the bar from practicing law. The present statute gives power to the courts
to define "practice of law" and to protect the public from its practice by
laymen and corporations through civil proceedings.
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corporations who draft any kind of legal instrument are guilty of the
unauthorized practice of law. The Texas court1 7 has consistently
held that in performing these acts corporations were rendering legal
services to others and acting ultra vires.
In answer to the argument that the practice of law by corporations is in the interest of public policy it can be argued that a corporation cannot give legal advice without regard to its own interests.
When an employee of a corporation, whether he is a layman or an
attorney, renders legal services for his corporation and another, the
The North Carolina Supreme
non-corporate party is cheated.'
Court argues that the purpose of G.S. § 84-4, and inferentially G.S.
§ 84-5, is to protect the public rather than the legal profession; but
the question remains as to whether this is the way to protect the
public. There are persuasive opinions saying it is not,"0 for the
public is entitled to a legal representative who has a legal education
and whose first and only loyalty is to his client's interests.
Some courts feel that if a corporation is allowed to prepare legal
documents which are necessary to carry out its business objectives
there is nothing to stop a building constructor, insurance company,
or bank from claiming that because their business requires properly
drafted deeds and other instruments affecting title to property they
should be allowed to prepare them. There is danger in stretching
the "its own business" concept so far that ultimately most of the
out-of-court legal work may be performed by corporations and others
" O'Neal v. Ball, 351 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) held that an
abstract company could not draft a conveyance even through its agents. In
San Antonio Bar Ass'n v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 156 Tex. 7, 291
S.W.2d 697 (1956), an injunction was granted to prohibit a corporation
engaged in selling abstracts and title insurance from employing an attorney
to prepare legal instruments. Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Comm., 272
S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) held that it constituted unauthorized
practice of law for a title company through attorneys to prepare legal
instruments for other persons and corporations in transactions where it had
no interest; Grievance Comm. v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945) held that the drawing of legal instruments by a corporation although
done without compensation constituted illegal "practice of law"; Hexter
Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946

(1944).

S18 Reisler, Fundamentals of Unauthorized Practice of Law for the Law
Student, 26 UNAUTHORIZED PRAcTicE NEws 11 (1960). The non-corporate
party either receives "incompetent and unethical advice" or is "served by
lawyers who are not disinterested, whose real client is not the person advised
but the entrepreneur furnishing the services."
"9Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E.
153 (1937).
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not licensed to practice law. "The law practice would be hawked
about as a leader or premium to be given as an inducenent for busi20
ness transactions."
AccO6rding, to the Pledger case the drafting of. legal instruments
would be warranted by a corporation provided the 1egahl services so
rendered are to its custoners pitrsuanit to tiansactions in which the
corpor4ion has a primary interest.. It is arguable that this practice
is not protective of the public interest2 1 If the legal services involved
require the knowledge judgment, and advic of an attorney, and the
interests of someone other than the corporation are involved, the
corporation should not be permitted under G.S. § 84-5 to render
that service in spite of the fact that its interest may also be involved.
'If the employee 'of -the corporation renders this service he is prirarily serving the interest of the corporation and is selling the legal
service to a customer of the corporation.. It is almost impossible
for him to serve equally both customer aid corporation for he
,cannot be impartial.'
This could result in harm not only to the
legal profession and the lay practitioner" who is liable for his
mistakes, but also t6 the customer who does-not have the advantage
.of an impartial representative who can give advice as to the legal
implications of the 'document drafted.
BONNIE DOUGLASS MENAKER
20

Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 519,

179 S.W.2d 946, 953 (1944).
" In Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 817, 273 P.2d 619, 625 (Dist.
-Ct. App. 1954) the court said that "any rule which holds that a layman
'Who prepares legal papers . . . is not practicing law when such services
are incidental to another business ... completely ignores the public welfare."

See also State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d
1 (1961).
.

. "In addition it requires no extensive citation of authority to prove that
even so simple inact as filling in the blanks of a form deed is fraught with
pitfalls for the inexpert. The reports abound with examples of defective
deeds, sometimes fatally so, resulting from carelessness, ignorance or both.
The lay practitioner may prepare many" hundreds- of perfect instruments,
but this is small consolation to the unhappy client who, at .best, is subjected
to an expensive lawsuit to. perfect his title or, at worst, loses his land, due to
,an "honest mistake." True, the same might have happened had he had
competent legal advice, but the chances are far less.
"Pelletier, Unauthorized Practice of Law by Real Estate Brokers and
Title Insurance Coinpanies, 27 UNAUTHORIZED PRAcTicE NEWS 217 (1961).
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Automobile Insurance-Permissive User Under the Omnibus Clause
In Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America' the plaintiffs
sought to fix liability upon defendant insurance company under the
"omnibus clause" 2 of an automobile liability insurance policy issued
by defendant to a corporation. One plaintiff suffered personal injuries and the other plaintiff's property was damaged when a vehicle
owned by the latter collided with a truck owned by the corporation
and driven by its employee. The employee, who had been given
permission to use the vehicle to drive to and from work, and to keep
it overnight at his home, was using it at the time of the accident on
an entirely personal mission after returning home from work. Plaintiffs had recovered judgments against the employee which were unsatisfied at the time the present action was instituted. The insurer
denied liability under the omnibus clause on the theory that the
"actual use" of the vehicle at the time of the accident was outside the
scope of the permission granted.
On appeal by defendant from an adverse judgment, the court
held that plaintiffs' evidence3 made a prima facie showing of express
permission4 for the use being made of the vehicle at the time of the
accident. However, an instruction by the trial court which assumed,
as a matter of law, that the initial permission to use the truck was
comprehensive and unlimited if specific uses were not expressly prohibited was held erroneous in that it failed to place upon plaintiffs
the burden of showing, as an affirmative matter, the nature and
extent of the permission granted. The court found that the instruc1257 N.C. 381, 126 S.E.2d 161 (1962).
2
The policy definition of "insured" contained a clause which included
as insured any person while using the vehicle, provided the actual iuse was
with the permission of the named insured. Similar omnibus clauses are now
contained in all standard automobile liability insurance policies. See Austin,
Permissive User Under the Omnibus Clause of the Automobile Liability
Policy, 29 INs. COUNSEL J. 49 (1962).
'The court held that evidence that the employee had been instructed
only that he was not to "do too much running around with it at night"
permitted the conclusion that non-excessive use at night was authorized. The
court also held that the mere, fact that the employee was carrying riders
at the time in disobedience of instructions would not nullify such permission. This is in accord with the general rule. See, e.g., Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co. v. Collins, 96 F.2d 83 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 627
(1938).
' It is universally held that permission under the omnibus clause may be
either express or implied. 257 N.C. at 384, 126 S.E.2d at 164.
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tion, in effect, was based on the liberal, "initial permission" rule5 of
construction, 6 and held that neither the omnibus clause required by
the applicable Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act of 1957,'
nor the similar clause written into the policy in question,' justified the
application of this rule.'
The main difference in the construction given an omnibus clause
in other jurisdictions seems to be in "whether the permission is
confined to the time when the accident occurs or whether it is defined
as permission 'in the first instance.' "1 Under the conventional
analysis," however, the decisions are divided into three groups.
'Under this rule, the person using the vehicle is insured if he has permission in the first instance, and any use while it remains in his possession is
"with permission" even though that use is for a: purpose not contemplated
by the named insured when he parted with possession. See 257.N.C. at
385, 126 S.E.2d at 165.
'In a dictum the court stated that the instruction "is not improper"
under the liberal rule, since most courts following this rule do not allow
recovery when the personal use by the employee was specifically prohibited. However, the cases relied upon for this conclusion, Waits v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 33 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 1947) and
cases therein cited, either did not apply the liberal rule, or held that there
was no initial permission for the use. The Waits case itself was reversed
by Waits v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 215 La. 349, 40 So. 2d
746 (1949). No decisions have been found denying recovery on such
grounds while applying the liberal rule. This is to be expected since the
very rationale of the liberal rule has been said to be that public policy will
not allow the defense that the permittee went beyond the scope of his permission. See Arnold v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 158 F. Supp. 1
(S.D. Ind.), aff'd, 260 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1958). But see Hubbard v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 192 Tenn. 210, 240 S.W.2d 245 (1951). Thus the
lower court's instruction seems to be a confusing combination of the liberal
and moderate rules.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1961). G.S. § 20-314 incorporates by reference the omnibus clause required by the Motor Vehicle SafetyResponsibility Act of 1953, codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2)
(Supp. 1961) ; this section provides that the policy shall insure "the person
named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle ...

with the express or implied permission of such named insured...."

8 See note 2 supra.
oThe court had not previously adopted a specific rule of construction. In
several cases, specific exclusion clauses were given effect to bar recovery.
See, e.g., Johnston v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 200 N.C. 763, 158 S.E. 473
(1931); Holton v. Eagle Indem. Co., 196 N.C. 348, 145 S.E. 679 (1928).
Recovery has also been denied on various other'grounds. See, e.g., Miller v.
New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 245 N.C. 526, 96 S.E.2d 860 (1957) (vehicle
involved not covered by policy).
'0 Hodges v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 66 Ga. App. 431, 435, 18 S.E.2d
28, 31, cert. denied, 316 U.S. 693 (1942). See generally Ashlock, Automobile
Liability Insurance: The Omnibus Clause, 46 IowA L. REv. 84 (1960), in
which many cases are classified on the basis of this "two rule" analysis.
11See generally 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTIcE, §§ 4366372 (1962) [hereinafter cited as APPLEMAN]; Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d'600 (1949).
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(1) Under the strict or "conversion" rule,1" any deviation from the
time, place, or purpose specified by the person granting permission
is sufficient to take the permittee outside the coverage of the omnibus
clause. (2) Under the moderate or "minor deviation" rule, 13 a
material deviation from the permission granted constitutes a use
without permission, but a slight deviation is not sufficient to exclude
the permittee from coverage. (3) Under the liberal or "initial permission" rule, 4 if the permittee has permission to use the automobile
in the first instance, any subsequent use while it remains in his
possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the bailment, is a permissive use within the terms of the
clause.
Such a superficial analysis of the cases, however, tends to overloolk the often critical effect of local statutes upon the construction
given an omnibus clause by the courts. Since the clause indirectly
extends protection to members of the public injured by the negligent
operation of motor vehicles, the courts often give great weight to
considerations of public policy suggested by legislation requiring
automobile liability insurance of certain vehicle owners or operators.
In a particular case, the traditional rules of construction of insurance
policies must be balanced against these considerations of public
policy.15
A few states require all

6

or some' 7 automobile liability policies

to contain a statutory omnibus clause. In most jurisdictions, however, the parties are generally free to include an omnibus clause of
their choice and to make it as broad or narrow in scope as they
12 See, e.g., Gray v. Sawatzki, 291. Mich. 491, 289 N.W. 227 (1939);
Cypert v. Roberts, 169 Wash. 33, 13 P.2d 55 (1932).
a See, e.g., Dickinson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 101 Conn. 369, 125 Ad.
866 (1924); Lloyds America v. Tinkelpaugh, 184 Okla. 413, 88 P.2d 356
(1939).
1' See, e.g., Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191 (1938); Matits v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 33 NJ. 488, 166 A.2d 345 (1960); Stovall v.
New York Indem. Co., 157 Tenn. 301, 8 S.W.2d 473 (1928). For an excellent discussion of the problems raised by the Matits case see Cohen &
Cohen, Automobile Liability Insurance: Public Policy and the Oimnibus
Clause in New Jersey. 15 RUTGERs L. REv. 155 (1961).
15 See generally 7 AP.PLEMAN § 4343 and Ashlock, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 86-90, for cases applying statutory provisions.
" See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4309 (1953).
" See, e.g,, IowA CODE ANN. § 321A.21 (2) (b) (Supp. 1962); N.C. GEN.
These are typical of statutes reSTAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2) (Supp. 1961).
quiring an omnibus clause only in those policies furnished as proof of
financial security following accidents, etc.
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wish."8 Thus it is not surprising to find that a majority of courts1 9
have held that the parties had no intent to adopt the "hell and high
water""0 liberal rule. However, in the comparatively few instances
where, as in the principal case, statutes require that a particular
omnibus clause be included in the policy, most courts have taken
the view that the clause should be liberally construed in favor of the
injured plaintiff.2
Although North Carolina has required various statutory omnibus
clauses since 1931,' no cases have been found in which the court has
attempted to construe one of these clauses. In Hooper v. Maryland
Cas. Co.,2 3 the only case in -this jurisdiction in which an omnibus
clause had to be interpreted, the statutory clause was apparently not
applicable and was not mentioned in the opinion. The court in that
case expressly declined to adopt any one of the rules of construction,
but its decision seems to follow the pattern of the strict or moderate
rule jurisdictions. 4
In recent years, several statutes 25 designed to increase the probability that innocent traffic victims will receive compensation have
18 See, e.g., McCann v. Continental Cas. Co., 8 Ill. 2d 476, 134 N.E.2d
302 (1956) (covered only named insured and relatives in his household).
"sSee, e.g., Hodges v. Ocean Acc. & Guai. Co., 66 Ga. App. 431, 18

S.E.2d 28, cert. denied, 316 U.S. 693 (1942); Gulla v. Reynolds, 151 Ohio
St. 147, 85 N.E.2d 116 (1949).

"0The "hell and high water" appellation, with its inflammatory connotations, is often used by courts which, like the court in the principal case, wish

to reject the liberal rule. It was probably originated by Appleman, a sharp
critic of the rule. See 7 APPLEMAN § 4366, at 308.
"See, e.g., O'Roak v. Lloyds Cas. Co., 285 Mass. 532, 189 N.E. 571
(1934).
" N.C. SEss. LAWS 1931, ch. 116, § 12(2) provided that piolicies issued
thereunder "shall insure the insured named therein and any other person
using . . . any such motor vehicle with the consent, express or implied, of
such insured . . .

'233 N.C. 154, 63 S.E.2d 128 (1951).
"By affirming a non-suit against the plaintiff on the grounds that
he had not shown that the permission given the employee to use his employer's truck to drive to and from work extended to use for other personal
purposes, it seems that the decision applied the "scope of permission" test
of the strict or moderate rule. Since this decision there have been several
decisions by federal courts applying North Carolina law which seem to
follow the strict or moderate rule. See, e.g., Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
265 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1959).
25See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-71.1 (Supp. 1961) (presumption that
operator is agent of owner); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -.39 (Supp.
1961) (broader financial responsibility law); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-280
(1953) (taxicab operators must prove financial responsibility); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 20-281 to -284 (Supp. 1961) (vehicle lessors and renters must
obtain insurance); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-194.1 (Supp. 1960) (requiring
insurance for state-owned vehicles)-.
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been enacted in this state. Among these is the Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Act of 1957.26 With the enactment of this
statute North Carolina became the third state2 to require proof
of financial responsibility as a condition precedent to the registration
of motor vehicles. This act provided that automobile liability policies
presented as proof must contain the statutory omnibus clause. If
such a clause is not inserted, it will be read into the policy by the
court.2" In view of these recent expressions of a legislative intent
to reduce the number of uncompensated automobile accident victims,
it could have been predicted with some degree of confidence that
the court would, given a proper case, adopt the liberal rule in construing the statutory omnibus clause in a policy issued in compliance
with the 1957 act. With only the relatively weak precedent of the
Hooper case to overcome, the court could have pointed out the
obvious advantages offered by the liberal rule in effectuating the
legislative policy. 9
Perhaps this result would have been reached in the principal
case30 had the court not determined, by a rather strained interpretation of the statutory omnibus clause, that the legislative intent was
to require no more "radical" coverage than that expressed by the
moderate rule. The court pointed out that the omnibus clause in
the superseded Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibility Act of
1947"' was broad enough to embrace the liberal rule in that it
required coverage' of anyone "in lawful possession" of the vehicle.
§§ 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1961).
Massachusetts enacted
the first such legislation in 1925. See MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34A-34J (1959), as amended, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
90, §§ 34A-34K (Supp. 1961); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, §§ 113A-113J
(1959), as amended, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, §§ 113A, 113D (Supp.
1961). New York enacted a similar law in 1956. See N.Y. VEI rCLE AND
TRAFFIc LAW §§ 310-321.
=' N.C. GEN. STAT.
27

"8Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d, 482
-(1960).
"1Cf. Matits v. Natiofiwide Mut. Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 488, 166 A.2d 345
(1960), by which New Jdrsey became the latest state to adopt the liberal
rule. The rule was chosen in this case because of its advantages in carrying
out the legislative policy incfkated by the trend toward stronger financial
'responsibility legislation.
" The eourt in the Hawley case noted that due to the widespread enactmenit of financial responsibility and compulsory insurance laws, there was a
decided
t-end in the courts toward liberal c6rnstruction of omnibus clauses.
1 3 -N.C.
SEss. LAws 1947; ch. 1006, §§ 1-59. Section 4(2) (b) of this
act. provided that every 'owner's l ficy shall insure "the person named,
4nd any other:person using_ . . the motor vehicle with the permission, 'expressed or implied, of 'the, named insured,'-or any other person in lawful
"ossesson.l..'

(Emphasis added.)

'
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Since the phrase "or any other person in lawful possession" was
deleted from the omnibus clause required by the Motor Vehicle
Safety-Responsibility Act of 1953,32 the court reasoned that this
indicated an intention on the part of the legislature to reject the
liberal rule.33 This argument, however, overlooks the more likely
explanation that the legislature was simply acting to bring our
financial responsibility law back into line with the uniform legislation
other jurisdictions.3 4 Indeed, if the true intent was to
enacted in.
preclude the adoption of the liberal rule by our court, it is highly
unlikely that the legislature would have utilized the very language
often construed in other jurisdictions as expressing the liberal rule.
In any event, before attributing an intent to the legislature to so
restrict the coverage of a policy required by such a remedial statute,
the court should have required more cogent evidence. 35
The court could have found more persuasive evidence of the
intended meaning of the current statutory omnibus clause by examining the background of the 1957 act. This act was copied with
slight modification from the comparable statute enacted in New York
s See note 7 supra.

"The court apparently overlooks the possibility that the phrase "or any
other person in lawful possession" might be construed as providing coverage
in situations where even the liberal rule courts would refuse to find the
insurer liable. Such a situation might be one in which the owner had bailed
the vehicle for storage and the bailee did not have even an implied initial
permission to use the vehicle on the highway. The deletion of the phrase,
to eliminate the possibility'of such a construction, would be consistent with
an intention to limit coverage to that provided by the liberal rule.
"The first motor vehicle financial responsibility legislation in North
Carolina, enacted in 1931, was based upon the model Safety-Responsibility
Act developed by the American Automobile Association in 1928. See 9
N.C.L. REv. 384 (1931). The model act was later incorporated into the
Uniform Vehicle Code as the Uniform Motor-Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Act (1934). Section 23(a)(3) of this act provided that the policy "shall
insure the person named therein and any other person using . . . said motor
vehicle . . -. with the express or implied permission of the said insured."

This omnibus clause was essentially the same as that required by the 1931
North Carolina legislation. See note 22 supra. The 1947 act departed
from the uniform act in many ways, including the addition to the omnibus
lause of the phrase "or any other person in lawful possession." See note
31 supra. The 1953 act, however, is modeled after the uniform legislation,
and the 1953 omnibus clause construed by the court in the principal case is
identical to that required-by the revised UNIFORM MOTOR-VEHICLE SAFETY
REsPONSIBm-ITY' Act § 21 (b)2 -(1952).
" After construing the statutory clause the court held that the provision
in 'the policy that the "actual use" must be. with permission indicated the
intention of the parties to limit the coverage to use within the scope of 'the
permission granted.- A 'majority of -the courts applying the mciderate rule
have interpreted this type of omnibus clause in the same manner. Seec ses
"
; -- '"-cifed in 7 APPLEMAIx §4354; a ii-.58.
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in 1956.8" The New York legislation was, in -turn, a broader
version of the 1925 Massachusetts compulsory insurance statute. 7
The wording of the omnibus clause required in North Carolina" in
the compulsory policy is quite similar to the earlier Massachusetts
act. 9 Since the New York courts had apparently not construed the
comparable omnibus clause required by its new act before the North
Carolina statute was enacted; well-known principles of statutory construction4 ° would suggest that our court should have examined the
construction given the Massachusetts clause by the courts of that
state. Such an examination would have -revealed that the Massachusetts court applies the liberal rule wheni construing the compulsory
omnibus clause." However, where there is inserted in the policy in
addition to the compulsory clause a voluntary clause, similar to that
relied on by the insurer in the principal case, the court applies the
strict rule to the extent that the policy coverage is greater than the
statutory amount.42
In selecting the liberal rule to construe the statutory omnibus
clause, the Massachusetts court reasoned in ohe case 43 that:
The full benefit of the compulsory security and of the provision
precluding avoidance by default of the owner will be lost, if
violations of rules of conduct laid down by an owner to be
observed by such as he permits to use his motor vehicle upon
86 See Faizan v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 47, 118 S.E.2d 303
(1961).

New York decisions were utilized in this case as an aid in con-

struing the North Carolina statute.

rT See Netherton & Nabhani, The New York Motor Vehicle Financial
Security Act of 1956, 5 Am. U.L. REv. 37 (1956), in which a detailed comparison
of the New York and Massachusetts laws is made.
8 See statutes cited note 7 supra.
(1959) requires that the policy
89 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § 113A(1)
provide coverage for "any other person . . . while legally using . . . such
motor vehicle . . . provided that such use is with the permission of the
named assured."
"°A statute adopted from another state will be presumed to have been
adopted with the construction placed on it by the courts of that state before
its adoption. Such construction will generally be followed if sound and
reasonable and in harmony with justice and public policy, and with other laws
of the adopting- jurisdiction, on the subject. Where courts of the foreign
state have not construed the law, decisions of the courts of the state from
which the statute was originally adopted will be considered. See generally
82 C.J.S Statutes § 372 (1953).
" See, e.g., Blair v.. Travelers Ins. Co., 288 Mass. 285, 192 N.E. 467

(1934).
1 'See, e.g., Blair v. Travelers Ins. Co., 291 Mass. 432, 197 N.E. 60
(1935).
"Guzenfield v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 286 Mass. 133, 190 N.E. 23 (1934),
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our ways are held to defeat an injured person's enforcement
of the policy by destroying the owner's consent to the use. 4
A recent North Carolina case45 followed the reasoning of the Massachusetts court as to the provision precluding avoidance by default
by the owner. In the North Carolina case, the insurer pleaded
certain policy violations by the insured after the accident is a
defense to a suit on a compulsory policy, contending that the nonforfeiture provisions of the 1953 act did not apply to a policy issued
under the 1957 act. In disallowing this defense, the court held that,
as to the compulsory coverage provided by a motor vehicle liability
policy, no violation of the policy would defeat or avoid said policy
"T6bar -recovery because of such a violation, the court argued, would
"practically nullify the statute by making the enforcement of the
rights of the person intended to be protected dependent upon the
acts of the very person who caused the injury."4 6 However, as to
coverage in excess of or in addition to the coverage specified, such
violation would constitute a valid and complete defense. Thus,
the Massachusetts solution 'to the problem of coverage under the
omnibus clause would seem to be in harmony with the view our
court has taken as to the effect of the' non-forfeiture provision of
the statute. The Massachusetts rule of construction is designed to
do justice both to the contracting parties and to the public. It
should have been adopted by the North Carolina court as being in
accordance with the public policy of this state.
The effect of the Hawley decision will undoubtedly be to render
coverage uncertain in many cases, foster litigation as to the existence
or extent of any alleged deviation, and ultimately to inhibit the
achievement of the legislative goal of broader coverage. Because this
decision seems to be in sharp conflict with the policy underlying the
1957 act, the legislature should seriously consider amending the act
to express its intent in this matter more clearly.
GEORGE

M.

BEASLEY,

III

" Id. at 136, 190 N.E. at 24.
" Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482
(1960).
" Id. at 126, 116 S.E.2d at 487. .In Lane v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 258 N.C.
319, 128 S.E.2d 398 (1962), the court extended Swain and held that the
non-forfeiture provisions of the act apply even to assigned risk policies.
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Compromise and Settlement-Release--Insurance-Liability
Carrier's Settlement as a Bar to InsuredPs Suit

In a recent Georgia decision the insured was involved in an
automobile collision with a motor vehicle owned by the Garden
Lakes Company and driven by Spector. The insurer entered into a
settlement agreement with Garden Lakes and Spector, paying them a
sum of money in consideration for a general release executed by them,
releasing the insured from all consequences of the collision. The
settlement was made without the insured's knowledge or consent,
under a provision of the policy providing that "the company may
make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient." Thereafter the insured brought an action for
damages against Garden Lakes and Spector. The defendants pleaded
the release as a defense. The trial court held this defense untenable
since the insured had neither acquiesced in nor ratified the release.
The defendant, Garden Lakes, then amended its answer to set up
a counterclaim against the insured.
The insurer, being obligated to pay any judgment rendered on
the counterclaim against the insured, sought to plead the release as
a defense to the counterclaim. The insured contended that to allow
the insurer to plead the release would defeat her claim against
Spector and Garden Lakes. The insurer brought the present action
seeking a declaratory judgment of its rights, naming Spector,
Garden Lakes, and the insured as defendants. The Court of Appeals
of Georgia held that the insured could prevent the insurer from
pleading the release, and that the release was void when repudiated
by the insured.
A release for money payment may take either of two forms. It
may provide either that the payee releases the payor, or that each
releases the other. 2 Generally it is held that the legal 'effect of either
form is the same. Although the former provides only that the payee
releases the payor, it is generally held that it will bar the payor's
claims as well.' In reaching this result, it is reasoned that the parties
' Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Brooks, 106 -Ga. App. 427, 127 S.E.2d. 183
(19.62)..
C
R.
8(5
2See 38 N.C.L. R~v. 81,* 83 (1959)'
' Giles v. Smith, 80 .Ga. App. 540, 56 S.E.2d 860 (1949); Brown v.
_Hughes, 251 Iowa 44.4,,99 N.W,2d 305 (1960); Graves Truck Line, Inc. v.
Home'Oil Co., 180"Karn. 594, 305 P.2d 1053 (1957); Cannon v. Parker, 249
N.C. 279, 106 S.E.2d 229"(I958)'; Traveler's Indem. Co. v. Home'Mut. Ins.

1963]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

made a complete settlement of all their claims, and that the payor
admitted his liability by making payment to the releasor.4 This
result has been reached even where the release contained an express
5
provision that it was not to be considered an admission of liability.
A few courts, however, hold that a release does not bar the
payor's claims unless it so provides by its terms. Reasons given for
this view are (1) that it is difficult to construe the language to be
an admission of liability by the payor,6 and (2) that the payor should
be able to "buy his peace" without defeating his own cause of
action.1
It is suggested that the preferred rule would be to make the
release prima facie evidence of the parties' intention to make a final
settlement of all claims arising out of the accident. 8 If it could be
shown that the payee knew or should have known 9 of the payor's
intention to maintain a suit against him, the presumption would be
overcome. Since it would seem that in most instances the parties
intend a release to be a final settlement of all the claims of both
Co., 15 Wis. 2d 137, 111 N.W.2d 751 (1961); cf. Mensing v. Sturgeon, 250
Iowa 918, 97 N.W.2d 145 (1959); England v. Yellow Transit Co., 240
Mo. App. 968, 225 S.W.2d 366 (1949); Kelleher v. Lozzi, 7 N.J. 17, 80
A.2d 196 (1951); Heinemann Creameries, Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co.,
270 Wis. 443, 71 N.W.2d 395, rehearing denied, 72 N.W.2d 102 (1955).
Contra, Schledewitz v. Consumers Oil Co-op., Inc., 144 Colo. 518, 357 P.2d
63 (1960) ; Ruf v. Wittenberg, 13 Pa. D.&C.2d 672 (1957) ; cf. Crawford v.
McLeod, 64 Ala. 240 (1879); Baldwin v. New York Central & H.R.R.R., 2
N.Y. Supp. 481, 56 N.Y. Super. Ct. 607, aff'd 121 N.Y. 684, 24 N.E. 1098
(1888); Penn Dixie Lines, Inc. v. Grannick, 238 N.C. 552, 78 S.E.2d 410
(1953); Wade v. Southern Ry., 89 S.C. 280, 71 S.E. 859 (1911).
'See, e.g., Giles v. Smith, supra note 3; Cannon v. Parker, supra note 3;
cf. Heinemann Creameries, Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., supra note
3.
5
Brown v. Hughes, 251 Iowa 444, 99 N.W.2d 305 (1960) ; Graves Truck
Line, Inc. v. Home Oil Co., 180 Kan. 594, 305 P.2d- 1053 (1957); cf. Mensing
v. Sturgeon, 250 Iowa 918, 97 N.W.2d 145 (1959); Heinemann Creameries,
Inc. v.Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 270 Wis. 443, 71 N.W.2d 395 (1955). As
stated in Giles v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 540, 543, 56 S.E.2d 860, 862 (1949),
"it ivould be anomalous indeed'for the plaintiffs, to -pay Jackson the $275

and then sue'him to recover the very money they had paid him."
' See Schledewitz v. Consumers Oil Co-op., Inc.,' 144 Colo. 518, 357
P.2d 63 (1960).
I See 1956 Wis. L. REV. 305; cf. Crawford v. McLeod, 64 Ala. 240
'(1879); Wade v. Southern Ry., 89 S.C. 280, 71 S.E. 859 (1911).
SThis was the rule used in Kelleher v. Lozti, 7 N.J. 17, 80 A.2d 196
(1951). See Brown v. Hughes, 251 Iowa 444, 99 N.W.2d 305 (1960); Cannon v..Parkef, '249 N.C. 279,. 106 S.E.2d 229 (1958).
'What an "ordinarily reasonable and reasoning man" in the place'of
the' releasor' af- the "tinie of the execution of the reledse would 'take the
settlement to mean was the mehsure for the objective testused in Mensiig
v. Sturgeon, 250 Iowa 918, 930, 97 N.W.2d 145,151 (.959). .
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parties,' 0 such a rule would have the desired result of effectuating the
intent of the parties. Although injustice might occasionally result
from the application of 'such a rule, due to the difficulty of proving
what the parties actually intended, such a result would seem less likely
than under alternative rules. To hold a release to be a final settlement
between the parties as a matter of law-as appears to be the rule in
the principal case"---would deny the parties the right to give effect
to a contrary intention, even though they might be able to prove it.
On the other hand, to hold that a release gives rise to either a conclusive or a rebuttable presumption that the parties did not intend to
bar the payor from bringing later claims would be to ignore the
findings of the great majority of courts that the release was intended
as a final settlement. A third alternative, that it be left to the court or
jury to decide what the parties intended by the release in a given
situation, would leave the law uncertain as to the effect of a release
and would do nothing to solve the problem in the absence of any evidence as to the intention of the parties.
It is a well-settled rule in Georgia 2 and the United States' 8 that
an insurer cannot bind its insured by settling without his knowledge
and consent. Where such settlement is made, however, and the insured brings suit against the releasor, who in turn counterclaims,
it has been the subject of speculation whether the release could be
4
used as a defense to the counterclaim. A recent law review note1
suggested that since the releasor had received all to which he was
legally entitled under the circumstances, it would seem bound to forego suing the insured. Consequently, the insured should be able to
'oThis statement is made on the assumption that a majority of the courts
which have considered the question have correctly decided that the parties
intended the release to be a complete settlement of all claims. See, e.g., Giles
v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 540, 56 S.E.2d 860 (1949).
1 The concurring opinion suggests a different interpretation of the release
if the defendant knew that the insurer was not representing the insured in
making the settlement, and suggests that this was a factual issue which
should be determined before the effect of the release was decided. However,
the majority decided the effect of the release without any determination of
the actual intent of the parties. From this it may be inferred that the
court held the effect of the release to be the same, no matter what the intent
of the parties.
12 See Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500,
196 S.E. 279 (1938).
(1952);
1" See, e.g., Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark 448, 248 S.W.2d 362
897 (1959).
S.E.2d
110
214,
251
N.C.
v.
Brown,
Campbell
" Note, 38 N.C.L. REv. 81 (1959).
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defeat the releasor's counterclaim by setting up the release as a
counterclaim.

.

",

Since the writing of that note, however, two cases have-been
litigated where an insured set up -a release in defense of the releasor's
counterclaim. Neither case was decided on the grounds suggested.
In Faught v. Washam'5 the Supreme Court of Missouri recognized the rule that ordinarily a release is ratified by one pleading it.
However, the court reasoned that the, general rule would not apply
so-as to bind the insured in this case because the release was pleaded
.for the benefit of the insurer and not the insured.'
In Cochran v. Bell' 7 the insured's attorney -elicited from the
releasor on cross-examination the fact that-he had signed a release
of all claims against the insured. This release was made the basis of
a motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The. Court of- Appeals -of
Georgia stated that the insured had relied on the release to obtain a
legal advantage for herself and that this constituted ratification "as
effectively as.though the release had been pleaded in the plaintiffinsured's petition.""'
The principal case extended the holding of Cochran to the situation where the insurer pleads the release in defense to the counterclaim. In such a -case, the court reasoned that the insured would be
This result would have
barred in the action against the releasor.'
15329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959).

"The court pointed out that the insurer was obligated under the policy
to pay any damages against the insured, resulting from the counterclaim,
since the damages sought were less than the limit of the insurer's liability
under the policy. Consequently, according to the court, the insured had no
for
financial interest in pleading. the release in defense but was pleading it'
the sole benefit of the insurer who, under Missouri practice and procedure;
could not be joined as.a party to the action.
It would seem, however; that it would be to a plaintiff's benefit to defeat
the defendant's counterclaim to his complaint. The fact that he had a collateral contract with a third party providing that the third party would pay
any judgments against him should have no bearing on the action between
the plaintiff and the defendant. In that respect the defense would benefit
the plaintiff-insured, even though the insurance contract would prevent
it from benefiting him monetarily.
17 102 Ga. App. 617, 117 S.E.2d 645 (1960).
16Id. at 619, 117 S.E.2d at 646.
'.
In a concurring opinion it was suggested that the effect of the release
being used as a defense should depend upon whether or not the releasor knew
that the insurer was acting without authority in making the settlement. If
the releasor had such knowledge,, he would be presumed to know that the
insurer could not defeat any claim that the insured might have against the
releasor. On the other hand, if he assumed the insurer to be acting as an
agent of the insured, the releasor would have thought that the insured
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allowed the insurer to defeat the insured's action for substantial
damages by settling even a small claim against the insured arising out
of the same cause of action. Thus the court held that the insured
could prevent the insurer from pleading the release as a defense.
The principal case-would seem to deny the insurer the right of
settlement and the right to control litigation-rights which were
given to it by the policy. However, since the insurer is chargeable
with knowledge that an insurer cannot bind its insured by making
settlement without his knowledge and consent,2" it should know that
the effect of the provisions in the contract would not give it those
rights.- If it wanted a final settlement of the claim against its insured, the insurer would be forced to get the insured's permission. 2
When compared to the alternatives,22 it would seem that the court
made the preferred choice.
CowLEs LIIPFERT

Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual PunishmentCriminality of a Status
The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The origin of
this provision of the Bill of Rights can be traced to the Magna
would be bound by the settlement. When he learned otherwise, the
releasor could repudiate the settlement by returning the consideration to the

insurer. To so hold would qualify the holding of Cochran and lend support
to the contention of the law review note where the releasor executed the
release for money consideration only. In such a case, ratification by the
insured should not release him, since the release was not part of the settlement..
The concurring judge probably assumed that by making a settlement
with the releasor, the insured impliedly held itself out to be an agent of the
insured. But see Note, 38 N.C.L. REV. 81, 83 (1959), where it was suggested that the releasor would be chargeable with knowledge that an insurer
cannot bind the insured without his consent and, therefore, could not be misled
by the insurer's making the settlement.
20 See Parham v. Robins, 197 Ga. 386, 29 S.E.2d 608 (1944).
" Unless a release is held to be conclusive evidence of the intent to settle
all claims of both parties arising from the same cause of action, the insurer
could also make a final settlement of the claim against the insured by first
notifying the releasor that it was not an agent of the insured. Of course
the insurer could still get authority from the insured to make such settlement.
" Other alternatives would be to allow: (1) a release to bar only the
claims of the releasor; (2) an insurer to bind its insured by settling without
his knowledge and consent; (3) the insurer to plead the release without
it being considered a ratification by the insured.
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Carta' and the English Declaration of Rights of 1688.2- It was
adopted in 1791 as an admonition to all departments of the national
government against such violent proceedings as had taken place in
England during the reign of the Stuarts.' Most states have also
adopted constitutional provisions which in some form prohibit cruel
and unusual punishments.4
5 the Supreme
In a recent decision, Robinson v. California,
Court took a new approach to the eighth amendment. The petitioner
was convicted under a California statute6 which makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment, for any person to "be addicted to the use of narcotics." In sustaining the petitioner's conviction, the California court construed the statute as making the
"status" of narcotic addiction a criminal offense.' The California
' See ch. 14 of the Magna Carta, printed as confirmed by King Edward
I in 1297, 4 HALSBURY, STATUTES OF ENGLAND 24 (2d ed. 1948). "A freeman shall not be amerced for a small fault; but after the manner of the
fault, and for a great fault, after the greatness thereof; saving to him his
contenement; and a merchant likewise, saving to him his merchandise; and
any other's villain than ours shall likewise be amerced, saving his wainage."
1 W. & M., c. 2, § I, 10. "Excessive bail ought not to be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
'2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
610 (2d ed. 1851).
'The constitutions of 48 states have express prohibitions of excessive
punishment. Wording of the provisions varies from "cruel" to "cruel or
unusual" and "cruel and unusual," while constitutions of a few states only
provide that all punishments shall be proportioned to the offense. Connecticut and Vermont have no constitutional prohibition against cruel punishment, but Connecticut provides against excessive fines, CONN. CONsT. art. 1,
§ 13, and CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-20 (1958) makes cruel and unusual punishment a crime. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 271 (1950) provides that the common law of England, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, applies.
See State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 Atl. 98 (1933).
-370 U.S. 660 (1962).
' CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721: "No person shall use, or be
under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics, excepting when
administered by or under the direction of a person licensed by the State
to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be the burden of the defense
to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of
violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one
year in the county jail. The court may place a person convicted hereunder
on probation for a period not to exceed five years and shall in all cases in
which probation is granted require as a condition thereof that such person
be confined in the county jail for at least 90 days. In no event does the
court have the power to absolve a person who violates this section from
the obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county
jail."
7
People v. Robinson, Super. Ct. No. CR A-4425, App. Dep't Super. Ct.
of Los Angeles, March 31, 1961. The opinion was unreported, but may be
found in Record, p. 102, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Due
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court further held that the offender may be prosecuted even though
he has never used or possessed any narcotics within the state. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that narcotics
addiction is a sickness and that to make a sickness a crime is to
inflict a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the fourteenth
amendment.
It has been.consistently held that the first eight amendments
restrict only the federal government and do not apply to the governments of the individual states.8 However, the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment protects many rights from state infringement which are similarly- protected from federal encroachment by
the first eight amendments. - The test of whether any right is included within the protection of the due process clause is whether
that right is "inherent in the fundamental principles of justice and
liberty which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions." 10
In the Robinson case the Supreme Court for the first time definitely
stated that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment proscribes cruel, and unusual punishment, although it had strongly indicated such in an earlier case," and several lower courts had so
2
stated.
Mr. Justice McKenna's observation that "a principle to be vital
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth,"'- has certainly been followed by the courts in applying the
cruel and unusual punishments provision. No longer is this prohibition limited to the physical brutality and torturous punishment contemplated by its framers. A review of the cases which have dealt
with this clause will illustrate how the meaning of cruel and unusual
to California procedure, after affirmance by the appellate department of the
California superior court, no further review in the.state courts was available,
and the case was brought to the Supreme Court on direct appeal.
. 'E.g., Bartkus v. fllinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Collins v. Johnston, 237
U.S. .502 (1915); Ohio v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445 (1904); McElvaine v.
Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
Cf. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
" E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932), quoting from Herbert
v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
"1Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
' Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943, 951-52 (S.D. Cal.
1950), revd on other grounds sub norn. Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d
308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 862 (1951); Johnson v. Dye, 175
F.2d.250, 256 (3rd Cir.), revd per curiam on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864

(1949).
'

Weems v, United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
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punishment has been expanded as society's concepts of decency and
humanity have changed.
The first significant consideration of cruel and unusual punishment by the Supreme Court was in an 1878 case from the Territory
of Utah. 4 The defendant was convicted of first degree murder
and sentenced to be shot. A territorial statute provided that every
person guilty of murder should suffer death, but did not state the
mode of execution. Since the territory derived its authority from
the federal government, it was therefore subject to the limitations
of the eighth amendment. It was held that death by shooting was
not a cruel and unusual punishment, as it involved no terror 5 and was
regularly imposed under the Articles of War.' 6 The Court stated
that even though it could not formulate an exact definition of cruel
and unusual punishment, it was axiomatic that torture and unneces1
sary cruelty were forbidden by the eighth amendment. 7
The next important decision was In re Kemmler, 8 in which
the petitioner had been sentenced to death pursuant to a state statute
"by then and there causing to pass through the body of him . . .a
current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death."' 9 It
was contended that electrocution violated the eighth amendment
and the due process and privileges and immunities guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
repeating the principle that the first eight amendments restricted
only the federal government. However, the Court indicated that
electrocution would violate no constitutional right if used by the
federal government, stating that punishments are cruel "only when
they involve torture or lingering death."2
The eighth amendment
"implies ...something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life."'"
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
Such as the common-law punishments of dragging to the place of execution for treason, emboweling alive, beheading and quartering for high treason,
public dissection for murder, and burning alive for treason by a female. Id.
at 135.
1 The articles did not prescribe the method of inflicting death, but custom
had determined that capital punishment may be inflicted by shooting and
hanging. Id. at 133-34.
117Id. at 136.
'8 136 US. 436 (1890).
'9 Id. at 441.
20 Id. at 447.
21 Ibid.
15
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. I In a 1910 decision22 the defendant was convicted in a Philippine
court, which was under United States authority, of falsifying a public
document recording certain wage payments. He was sentenced to
fifteen years at hard labor in chains, a fine of four thousand pesatas,
loss of civil rights during imprisonment and political rights thereafter, and subjection to surveillance by the authorities for life. The
statute under which the sentence was imposed was declared void
and the conviction was reversed. The Supreme Court there established the principle that punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual when it is not. graduated and proportional to the offense
committed. The Court's decision was largely influenced by the
result of its comparison of the defendant's sentence with penalties
imposed in other jurisdictions. It found that the defendant's punishment not only greatly exceeded those which were usually inflicted
for similar offenses, but that more serious crimes such as robbery,
larceny, and some degrees of homicide were not punished so severely.
The Court also pointed out that other Philippine statutes did not
provide for such harsh punishment for much more atrocious crimes.
Other attacks on the severity of fines or terms of imprisonment
have generally failed. 3 Large aggregate sentences, arrived at by
treating a single act or series of acts as distinct offenses and imposing separate sentences for each, have been held not to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.24 The standard against which the
courts have measured the sentence or fine is not the total penalty, but
25
rather the penalty for each individual offense.
Habitual criminal statutes under which repeated offenders are
punished more severely for the same offense than are persons with
shorter records have been upheld as not providing cruel and unusual punishment.20 Nor does it matter that the stricter sentence is
22 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
"E.g., Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909) ($1,623,500
in penalties -for violation of state anti-trust laws assessed against corporation with over forty million dollars in assets).
2'Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916) (conviction on seven
counts of using the mails to defraud, concurrent five-year sentences and
$1000 fines on eich count); Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462

'(10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846 (1960) (conviction on fourteen
separate counts resulting from one sale of marihuana, two sales of heroin,
and possession of both, sentence of fifty-two years in jail).
"E.g., Manley v. Fisher, 63 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1933) ; Scala v. United
States, 54 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1931).
" E.g., MacDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Beland v.
United States, 128 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 676 (1942).
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imposed in a,special proceeding commenced by information after
7
conviction of a substantive offense.1
Shortening or remitting of a sentence is purely a matter oflegislative or executive grace, so that none of the prisoner's constitutional rights are infringed if he is denied these piivileges2 The-federal statute prohibiting probation of first-time narcotics -offenders 2
does not violate the eighth amendment, 30 nor does commutation of a
death sentence to life imprisonment without the opportunity of
parole."' In United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen3 2 the
petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 199
years in prison. Under Illinois parole law, a prisoner serving a life
term becomes eligible for parole after -twenty years, but a person
serving a term of years becomes eligible only after he has completed one third of his term. The petitiofier sought habeas corpus
claiming that his punishment was cruel and unusual because, as the
parole laws were framed, he would not live long enough to applyfor parole. The writ was denied, even though the 199 year sentence
was a device specifically used to avoid the parole of murderers after
twenty years.
It has been held that a prison sentence does not become cruel
and unusual merely because the defendant is so old that he is
unlikely to survive it."3 Nor is a long sentence objectionable because equally guilty co-defendants have been dealt with more leniently,34 or because the jurisdiction imposes lighter penalties on crimes
generally thought to be more grievous.35 Imprisonment at hard
labor is not objectionable." Solitary confinement for convicts condemned to death,3 7 and for a prisoner whose death sentence for
2*8 Graham
E.g.,

v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
Lathem
v. United States, 259 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1958).
,' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7237(d).
3o Lathem v. United States, 259
81

F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1958).
Green v. Teets, 249 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957).

54 F. Supp. 973, (N.D. Ill. 1944), af'd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945).

"E.g., Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 938 (1960) (30-year sentence for narcotics violations on a 51-year
old defendant).
, United States v. Sorcey, 151 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
3278U.S. 794 (1946).
Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 135-36 (1903).
, 8Pervear ,y. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475 (1866) (Court regarded pioblem as one of proportional sentence rather than of humaneness of punishment).

"'McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891).
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murder of a prison guard was commuted to life and who was considered dangerous as an inmate, 38 were upheld against cruel and
unusual punishment objections.
IElectrocution came up again in 1946 in Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber."9 Willie Francis, having been convicted of
murder and sentenced to death by a Louisiana court, was placed in
the electric chair and subjected to an electrical current which was not
of sufficient intensity to cause his death, presumably because of some
mechanical defect. He was returned to prison and a,warrant for
his subsequent execution was issued. Francis contended that "two
electrocutions" would be a cruel and unusual punishment barred by
the eighth amendment. Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the Court,
stated that the petitioner's claim would be considered "under the
assumption, but without so deciding, that violation of principles of
.. the Eighth Amendment.. . as to... cruel and unusual punishment, would be violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."4 The Court expressly rejected the contention by the
petitioner that the manifold psychological factors involved in two
executions was cognizable under the eighth amendment. 4
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter was based
upon the continued freedom of a state to administer criminal justice
unless it should offend "some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 42
Four members of the Court dissented,4 3 urging that the case
be remanded for further proceedings to determine whether current
was actually applied to the petitioner, and, if so, how much.4 4 They
Stroud v. Johnston, 139 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1943).
329 U.S. 459 (1947).
10 Id.at 462.
' "Even the fact that the petitioner has already been subjected to a current
of electricity does not make his subsequent execution any more cruel in the
constitutional sense than any other execution. The cruelty against which
the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method
of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed
to extinguish life humanely. The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt consummation of the sentence cannot, it seems to us, add
an element of cruelty to a subsequent execution. There is no purpose to
inflict unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution." Id. at 464.
" Id. at 469, quoting Mr. Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
" Justices Burton, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. Id. at 472.
"There were conflicting affidavits in the briefs as to whether current had
88
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argued that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the
eighth amendment. If electric current had passed through Francis'
body during the first attempt, a second attempt would be a "cruel
and unusual punishment violative of due process of law," as this
would not be an instantaneous execution, which had been upheld by
the Court in the Kemmler 45 case.
The 1958 case of Trop v. Dulles4" represents the second time
the Supreme Court has held a punishment to be cruel and unusual.
Trop had been convicted by a court martial of wartime desertion.
The Nationality Act of 1940 provided that a person so convicted
shall lose his citizenship.47 Trop brought action for a declaratory
judgment that he was an American citizen. The Supreme Court
declared the statute unconstitutional, four justices holding that. it
was penal in nature,4 s and that loss of citizenship as a punishment
reached Francis at all. These are set out in a footnote in the dissenting
opinion. Id. at 480-81 n.2.
"Then the electrocutioner turned on the switch and when he did Willie
Francis' lips puffed out and he groaned and jumped so that the chair came
off the floor. Apparently the switch was turned on twice and then the condemned man yelled: 'Take it off. Let me breath.'" Affidavit of official
witness Harold Resweber.
"I saw the electrocutioner turn on the switch and I saw his lips puff out
and swell, his body tensed and stretched. I heard the one in charge yell to
the man outside for more juice when he saw that Willie Francis was not
dying and the one outside yelled back he was giving him all he had. Then
Willie Francis cried out 'Take it off. Let me breath."' Affidavit of official
witness Ignace Doucet.

Attached to respondents' brief was a transcript of testimony, taken before

the Louisiana Pardon Board, of those who were in charge of the equipment
at the attempted execution that no electric current reached Francis' body
and that his flesh did not show electrical burns. Also included was a statement by the sheriff of a neighboring parish that Francis told him on leaving
the chair that the electric current had "tickled him."
An interesting discussion of this case can be found in PRETTYMAN, DEATH
AND THE SUPREME COURT 90 (1961).
" it re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
"356 U.S. 86 (1958).
'766 Stat. 163, 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1958).
"The courts have held that deportation of an alien for the commission of
a crime involving moral turpitude is a civil proceeding so that the eighth
amendment does not apply. United States ex rel. Circella v. Sahli, 216 F.2d
33 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 56 F.2d 566 (1st Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 287 U.S. 341 (1932),
In United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellog, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929), it was
held that exclusion of an alien convicted of crime involving moral turpitude
before her marriage to a native-born American citizen did not inflict a cruel
and unusual punishment.
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for crime was cruel and unusual. 9 "There may be involved no
physical mistreatment, no primitive torture," the opinion remarks,
but "there is instead the total destruction of the individual's status
in organized society." 50 The part of the decision that may have the
most far-reaching effects was the recognition that the mental as well
as the physical element must be considered in determining what
punishments are cruel and unusual."'
In the principal case the Court was not concerned with the
method of punishment or with a punishment disproportionate to
the offense as in previous cases. Rather, it was the purpose of the
confinement that was measured against the constitutional prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishments. 52 "[Ilnmprisonment for ninety
days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel
or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the abstract.
Even one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for
The Court recognizes the
the 'crime' of having a common cold."'
authority of a state in the exercise of its police power to regulate
the administration, sale, prescription, and use of habit-forming
drugs," or to establish a program of involuntary confinement.5
While evidence of past narcotics use is necessary to prove addiction,
under the California statute involved in this case no proof of any
specific instance of use or possession within the jurisdiction was
necessary. The state only had to show that the defendant had the
"status" of addiction, for which he was to be punished.
Con4' Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker.
curring, Mr. Justice Brennan stated that there was no relevant connection
between the act in question and any power granted to Congress by the
constitution.
In a companion case, the Court upheld another section of the Nationality
Act, which provided for automatic denationalization by voting in a foreign
election, as a valid exercise of congressional power to regulate foreign affairs.
356 U.S. 44 (1958).
Perez v. Brownell,101.
50356 U.S. at
51 "It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress.
He knows not what discriminations may be established against him, and
when and for what cause his existence in his native land may be terminated.
He may be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized
people. He is stateless, a condition deplored in the international community
of democracies. It is no answer to suggest that all the disastrous consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person. The
threat makes the punishment obnoxious." Id. at 102.
5" Id. at 677 n. 5 (concurring opinion of Justice Douglas).
1Id.at 667.
Id. at 664.
5 Id. at 665. California has established such a program. Cal. Welfare &
Inst'ns Code §§ 5350-361.
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The scope of the cruel and unusual punishments provision has
undergone considerable expansion since the eighth amendment was
adopted in 1791. The Weems5" decision extended its protection
57
to punishments disproportionate to the offense. Trop v. Dulles
recognized that mental anxiety must be considered. Now Robinson
v. California58 has put the legislatures on notice that the Court will
also apply the cruel and unusual punishments clause to the purpose
of a statutory penalty in deciding upon its constitutionality. This
case is an exception to the general rule that constitutional limitations in the area of criminal law do not restrict the power of the states
to define crime, but only restrict the manner in which the states
may enforce their penal codes.
Whether the principle of the Robinson decision will be extended
to strike down other statutes which define offenses in terms of
personal condition must await future litigation.59 By applying the
cruel and unusual punishments provision to the states through the
fourteenth amendment and establishing limitations on the power
of states to define crime, the Supreme Court has significantly enlarged its area of supervision of state penal legislation.
RALPH A. WHITE, JR.
Contracts-Employee Covenants Not to Compete-"Blue
Pencil" Rule
The case of Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender' marks the
first clear application of the "blue pencil" rule2 in employment con"' Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
1356 U.S. 86 (1958).
8370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"In Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229, 236 (1900), the court
stated that conviction under a statute which provided that "all suspicious
persons" could be arrested and prosecuted as criminals, without anything
more, would impose a cruel and unusual punishment. See generally Lacey,
Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1203
(1953); Note, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 102 (1962).
'255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
Where a contract not to compete contains both lawful and unlawful
restrictions, if the restrictions are stated separably or in the alternative the
court will enforce the valid restrictions and disregard the invalid. In effect
the test is whether the court could take a "blue pencil" and mark out the invalid restrictions, leaving the valid ones to be enforced. E.g., Roane Inc. v.
Tweed, 33 Del. Ch. 4, 89 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1952) ; General Bronze Corp. v.
Schmiling, 208 Wis. 565, 243 N.W. 469 (1932); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 518 (1932); 6A CoRaIN,' CONTRACTS § 1390 (1962); 5 WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS § 1659 (rev. ed. 1937).
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tracts in North Carolina. In Welcome Wagon the defendant, a
former employee of the plaintiff, had covenanted not to engage in a
similar business during employment or thereafter for a period
of five years, (1) in Fayetteville, N. C., (2) in any other city or
town in North Carolina where plaintiff was engaged in such business,
(3) in any city or town in the United States in which plaintiff was
engaged in such business, or (4) in any city or town in the United
States in which plaintiff has been or signified its intention to engage
in such business. Shortly after termination of her employment
defendant set up a similar business in Fayetteville and plaintiff sought
to enjoin such competition. Defendant demurred, claiming among
other grounds, that the restrictions contained in the covenant were
unreasonable as to the extent of territory. In overruling the demurrer, the court applied the "blue pencil" rule, saying that if the
parties made divisions of the territory, some reasonable and some
unreasonable, a court of equity will enforce the territorial divisions
deemed reasonable and refuse to enforce those deemed unreasonable.
Restriction (1) (as to Fayetteville) was reasonable and enforceable;
restriction (2) might be reasonable or unreasonable, raising a question for the chancellor; and restrictions (3) and (4) were clearly
unreasonable and thus unenforceable. This is in accord with the
majority.'
There is little North Carolina authority prior to the principal
case dealing with divisible covenants not to compete in employment
contracts. North Carolina has clearly applied the "blue pencil" rule4
to covenants not to compete in contracts for the sale of a business.
However, the prevailing tendency, followed in North Carolina, is to
,distinguish covenants ancilliary to the sale of a business from those
in an employment contract.5
There are two previous North Carolina cases involving employment contracts which seemingly deal with separable territorial
8 Ibid.

Hauser v. Harding, 126 N.C. 295, 35 S.E. 586 (1900), where the restriction ancillary to the sale of a medical practice covered "Yadkinville and
the surrounding territory." The court severed the indefinite "surrounding
territory" restriction and upheld an injunction as to the definite area of
Yadkinville. Accord, Wooten v. Harris, 153 N.C. 43, 68 S.E. 898 (1910).
'E.g., Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17,
45-46, 105 N.E.2d 685, 703-04 (C.P. 1952), citing among numerous other
authorities, Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944). That they
have been distinguished in regard to application of the "blue pencil" rule see
notes 24, 25 infra and accompanying text.
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covenants, but neither is clear authority for an application of the
rule. In Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin6 the covenant restricted a former
employee from competing in a forty-nine county area and a fifty
mile strip on either side. The lower court injunction covered only
the forty-nine counties. In upholding the lower court's injunction
the opinion made no reference to severability, saying only that the
covenant was "reasonably limited both in respect of time and territory."' Whether the court referred to the separated or the original
covenant cannot be determined.
In Moskin Bros. v. Swartzbergs the court upheld a municipal
court injunction covering only the city of High Point even though
the covenant was much broader in its scope. But the court's only
reference to territory was "we think the covenant is reasonable in its
terms, and not unreasonable in time or territory." 9 In neither case
is there a clear cut application of the "blue penciF' rule."0
On the other hand, the North Carolina court has held that it
will not give partial effect to an "indivisible" promise, i.e. one not
grammatically severable, by granting an injunction to cover only
a reasonable area of a larger territory. In Noe v. McDevitt" the
covenant was not to compete in North and South Carolina. The
plaintiff's business covered only eastern North Carolina, and the
court refused to grant an injunction covering this smaller area,
saying, "the court cannot by splitting up the territory make a new
This
contract for the parties-it must stand or fall integrally."'"
view is not in accord with the more modern approach in which courts
do not depend on grammatical severability, but issue an injunction
3
to cover the reasonable part of an excessive restraint.'
0227 N.C. 387, 42 S.E.2d 352 (1947).
7Id. at 391, 42 S.E.2d at 355.
8 199 N.C. 539, 155 S.E. 154 (1930).
DId. at 545, 155 S.E. at 157.
"oIn Welcome Wagon v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955) the court
of appeals considered a contract from Gastonia, North Carolina almost
identical to that in the principal case. The court of appeals refused to apply
the "blue pencil" rule saying, "we find nothing in the authorities cited by
counsel for Welcome Wagon that militates against this view. See Moskin
Bros. v. Swartzberg . . . Wooten v. Harris... Hauser v. Harding."
1228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E.2d 121 (1947).
2
I d. at 245, 45 S.E.2d at 123.
E.g., Hill v. Central West Pub. Service Co., 37 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.
1930) (restraint throughout Texas, enforced as to city of Dallas);, New
England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 306 Mass. 504, 28 N.E.2d 997 (1-940)
(restraint as to all New England states, enforced as to one state and parts
of two others); 6A CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1390; Williston & Corbin,
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In Henley Paper Co. v. McAllister"4 the court seemingly refused
to apply the rule to a separable list of activities." Here the court
considered a covenant which bound the defendant for three years
after termination of employment not to "either directly or indirectly
engage in the manufacture, sale, or distribution of paper or paper
products within a radius of 300 miles of any office or branch of the
Henley Paper Co. or its subsidiary divisions."'"
The court held
that the contract excluded the defendant from too much territory
and too many activities and was therefore void and unreasonableYT
'The court did not see fit to sever the activity restrictions which were
phrased in the alternative." Thus it seems that the court has been
faced with two covenants where severability was applicable; one concerning activity restrictions (Henley Paper Co. v. McAllister),
the other territory restrictions (Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v.
Pender). The court apparently denied severance in relation to
activities and allowed it in relation to territory. As pointed out by
the dissent in Welcome Wagon, the holdings are clearly inconsistent
in that the rule was applicable in both cases, yet applied only in the
second. This inconsistency raises the question of what the court
will do when faced with a covenant not to compete, otherwise
reasonable except for restrictions as to time 9 or as to persons with
On the Doctrine of Beit v. Beit, 23

CONN.

B.J. 40 (1949); Note, 26 N.C.L.

R.Ev. 402 (1948).
,253 N.C. 529, 117 S.E.2d 431 (1960).
" Generally the "blue pencil" rule is applied to separate covenants covering too many businesses or activities, too much time or too broad a class of
persons, as well as excessive territory. John T. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino,
53 F.2d 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); 5 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1659
RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS, § 518 (1932).
16 253 N.C. at 531, 117 S.E.2d at 432.
'1Id. at 534-35, 117 S.E.2d at 434.
" The court seems to base its holding on Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242,
45 S.E.2d 121 (1947) in which the court, faced with a covenant not grammatically severable, refused to grant an injunction to a lesser reasonable area.
This is applicable to the 300 mile restraint in the present case, and this alone
would make the covenant invalid. However, the court specifically includes
the activities as being unreasonable. The prayer for relief asks the defendant
be enjoined from the "manufacture, sale or distribution" of paper products,
and the plaintiff's brief raises the question of severability.
" Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934)
dealt with a covenant by an employee to assign invention rights, and the
court severed the unreasonable time period. See also 5 WILLISTON, Op. cit.
supra, note 2, § 1659. "No example has been found of comparable draftsmanship as to the time element, although someday a draftsman may summon up
the courage to try 'for 6 months plus 6 months plus . . . for a total of ...
years.'" Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv.
625, 682 n.193 (1960).

1963]

NOTES AND. COMMENTS

whom the covenantee will not do business,.9 such covenants being
grammatically divisible into valid and invalid units.
At present there is no clear answer to this question. The-decision
in Welcome Wagon makes no mention of overruling Henley Paper
Co. v. McAllister and contains no dicta to indicate extensions of the
rule. In applying the rule the court refers only to territorial restraints2 since this was the only "divisible" issue before the court.
The language in Henley Paper Co. v. McAllister is the broader
of the two,2 2 but in the light of the subsequent Welcome Wagon
decision this language must now be taken as limited. Thus authority
can be found both for extending the rule to new factual situations, or
refusing to do so. An extension would be in accord with leading
authorities.23
By choosing the traditional "blue pencil" rule in the-principal
case, the court refused to follow a trend24 toward the more conservative English view 25 which generally denies the doctrine of
severance in employer-employee contracts when the covenant is harsh
or oppressive. Under this view if the restraint is excessive, though
grammatically severable, the court will reject the whole covenant.
In Welcome Wagon v. Morris26 the contract was almost identical
to that in the principal case and the court of appeals refused severance
saying, "we think the restrictive covenant must be judged as a whole
and must stand or fall when so judged." The North Carolina
court's comment in the principal case was that this case did not follow
the general rule and was not based on the sounder reasoning.
Dubowski & Sons v. Goldstein [1896] 1 Q.B. 478 allowed severance as
regards classes of customers. See also 5 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 1659.
" 255 N.C. at 248, 120 S.E.2d at 742.
2 "Whether part of the contract might be deemed reasonable and enforceable is not the question. It comes to us as a single document. We
must construe it as the parties made it. 'The court cannot by splitting up
the territory make a new contract for the parties. It must stand or fall integrally.'" Noe v. McDevitt, 253 N.C. at 535, 117 S.E.2d at 434-35.
2" See authorities cited note 15 supra.
2' "In addition courts are increasingly subscribing to, or at least acting in
accordance with the Mason [English] rule in distinguishing employee restraint cases .... " Blake, supra note 19, at 682 n.193; 5 DUKE B.J.
115 (1956).
255 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2; Farwell, Covenants in Restraint
of
Trade as Between Employer and Employee, 44 L.Q. REv. 66 (1928). This
approach finds its basis in Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co., [1913]
A.C. 724.
2"224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955).
20
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The question of which of these views follows the sounder
reasoning has been the subject of extensive argument and comment.2 7
The chief argument against the rule is that it gives the employer, who
normally has superior bargaining power, an undue advantage in
that he can draft a wide and oppressive covenant in the alternative,
confident that the court will enforce the reasonable part.28 Also, as
pointed out by the Pender dissent, the covenant in its entirety hangs
over the employee. It is he who must ascertain where the court will
draw the line. 29 Thus, the unreasonable covenant may well be
enforced by intimidation or fear of litigation. 0 Also, by severance,
the court in effect makes a new contract for the parties."'
Under the "blue pencil" rule the emphasis is on form rather than
substance.3 2 "Questions involving legality of contracts should not
depend on form. Public policy surely is not concerned to distinguish differences of wording in agreements of identical meanIt is not really a matter of what the covenant contains,
ing.""3
but how it is drafted. The crucial factor in determining enforcement
is whether or not the covenant is worded in the alternative. This
conclusion is criticized by writers who favor partial enforcement of
34
indivisible promises, rather than the traditional "blue pencil" rule.
On the other hand the employer certainly has an interest to protect. He is not solely interested in oppressing a former employee, but
he has trade secrets, good will, and the like to retain. "[T]his
requires us to recognize that there is such a thing as unfair competition by an ex-employee as well as unreasonable oppression by an
Blake, supra note 19, at 682-84; 5 DUKE B.J. 115 (1956).
See Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co., [1913] A.C. 724, 745;
WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1660.
2 Corbin points out that in the principal case the ex-employee should have
known that competition in Fayetteville was unreasonable, irregardless of
"blue pencil" application. 6A CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1390 n. 51.5.
. "It must be remembered that the real sanction at the back of these
covenants is the terror and expense of litigation, in which the servant is
usually at a great disadvantage, in view of the longer purse of his master."
Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co., [1913] A.C. 724, 745 quoted by
the dissent in the principal case.
1 "By some occult process, the courts adopting this rule convinced themselves that partial enforcement without the aid of a 'blue pencil' would be
making a new contract for the parties, while partial enforcement in the
wake of a 'blue pencil" would not." 6A CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1390.
"Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 256, 120 S.E.2d
2

2"

739, 747 (1961) (dissent); Note, 26 N.C.L. REv. 402, 404 (1948).
" 5 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1660.
" Ibid.; CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1390.
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employer.""5 The court must balance these two interests. Also the
defendant ":should not. object to a lawful restraint which is less than
he voluntarily agreed to and for which he has been paid."3 6 Usually
restrictive covenants are made with employees with executive or sales
ability who fully understand the covenant; not with a workingman
who has nothing to sell but his labor and who must take what he is
offered.
It has been suggested that courts should refuse severance when
it is clear that the employer has exacted an unduly harsh covenant,
and allow severance where the employer acts fairly in trying to
reasonably protect his interests and not impose an undue burden
This would combine the best features of the
on the employee.s
English view and the "blue pencil.""8
But whether or not it has selected the best rule, in Welcome
Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender the North Carolina court has taken a
clear stand on the territorial aspect of covenants not to compete.
With respect to territorial restraints, the court has rejected both the
liberal view which upholds the reasonable part of a grammatically
inseparable covenant and, the English view which denies severance
even where it is grammatically possible. It is clearly established that
North Carolina will apply the "blue pecil" rule to appropriate territorial restrictions, both in contracts for the sale of a business and, by
the principal case, employment contracts.
CHARLES M. WHEDBEE

6A ConnIN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1394.

80Breckenridge, Restraint of Trade in North Carolina,7 N.C.L. REv. 249,
258 (1929).
Blake, supra note 19, at 683-84.
8aThe application of this proposed rule will, of course, depend on the particular facts of each case. It would seem that if this rule had been applied
in the principal case, the court would have refused severance, for it seems
that the restrictions here (extending to any city or town in the United
States where employer has signified his intention to operate such business)
are an unduly harsh and unjustified burden. Perhaps if the covenant had
contained only the provisions regarding (1) Fayetteville and (2) North
Carolina, this would not have been deemed unduly harsh and the court could,

under the proposed rule, allow severance. Also the type of covenant in
Hauser v. Harding, 126 N.C. 295, 35 S.E. 586 (1900), covering "Yadkinville
and the surrounding territory" may be one which falls into the latter class
and would not be denied severance. This covenant, on its face, does not seem

excessively harsh and is a good example of a covenant which is not an
undue burden and is also severable.

Blake, ibid, suggests that the burden

should be on the employer to show that he acted fairly towards the employee
and did not impose an unjust burden on him.
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Criminal Law-Presentence Investigation-Right of Confrontation
In every criminal prosecution the accused enjoys the constitutional right to be present at his trial.' State v. Pope2 presented for

the first time in North Carolina the question of whether this right
After the defendant had
extends to a presentence investigation.'
been found guilty of felonious breaking and entering and of larceny,
but prior to sentencing, the trial judge, in the company of the
solicitor, the deputy clerk, and two state's witnesses, retired to chambers to clerically compile the counts in the indictment. Neither the
defendant nor his counsel was present at this conference. Here, information was elicited for the first time which tended to implicate
the defendant in the commission of other crimes for which no warrants had been issued. Before pronouncing sentence, the judge confronted the defendant with this information and gave hiin an opportunity to refute or explain it. The defendant declined to comment,
but on appeal from a denial of his motion to set aside the judgment
and vacate the sentence, he contended that his exclusion from the
presentence investigation amounted to a violation of his fundamental
rights and a denial of due process of law. The North Carolina
Supreme Court rejected these contentions 4 and affirmed the lower
court conviction. They warned, however, that all information
coming to the notice of the trial court which might conceivably aggra1 "In all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has the
right to be informed of the accusation and to confront the accusers and wit" N.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11. "This, of course,
nesses with other testimony .
implies that he shall have the right to be present." State v. Overton, 77
N.C. 485, 486 (1887).

257 N.C. 326, 126 S.E.2d 126 (1962).

' When a defendant is convicted of a crime, the punishment for which is
left, within certain defined limits, to the discretion of the judge, an investigation may be conducted with regard to any circumstances which tend to
aggravate or mitigate the punishment. The investigation may be conducted
by the judge himself, or consist merely of the submission of a presentence
report prepared by a probation officer. N.C. Gir. STAT. § 15-198 (1953),
State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 335, 126 S.E.2d 126, 133 (1962). See also
State v,Barbour, 243 N.C. 265, 90 S.E.2d 388 (1955), and State v. Summers,
98 N.C. 702, 4 S.E. 120 (1887). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R. 1211
.(1932-).
..

The court noted the distinction between the trial and sentencing stages

of the proceedings, recognizing that whereas the issue of guilt or innocence

inthe former demands the defendant's presence at all times to confront his
acqusers, the same reason does not prevail, in the latter. 257 N.C. at 333,
126 S.E.2d at 132.
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vate the punishment should be .disclosed to the defendant, with an
opportunity afforded to refute or explain it.'
Although the subject of the defendant's right to be present at a
presentence investigation has received little judicial attention, those
courts which have directly decided the question are not in agreement.
Some states have judicially extended the defendant's right to be
present at the trial to a presentence investigation,' while other states
have failed to recognize such a right.' Notwithstanding dictum to
the contrary,8 the federal courts have generally denied the defendant a
right to be present at this time.9 Those courts which demand the
defendant's presence rely mainly on constitutional grounds, 10 although one court suggests the defendant's common-law right to be
present when sentence is pronounced as a possible basis for such a
rule." On the other hand, the opposing view, possibly in deference
sId. at 335, 126 S.E.2d at 132.
'Inthe Matter of Fowler, 49 Mich. 234, 13 N.W. 530 (1882); State v.
Simms, 131 S.C. 422, 127 S.E. 840 (1925); State v. Harvey, 128 S.C.
447, 123 S.E. 201 (1924); Phelps v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 510, 257 S.W.2d
302 (1953); State v. Stevenson, 64 W. Va. 392, 62 S.E. 688 (1908). Note
that in West Virginia, the right to be "personally present during the trial"
is reserved by statute rather than by the constitution. W. VA. CoDE AN1N.
§ 6191 (1961). This statute has been construed as requiring the defendant's
presence "when any step affecting him is taken from arraignment to final
judgment inclusive." State v. Vance, 124 S.E.2d 252, 259 (W. Va. 1962).
(Emphasis added.)
7Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570 (1952); Commonwealth v.
Myers, 193 Pa. Super. 531, 165 A.2d 400 (1960). See also Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 348 Pa. 349, 35 A.2d 312 (1944), where the Pennsylvania court
reversed a judgment in which the record failed to disclose that no ex parte
evidence was heard by a three judge court sitting en banc to determine
the degree of guilt. The court stresses the fact that they are not reversing
because ex parte evidence might have been heard in the determination of
sentence.
8 "We think, however, that such information should have been disclosed
to the judge in open court and in the presence of the appellant." Stephan v.
United States, 133 F.2d 87, 100 (6th Cir. 1943).
- Zeff v. Sanford, 31 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
2' These courts have held that since a defendant has a right to have
everything bearing on his case open and above board, State v. Harvey; 128
S.C. 447, 123 S.E. 201 (1924), it would be clearly unconstitutional to permit
evidence to be introduced and considered in the absence' of a convicted
defendant, In the Matter of Fowler, 49 Mich. 234, 13 N.'W. 530 (1882).
"Our system of jurisprudence is based on the doctrine of confrontation. An
accused is not confronted by witnesses who speak in his absence." Phelps v.
State, 158 Tex. Crim. 510, 512, 257 S.W.2d 302, 303 (1953).
. The fontana court in construing their statutory presentence procedure,
note 13 infra, finds support for demanding the defendant's, presence in the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. Kuhl v. District Court,
366 P.2d 347, 362 (Mont. 1961).
11"One of the purposes of requiring that the defeiidaht be present may
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to administrative convenience, favors limiting the right to be present
solely to that period in' which the alleged guilt of the defendant is
determined. 2
Statutory provisions in nine states provide that all information
in aggravation or mitigation of punishment must be presented in
open court."3 At least two states have construed these statutes as
also requiring the defendant's presence.' 4
In reaching its conclusion in the principal case, the court recognized that the modem philosophy of fitting the punishment to -the
offender rather than the crime,' 5 demands that a sentencing judge
not be restricted to the formalistic requirements of trial procedure
in gathering information to assist him in determining an appropriate
sentence.' 6 While it may be conceded that the practice of individualizing punishment is commendable, it nevertheless may be argued that
the means employed to achieve this goal are frequently open to
criticism. The rationale employed to deny the defendant a right
vell be to give him an opportunity to show that accusations made against
him, other than the one of which he stands convicted, are without foundation,
and a chance to object to the consideration of improper evidence." People
y. Giles, 70 Cal. App. 2d 872,

-,

161 P.2d 623, 628 (1945).

This argu-

ment is supported by no authority. For a statement of the reason for the
common-law rule, see Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 131 (1891).
" Thus, the right to be present is limited to that period between arraignment and verdict. Commonwealth v. Myers, 193 Pa. Super. 531, 540, 165
A.2d 400, 405 (1960). Compare this with the West Virginia interpretation
of its statutory provision requiring the defendant's presence at the trial, supra
note 6. Those courts which refuse to extend the right to a presentence
investigation nevertheless insist that "the manifestly correct practice . . .
is-to hear all the testimony in the case, including the testimony which relates
to the fixing of the penalty, in the presence of the defendant and his
counsel . . .

."

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 348 Pa. 349, 355, 35 A.2d 312,

314-15 (1944).
8

ARIz. CRIM. RULES § 336; CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1203, 1204; IDAHO CODE
§19-2516 (1948); MINN. STAT. §631.20 (1947); MONT. REV. STAT.
§§ 94-7813, 7814 (1949); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-26-18 (1960); OKLA.
STAT. § 974 (1958) ; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 137.080, 137.090 (1959) ; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-35-13 (1953).
"People v. Giles, 70 Cal. App. 2d 872, 161 P.2d 623 (1945); People
v. Sauer, 67 Cal. App. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 55 (1945); Kuhl v. District Court,
366 P.2d 347 (Mont. 1961), in which the reception of information offered
by a probation officer in the absence of the defendant constituted a violation
of the Montana statute.
In courts-martial trials, evidence bearing on the subject of punishment
is heard immediately after a plea or verdict of guilty. MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL UNITED STATES § 75 & app. 8 (1951). This implies the defendant's

presence.
' 5 Weihofen, Retribution Is Obsolete, 39
1 (1960).
I
257 N.C. at 333, 126 S.E.2d at 133.
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to be present at the presentence investigation 7 fails to take into
account the fact that in many criminal cases, the paramount interest
in the proceeding is not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but
rather the type and amount of punishment to be inflicted."8 In North
Carolina, the trial judge, for purposes of sentencing, may avail himself of information concerning every facet of the defendant's background.' 9 If the defendant's liberty is to be deprived on the basis
of such information, justice requires that the information be accurate.20 One method of promoting accuracy is to confront the
defendant with such information and give him an opportunity to
rebut it. 2 1

The principal case purports to insure such safeguards,

22

yet, in effect, reposes the defendant's protection in the discretion of
the trial judge.23 Although a sentence based on false information
concerning the defendant's background is vitiated under due process
standards,24 such a holding is of little comfort to a defendant
See note 4 supra.
A study made in 1956 of 32 superior courts in North Carolina revealed
that 47.7% of all felony cases were disposed of by pleas of guilty. Hall,
The Administration of Criminal Justice in North Carolina, 1956 (unpublished
research in N. C. Inst. Govt. Library). "About ninety percent of all defendants in federal courts plead guilty." Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1290 (1952). See generally
ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 546 (1947) and
Note, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 702, 706 (1958).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-198 (1953) provides for furnishing the court
with a probation report concerning the criminal record, social history, and
present condition of the defendant. "The investigation may adduce information concerning defendant's criminal record, if any, his moral character,
standing in the community, habits, occupation, social life, responsibilities,
education, mental and physical health, the specific charge against him, and
other matter pertinent to a proper judgment." 257 N.C. at 335, 126 S.E.2d
at 133.
,Wyzanski, supra note 18, at 1291.
" "Anglo-American law has relied traditionally upon an adversary system
to ascertain the facts. Impartiality has not been considered a sufficient safeguard." Knowlton, Should Presentence Reports Be Shown to a Defendant,
79 N.J.L.J. 409, 417 (1956).
"*The court instructed judges to disclose all information coming to their
notice which might conceivably aggravate the punishment, and afford the
defendant an opportunity to refute or explain such information. 257 N.C.
at 335, 126 S.E.2d at 133.
" In order for the defendant to know the contents of probation reports
and other oral testimony, it is obvious from this holding that such knowledge
will be dependent on the trial judge's decision whether to disclose or conceal
the information. "Certainly due process should not depend on the unrestrained discretion of one man in determining whether the information
considered should be disclosed." Note, 34 MINN. L. REv. 470, 472-73 (1950).
" Ex parte Hoopsick, 172 Pa. Super. 12, 91 A.2d 241 (1952). See also
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), and Smith v. United States, 223
'

:
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sentenced on the basis of false information if the trial judge inadvertently fails to disclose such information to the defendant before
sentencing.
The procedural problem at the sentencing stage is characterized,
on the one hand, by a desire to grant the sentencing judge the utmost
leeway in access to information properly bearing on the question of
punishment, and, on the other, by the necessity that the defendant
be confronted with such information to insure its accuracy. Although the principal case dealt primarily with the propriety of receiving oral testimony in the defendant's absence, the problem frequently arises with regard to a written report considered by the
judge prior to sentencing. In Williams v. New York2" the United
States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment is not violated when the defendant is denied
the opportunity to confront and cross-examine informants who contribute to a probation report considered by the judge before
sentencing.2" Perhaps the more serious question is whether the
defendant should be allowed to examine the report itself and chalF.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1955). Townsend appears to have been determined
largely on the ground that the defendant was not represented by counsel
When sentence was imposed. However, one writer has questioned the
benefit of counsel in a situation in which the judge fails to disclose the
false premises on which he bases his stentence. Note, Due Process and
Legislative Standards in Sentencing, 101 U. PA. L. Rxv. 257, 267 (1952).
25337 U.S. 241 (1949), portions of which are quoted in Pope in support
of the court's holding that the instant procedure was not in violation of the
due process clause of the North Carolina Constitution, art. 1, § 17. 257 N.C.

at 332-34, 126 S.E.2d at 131-32.

2" Mr. Justice Black reasoned that "most of the information now relied
upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentence would
be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by
witnesses subject to cross-examination." 337 U.S. at 250. But see Jay v.
Boyd, 351 U.S.'345 (1956), in which Mr. Justice Black in a dissenting opinion
vigorously objects on due process grounds to the Attorney General's use of
confidential information as a basis for refusing to suspend deportation of a
former Communist.
A closely analagous situation is the procedure by which the sanity of
a convicted murderer is determined subsequent to sentence but prior to
execution. In Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), the Supreme Court
over due process objections approved a procedure in which the defendant
was denied an opportunity to present his own evidence or confront the
evidence submitted by the state on the issue of sanity. In a dissent, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter addressed himself to the majority's argument that
such a procedure was necessary to obviate delay: "[T]he risk of an undue
delay is hardly comparable to the grim risk of the barbarous execution of an
insane man because of a hurried, one-sided, untested determination of the
question of insanity." 339 U.S. at 25. The decision in this case was approved in Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958).
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lenge its accuracy.17 Statutes in at-least three states expressly provide for such inspection by the defendant.2" The originally proposed
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure included a provision2 9 which
would have insured inspection of a probation report by the defendant.
This provision was deleted in the final draft,3 ° however, and the
practice now varies between making the report public in some districts, and treating it as confidential in others. 3 ' Arguments against
a procedure of inspection stress the possibility that such a procedure
would seriously hamper the efficient administration of criminal
justice, and possibly result in a retrial of collateral issues.3 2 It seems
just as probable, however, that if the report is true, it will not be
contested at all, either because it is not detrimental to the defendant,
or because it is capable of comparatively easy proof, as in the case of
establishing the fact of a prior conviction. Conversely, those portions of the report which are challenged are likely to be statements
which are most prejudicial to the defendant and more difficult to
It is questionable whether Williams decided this issue. Note, 23 So.
L. REv. 105, 107 (1949). For a statement of the narrow holding in
Williams, see Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 412 n. 4 (1954), and
White
v. United States, 215 F.2d 782, 789 (1954).
2
ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 42, § 23 (1959); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203 (Supp.
1962); VA. CODE § 53-278.1 (1958). See Linton v. Commonwealth, 192
Va. 437, 65 S.E.2d 534 (1951) where the failure to allow defense counsel
to cross-examine the probation officer was reversible error. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-207 (1953) provides that the probation report is privileged information and may only be seen by the court and "others entitled under this
article." One writer has interpreted this to include disclosure to the de4fendant and his counsel. Sharp, The Confidential Nature of Presentence
Reports, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 127, 131 (1955). In the absence of case
authority to substantiate either position, it seems reasonable to argue that
the section does not make disclosure to the defendant mandatory.
" "After determination of the question of guilt the report shall be made
available, upon such conditions as the court may impose, to the attorney for
the parties and to such other persons as the court may designate." FED. R.
CRIM. P., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 34 (1944).
"oSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c).
" "[I]n 65 districts the presentence report is available only to the judge.
In 30 districts the report is available also to other interested parties and in
all but two of these the United States Attorney receives a copy. In 11 districts the defense counsel has access to the report." Pilot Institute On
Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231, 329 (1961). See generally Chandler, Latter-Day
Procedures In the Sentencing and Treatment of Offenders in the Federal
Courts, 37 VA. L. REV. 825, 834 (1951).
"Morgan v. State, 142 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla. 1962). The rules of evidence in the California presentence procedure appear to be rather rigid.
People v. Valdivia, 5 Cal. Rptr. 832, 182 Cal. App. 2d 149 (1960), 34 So.
CAL. L. REv. 231 (1961) ; People v. Neal, 97 Cal. App. 2d 688, 218 P.2d 556
(1950).
CAL.

266
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prove, such as conclusions deduced from hearsay or rumor.3 3 The
risk of injustice to the defendant if such statements are false would
seem to outweigh contrary considerations of administrative con4
venience.3
A further argument against allowing disclosure and challenge
is that such a rule might discourage confidential informants, thus
rendering unavailable much of the information now relied upon by
judges.3 " This possibility is conceded, although it would seem to be
an unavoidable consequence of any system of criminal administration
which requires that defendants be informed of the evidence against
them."
Judging from the tenor of opinions which deny the defendant
access to probation reports and the right to be present when oral
testimony is presented, the inescapable conclusion is that, but for insuperable procedural difficulties, the courts think it only fair that
there be some means by which a defendant may be confronted with
8 7
information bearing on the subject of punishment.
The English courts seem to have reached a flexible solution.
An act of Parliament38 provides that after conviction "without
prejudice to any right of the accused to tender evidence as to his
"' "The presentence probation report in Williams v. New York illustrates
this problem. The probation department there concluded that Williams was
a 'psychopathic liar' whose ideas 'revolve around a morbid sexuality,' that
he was 'a full time burglar,' 'emotionally unstable,' 'suffers no remorse,' and
was deemed to be 'a menace to society.'" His criminal record consisted of a
charge of theft when he was 11 years old and a conviction as a wayward
minor. Such a record would not support such generalizations as above. The
conclusions were drawn from information solicited from various people who
accused Williams of committing other crimes for which he had never
been prosecuted. Note, Due Processand Legislative Standardsin Sentencing,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 257, 276-77 (1952). On conclusions of probation officers
based on these uncorroborated accusations, the trial judge overrode the jury's
recommendation of life imprisonment and imposed the death penalty on
Williams, a convicted murderer.
8" Rubin, Probation and Due Process of Law, 31 Focus 40, 44 (1952);
Note, Right of Criminal Offenders To Challenge Reports Used In Determining Sentence, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 567, 571-72 (1949).
8
United States v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503, 504 (D.D.C.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 854 (1960).
"Rubin, op. cit. supra note 34, at 45.
See Zeff v. Sanford, 31 F. Supp. 736, 738 (N.D. Ga. 1940) ; Driver v.
State, 201 Md. 25, 32, 92 A.2d 570, 573 (1952) ; Commonwealth v. Johnson,
348 Pa. 349, 355, 35 A.2d 312, 314-15 (1944). The court in the principal
case admits that it is better practice to receive all reports and representations
from probation officers in open court. State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 335, 126
S.E.2d
126, 133 (1962).
"8 Prevention of Crime Act, 1908 8 Edw. VIII, ch. 59 § 10(5).
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character and repute, evidence of character and repute n-iay, if the
court thinks it fit, be admitted as evidence bearing on the question
whether the accused is or is not leading persistently a dishonest or
criminal life." If the accused challenges any statement, the judge has
two alternatives. He must either disregard the challenged statenient,89 or require legal proof of it.4" Such a procedure accommodates both interests by allowing the judge to consider all unchallenged information, while at the same time insuring its accuracy
by requiring proof of those statements which are challenged.
While the decision in the Pope case worked no obvious injustice
on the particular defendant, its limited protection to defendants in
general should provoke serious legislative attention to the possible
adoption of a statutory presentence procedure. This procedurej while
reserving the necessary discretion in the sentencing judge, should be
geared to insure the utmost accuracy of any information, oral or
written, which is offered in aggravation or mitigation of punishment.
New concepts of administering sentences should not neglect the
protection of the individual they seek to benefit.
WILLIAM E. SHINN, JR.

Estoppel by Judgment-Client Not Estopped in Action.
Against Attorney
A resident of Virginia and his wife engaged a North Carolina
attorney to defend them in an action brought against them in North
Carolina. The attorney failed to file any pleadings and a default
judgment was entered against his clients. Subsequently, they employed other counsel and moved to set aside the default judgment on
the ground of excusable neglect.1 The attorney also retained counsel
and joined in the prosecution of the motion. The court found that
the neglect of the attorney was not attributable to his clients,2 but
" Rex v. Campbell, 6 Crim. App. R. 131, 132 (1911).
Ibid.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-220 (1953) provides: "The judge shall, upon such
terms as may be just, at any time within one year after notice thereof, relieve
a party from a judgment ... taken against him through his mistake ... or
40

excusable neglect . ..

."

If a party has employed counsel and given him the necessary information about the case, the attorney agreeing to file an answer and protect his
interest, failure of the attorney to perform his duty is excusable neglect on
the part of the client. Gunter v. Dowdy, 224 N.C. 522, 31 S.E.2d 524 (1944) ;
Edwards v. Butler, 186 N.C. 200, 119 S.E. 7 (1923) ; Mann v. Hall, 163 N.C.
50, 79 S.E. 437 (1913).
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refused to set aside the judgment because they had no meritorious
defense to the prior action.' Rather than appealing from the order
denying the motion, the clients instituted the instant action against
the attorney, alleging that by reason of his negligence in the first
action they had been substantially damaged.
As an affirmative defense the attorney pleaded an estoppel by
judgment. He contended that it had been determined by final
judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction that plaintiffs had no
meritorious defense in the first action.4 Plaintiffs moved to strike
this defense. The court ruled that the findings by the court which
refused to set aside the default judgment did not constitute an
estoppel. The defense was ordered stricken and on appeal this was
affirmed.'
An estoppel by judgment differs from res judicata in that the
latter refers to the conclusive effect of a judgment upon an adjudicated cause 6f action, and the former refers to the judgment's conclusive effect upon issues that were litigated and necessarily adjudicated by the judgment in litigation involving a different cause of
action. 6
It.
is fundamental that a final judgment, when rendered on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights,
'In a proceeding to set aside a default judgment the court determines, as
a matter of law, whether or not there was excusable neglect, and whether or
not the facts alleged would constitute a meritorious defense if proven in a

trial on the merits. Helderman v. Hortsell Mills Co., 192 N.C. 626, 135 S.E.
627 (1926); Gaylord v. Berry, 169 N.C. 733, 86 S.E. 623 (1915). The
judgment cannot be set aside unless the moving party can show both excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense. Greitzer v. Eastman,
254 N.C. 752, 119 S.E.2d 884 (1961); Moore v. Deal, 239 N.C. 224, 79
S.E.2d 507 (1954). But even though it may be determined that there was
excusable neglect and a meritorious defense, it is within the discretion of
the court to set the judgment aside or not. The decision is not subject to
review unless it appears there was an abuse of discretion. Allen v. McPherson, 168 N.C. 435, 84 S.E. 766 (1915); Pepper v. Clegg, 132 N.C.
312, 43 S.E. 906 (1903).
""In an action by a client against his attorney, the attorney is not liable

for negligence in the conduct of litigation, where notwithstanding such negligence in defense of a suit, the client has no meritorious defense."

Masters

v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 523, 124 S.E.2d 574, 576 (1962). This logically
follows, since where there is no meritorious defense the attorney's negligence

results in no damage.
'Masters v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 124 S.E.2d 574 (1962).
1RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68, comment a (1942). This distinction

is a technical one which is not always observed in the language of the court's
decisions. See Cannon v. Cannon, 223 N.C. 664, 28 S.E.2d 240 (1943);
Southern Distrib. Co. v. Carraway, 196 N.C. 58, 144 S.E. 535 (1928).
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questions, and facts in issue as to all parties and their privies in all
other actions involving the same matter.' This principle is based on
the "mutuality" concept and requires a former judgment to be mutually binding upon the parties before it can be used as an estoppel or is
res judicata.' A party will not be bound by a former judgment unless
he could use it for protection, or for the foundation of a claim, had
the judgment been decided the other way.9
The doctrine of mutuality is firmly established in North Carolina,'" and is recognized and applied by the majority of jurisdictions.'
Bryant v. Shields, 220 N.C. 628, 18 S.E.2d 157 (1942); Bruton v.
Carolina Power & Light Co., 217 N.C. 1, 6 S.E.2d 822 (1940); Gay v.
Stancill, 76 N.C. 369 (1877).
8 Comment, 34 N.C.L. Rev. 458 (1956).
' Queen City Coach Co. v. Burrell, 241 N.C. 432, 85 S.E.2d 688 (1954);
Meacham v. Larus & Bros. Co., 212 N.C. 646, 194 S.E. 99 (1937) ; Armfield
v. Moore, 44 N.C. 157 (1852).
A judgment in rem is generally taken as an exception to the mutuality doctrine, since it is binding on all those having an interest in the subject matter.
But the fact that in rem judgments are good against the world actually
brings them within the limits of the mutuality doctrine. Comment, 34
N.C.L. REv. 458 (1956). But see Current v. Webb, 220 N.C. 425, 17
S.E.2d 614 (1941), where a former decision as to the residence of D was
held to be in the nature of a judgment in rem and was res judicata when D
was sued by a different plaintiff. Both cases involved a motion to quash
the purported service of summons on D, and the facts of each case were
identical. Service in both cases was made by the same officer at the same
time. But the parties were not the same, and there was no showing of
privity.
"0 Allred v. Webb, 135 N.C. 443, 47 S.E. 597 (1904), has been cited
as indicating that the mutuality requirement may lead to some unusual results.
Comment, 34 N.C.L. REv. 458, 464 (1956). In that case X died leaving
nine heirs at law, but prior to her death she had executed a deed for the
land in controversy to one of them, D. Another heir, A, in a former suit
against D, alleged X did not have sufficient mental capacity to execute
the deed, and the jury so found. The deed was declared void and ordered
cancelled. Subsequently, the heirs brought a partition proceeding against D,
alleging that each was entitled to a one-ninth interest in the property. The
court ruled that the prior judgment was good only between A and D, since
the estoppel must be mutual.
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Clark argued that the former judgment was a final cancellation of the defendant's title, binding him against
all parties. But see First Nat. Bank v. McCaskill, 174 N.C. 362, 93 S.E.
905 (1917), where the Chief Justice wrote an opinion on similar facts, but
,said such a judgment could not be pleaded as an estoppel.
" For a collection of cases, see Annots., 23 A.L.R.2d 710 (1952); 133
A.L.R. 181 (1942). See generally RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 96, comment
a (1942). Those who advocate the same issue rule advance the following
rational. "The requirement that in order to be bound by a judgment a
person must have had his day in court, say the critics of the mutuality doctrine, is a requirement of due process and the only necessary limitation on
the persons who may be bound by, or entitled to the benefit of, a judgment's
conclusive force. Thus when A obtains a judgment against B and attempts

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

There is, however, a long recognized exception to the rule where
the liability of a defendant is dependent upon the liability of another
-or on the existence of some culpable act of another-that has been
judicially determined not to exist in other litigation by the same
plaintiff, but to which the defendant was not a party nor privy. The
theory 2 of this exception can be illustrated as follows: Assume that
A and B are both liable, if at all, on the basis of the same factual
situation, and the liability of one is derived from the liability of the
other because of some legal relationshipbetween them. P sues A and

obtains an adverse judgment, necessarily adjudicating that no primary liability towards A arose from the factual situation involved.
In such a case P is precluded from retrying the same issue in a suit
against B. Only those situations involving derivative liability, based
on a legal relationship between the person invoking the judgment
and a party to it are included in this exception, and it permits only
defensive use of prior judgments.
This exception is also well recognized in North Carolina, and
the court has held that where the relationship between two parties is
analogous to that of principal and agent, or master and servant, or
to use the judgment to bind X, who was neither party nor privy to the A-B
litigation, X is not bound because the 'day in court' requirement is not fulfilled. But in litigation between X and B, the opponents of mutuality say
that B has had his day in court (against A) and lost; therefore no logical
reason exist to prevent X from using A's judgment to conclude B on issues
that the judgment necessarily adjudicated. And this is true whether X is a
defendant, using the A-B judgment to bar B's suit against him, or a plaintiff
using the judgment to preclude a defense by B." Moore & Currier, Mutuality
and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REv. 301, 307 (1961).
But "the contention that when X uses A's judgment against B, B has
had his day in court, clearly begs the question: his day in court against
whom? When B was a pat -y to the suit in which judgment was rendered,
and X was a stranger to that suit, B has no more had his day in court
against X than if X had been a party to the suit, and B a stranger to it."
Moore & Currier, supra at 310. Because of the sum involved in A's claim,
,or other more personal reason, B may have been quite willing to allow A's
judgment against him, but not X's; and to preclude B from defending X's
suit would in effect deny him his day in court.
1 Moore & Currier, supra note 11, discusses two general theories supporting this exception, but admits that the broader theory includes the
-narrower one. The narrower theory, briefly, is that "an indemnitee against
whom a claim is asserted on the basis of secondary liability derived from the
primary liability of his indemnitor is normally permitted to invoke the conclusive effect of a judgment adverse to the same plaintiff rendered in a suit
between him and the indemnitor, although the indemnitee-defendant was
neither party nor privy to the suit, and would not be bound had the judgment gone the other way" Moore & Currier, supra note 11, at 311. See
generally RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 96-99 (1942).
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employer and employee, a judgment in favor of either in an action
brought by a third party, rendered upon a ground equally applicable
to both, will be accepted as conclusive against the claimant's right
of action against the other."3
4
Another exception is stated in the Restatement of Judgments.'
Under this rule, one who controls an action, but is not a party to it,
is bound as if he were a party, on the principle that a person is
5
entitled only to one adjudication of an issue.
In the principal case it was recognized that the estoppel was not
mutual, because an opposite finding on the question of meritorious defense could not have estopped the attorney from denying negligence
on his part and asserting want of a meritorious defense. Thus, apply3Leary v. Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 215 N.C. 501, 2
S.E.2d 570 (1939).

"[W]here the doctrine of respondeat superior is or may be invoked, the
injured party may sue the agent or servant alone, and if a judgment is obtained against the agent or servant and such judgment is not satisfied, the
injured party may bring an action against the principal or master. In such
case, however, the recovery against the principal or master may not exceed the
COn the other
amount of the recovery against the agent or servant ....
hand, if the agent or servant satisfies the judgment against him or obtains
a verdict in his favor, no action will lie against th6 principal or master."
Thompson v. Lassiter, 246 N.C. 34, 38, 97 S.E.2d 492, 496 (1957).
At times the court has reached the proper result under this principle
without referring to it. In Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249 N.C. 167,
105 S.E.2d 655 (1958), the plaintiff was the initial beneficiary of X's life
insurance policy, but assigned it to X's wife. When X died the proceeds
of the policy were paid to his widow. Plaintiff sued the insurance company
alleging that the assignment was invalid. The assignment was found to be
valid and there was a judgment for the insurer. In a subsequent suit
against the widow, it was held that the judgment in favor of the insurer
established the validity of the assignment as far as plaintiff was concerned,
and it mattered not that the widow was not a party. Although the court
spoke in terms of the "same issue" rule, it would seem that the relationship
of indemnitee-indemnitor between the insurance company and the widow
should support the result.
Savage v. McGlawhorn, 199 N.C. 427, 154 S.E. 673 (1930), was apparently decided on an in rem theory. Plaintiff P sued partners A and B
for breach of contract, and A set up a former recovery against P for
breach of the same contract. It was held that although B was not a party
to the original action this did not prevent the former judgment from being
res judicata, since there was but one contract. Again, the partnership relation between A and B should have supported this result.
" "A person who is not a party but who controls an action, individually
or in co-operation with others, is bound by the adjudications of litigated
matters as if he were a party if he has a proprietary or financial interest
in the judgment or in the determination of a question of fact or of a question of law with reference to the same subject matter or transaction; if
the other party has notice of his participation, the other party is equally
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 84 (1942).
bound."
15
Id. at comment a (1942).
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.ing the mutuality concept, the finding made would not estop the

plaintiffs.1"
It is obvious that the exception to the mutuality rule, which is
based upon liability derived from some legal relationship between
the parties, does not encompass the principal case. This exception is
invoked only against third party plaintiffs and not between those
liable on the same factual situation because of the legal relationship.
The effect of the attorney's control over the proceeding to set
aside the default judgment is not so obvious. The attorney argued
that his participation in the motion put him in privity with plaintiffs.
17
The court, however, ruled that there was no privity between them,
and that mere participation in the motion created no estoppel by
judgment between plaintiff and one not a party.
In support of this latter ruling the court quoted the headnote
from Falls v. Gamble."
No estoppel of record is created against one not a party to the
record, even though he had instigated the trespass, on account
of which the action was brought, aided in defence of the
action, employed counsel, introduced his deeds in evidence
and paid the cost, and though he and the present defendant
claimed by deeds under the present trespasser.19
The Falls case is a strong decision to the effect that even one
who instigates and controls the action is not bound by the judgment
unless he is a party thereto."
But that decision was handed down
l8 Even if the court had found excusable neglect and a meritorious
defense and still refused to set aside the default judgment in exercise of its
discretion, this could not estop defendant from asserting want of a meritorious
defense without denying him his day in court.
'¢ "When used with respect to estoppel by judgment, the term 'privity'
denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property."
Queen City Coach Co. v. Burrell, 241 N.C. 432, 435, 85 S.E.2d 688, 691
(1954).
1866 N.C.- 455 (1872).
'°

Id. at 455.

The court also cited Meacham v. Larus & Bros. Co., 212 N.C. 642, 194
S.E. 99 (1937), where A and B, both passengers in an automobile, were
injured when their automobile collided with one driven by D. A sued D
for damages and B testified for A at the trial, which resulted in a judgment
adverse to A. B then sued D who pleaded the former judgment as res
judicata. It was held that B's participation in the former trial created no
estoppel against him. While the result is the same as in the principal case,
the difference in one's participation as a witness and as attorney would
seem great enough to render this case of doubtful value as precedent.
" In Falls v. Gamble, 66 N.C. 455 (1972), A and B both claimed under
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ninety years ago, and the court failed to mention that more recent
decisions2 have recognized the Restatement of Judgments rule 2
that control is an exception to the general requirement of parties or
privies.
Nevertheless, the result of the principal case seems correct for
reasons of sound administrative policy. The control exercised by
the attorney over the proceeding to 'set aside the default judgment is
all the more reason to deny his plea of estoppel when he is later
sued by his former client. To apply the exception to this case would
in effect allow the attorney who controlled the proceeding to work
toward a result beneficial to his own interest, but detrimental to his
clients. Since the attorney was acting in a representative capacity,
this would be a violation of his fiduciary obligations.2 3
SAMUEL S. WOODLEY, JR.

deeds from X. A brought an action against B to recover the land and introduced both deeds from X into evidence, attempting to prove that the deed to
B was given while X was an infant of ten. B pleaded as an estoppel a former
suit by B against X for trespass, where A had instigated the trespass then
complained of, aided in defending- that suit, employed counsel, and introduced his deed from X in evidence. The jury decided in the former
action that X was not an infant when he delivered his deed, which passed
title to B. A admitted his part in the former action. Although the same
questions were involved in both actions the court found no privity between
4 and X, holding that A's participation in that action made him an accessory
,before and after the act, but not a sufficient party to be estopped by it.
21
In Thompson v. Lassiter, 246 N.C. 34, 97 S.E.2d 492 (1957), A brought
an action against B to recover damages suffered by him in a collision between
an automobile driven by B and a family purpose automobile owned by A
and driven by his son. A alleged damage to his automobile, medical
expenses for his son, and loss of his son's services. In a former action
by C, who was injured in the same accident, against B, A's son was made
a party by B for purposes of contribution. A participated, in that suit as
guardian ad litem, and both B and A's son were found guilty of negligence.
B pleaded the former action as an estoppel, and the court agreed, quoting
the Restatement of Judgments.
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 238
N.C. 679, 79 S.E.2d 167 (1953), recognized the Restatement of Judgments
rule as an exception, but held the facts alleged were insufficient to invoke
it. See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R. 9 (1942).
"Falls v. Gamble, 66 N.C. 455 (1872), would seem to fall within this
rule. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 84, comment b (1942). "The rule
also applys to one who participates in an action because an issue in the
action is the tortious quality of an act on which his liability or freedom from
liability depends, or because the validity of a deed to which he claims title is
involved." (Emphasis added.)
2 One case has been found, on comparable facts with the principal case,
where a former finding was held conclusive in an action between an attorney
and his former client, but in that case the finding of fact in the prior suit
was to the best interest of the client. In Boynton v. Brown, 103 Ark. 513,
145 S.W. 242 (1912), attorney A brought suit against B for attorney's fees
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Foreign Divorce-Fraudulent Domicile-Full Faith and Credit
In Donnell v. Howell' the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that the full faith and credit clause' did not apply to a foreign divorce
decree obtained through fraudulent allegations of domicile in an
Alabama court. A brief review of prior decisions seems appropriate
in order to put this case in context.
The first of the celebrated Williams v. North Carolina decisions
involved a criminal prosecution for bigamous cohabitation. The
United States Supreme Court held that for a state to have jurisdiction to grant a divorce, at least one of the parties must be domiciled
4
in the state which awards the decree. The second Williams decision
held that full faith and credit need not be accorded to a foreign
divorce decree obtained in an ex parte proceeding where neither party
was domiciled in the awarding state. This blow to the efficacy of
the full faith and credit doctrine was somewhat softened by the
subsequent decisions of Sherrer v. Sherrer' and Coe v. Coe." In
these two decisions, the Court held that decrees obtained by fraudulent
due for services rendered in a prior action, and B alleged negligence on the
part of A in the management and conduct of that action. In the prior litigation the court ruled that A had not been negligent in discovering after the
trial that a certain decree upon which the opposing party based his claim
had been rendered in vacation time, and was, therefore, void, and ruled that
B was entitled to a bill of review. This finding was held conclusive in the
A-B suit, with no discussion of party or privy requirements.
In the principal case the clients alleged that they had been damaged in the
sum of $4203.54. Subsequent to the reported opinion the case was settled for
$2200.00. Letter From Rodman & Rodman, Attorneys For Plaintiffs, to Sam
S. Woodley Jr., December 6, 1962. While it would have been difficult for
plaintiffs to prove there was a meritorious defense, the court having ruled
as a matter of law, taking the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs,
that there was none; still defendant was undoubtedly reluctant to have the
case go to trial.
1 257 N.C. 175, 125 S.E.2d 448 (1962).
'U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
8317 U.S. 287 (1942).
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). For excellent discussions of the total effect of Williais and subsequent litigation, see Baer, So
Your Client Wants a Divorce!, 24 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1945) ; Baer, The After"mathof Williams v. North Carolina,28 N.C.L. REv. 265 (1950); Baer, The
Law of Divorce Fifteen Years After Williams v. North Carolina,36 N.C.L.
REv. 265 (1958).
334 U.S. 343 (1948). In Sherrer the defendant's attorney denied the
allegations of the plaintiff's domicile in the Florida divorce proceedings.
However, there Was no subsequent attempt to disprove the domicile.
U.S. 378 (1948). Coe was a companion case to Sherrer and in0334
volved a Nevada proceeding wherein the allegations of domicile were admitted by the defendant.
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jurisdiction in a sister state could not be collaterally attacked and
were entitled to full faith and credit where: (1) there was participation in the divorce action by the defendant, (2) full opportunity to
contest the jurisdictional issue of domicile was afforded the defendant, and (3) where the decree would not be subject to collateral
attack in the awarding state. When these requirements have been
met, res judicata applies to the jurisdictional issue of domicile. Regardless of whether the issue of domicile was actually litigated, the
decree is entitled to full faith and credit.'
In the principal case, the plaintiff-wife brought a partition proceeding8 concerning certain real property. She alleged that the
property was held with the defendant-husband as tenants in common
as a result of an Alabama divorce. The defendant answered that
the divorce was null and void because plaintiff was a bona fide resident of North Carolina at the time of the divorce. Therefore they still
held the property as tenants by the entirety, and no partition proceedings could be enforced. 9 The defendant had entered a general
and personal appearance in the Alabama proceedings by signing a
notice of waiver and answer to the complaint. By this instrument,
the defendant waived all service of process, submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of that court, and admitted that the plaintiff was a bona
fide resident of Alabama. The plaintiff replied that the effect of the
defendant's having signed the instrument was: (1) to estop the
defendant from attacking the decree, and (2) to entitle the decree
to full faith and credit. 10
It was clear from the facts that neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant had ever been domiciled in Alabama. The court found
that there was no estoppel." The court then held that the decree
7334 U.S. at 351-52.
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-3 (1950) allows such special proceedings for joint
tenants or tenants in common. When the parties are divorced, they become
tenants in common rather than remaining tenants by the entirety. McKinnon, Currie & Co. v. Caulk, 167 N.C. 411, 83 S.E. 559 (1914).
°The rule in North Carolina appears to be that a tenant by the entirety
cannot force partition without the consent of the spouse. See, e.g., Davis v.
Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 208, 124 S.E. 566, 570 (1924) (dictum) ; Jones v. W. A.
Smith
& Co., 149 N.C. 318, 319, 62 S.E. 1092, 1093 (1908) (dictum).
10 257 N.C. at 177, 125 S.E.2d at 450.
1
There could be no true estoppel. The plaintiff knew all of the material
facts and had not been misled. She was actively trying to enjoy the benefits
of her fraudulent act. The defendant was merely trying to resist. Although the defendant had participated with her in the fraud, to estop him
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was subject to collateral attack and that full faith and credit did not
apply. The Sherrer and Coe cases were. distinguished on the grounds
that in the Donnell case: (1) the defendant was not at the trial, (2)
the defendant did not participate in the trial, and (3) the defendant
vvas not represented by counsel at the trial. 2 The first two reasons
given for refusing to invoke the Sherrer doctrine seem clearly insufficient. In a United States Supreme Court decision,'" the defendant's sole participation in the divorce action was by attorney,
and the Court held the decree was not subject to collateral attack. The Sherrer and Coe cases were cited as controlling. The
third reason given would seem equally insufficient because the only
requirement laid down by the Sherrer case is that there be participation by the defendant. There appears to be no requirement of a cerThere was participation in Donnell.
tain degree of participation.
by his answer and waiver, the defendant entered a general and
personal appearance and became a party to the suit.' 4 The defendant
clearly participated, but failed to take advantage of his opportunity
to contest the issue of domicile.' 5
Perhaps a better attempt at evading the effect of the Sherrer
doctrine could have been made. It could have been argued that
the failure of the defendant to be at the trial, or to have a lawyer, may.
have resulted in there not having been a full opportunity to contest
the issue of domicile.' 6 Still another device would be that the decree
would be subject to collateral attack in the awarding state, Alabama,
"would be [productive of] an offense against public morals and good conscience, a reflection upon the integrity of the court, and productive of perjury." Id. at 185, 125 S.E.2d at 455. For comprehensive treatments of the
doctrine of estoppel with respect to the validity of foreign divorce decrees,
see, e.g., Annots., 175 A.L.R. 538 (1948), 153 A.L.R. 941 (1944), 140 A.L.R.
914 (1942), 122 A.L.R. 1321 (1939), 109 A.L.R. 1018 (1937).
- 2 Id.at 187, 125 S.E.2d at 457.
" ohnson v.Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).

In order to overcome the validity of a foreign decree, it would seem
that the attacking party has the burden of showing that the defendant never
made an appearance in the divorce action. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 128
(1951) (dictum).
" "If respondent failed to take advantage of the opportunities afforded
him, the responsibility is his own. We do not believe that the dereliction of
a defendant [to litigate the issue of domicile] under such circumstances
should be permitted to provide a basis for subsequent attack in the court of
a sister State on a decree valid in the State in which it was rendered."
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 (1948).
" See Note, Participation by Defendant Spouse in a Foreign Divorce
Action: State Court Interpretation of the "Sherrer Doctrine," 34 IND. L.J.
592, 597 (1959).
14
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and hence not subject to full faith and credit under the Sherrer-Coe
17
decisions.
. It should not be overlooked that the exact fact situation in Donnell has not been before the United States Supreme Court, i.e. where
the sole participation by the defendant was the signing of a written
instrument."8 In this fact situation, the states have reached different
results. Some states grant full faith and credit, 9 while others, like
North Carolina have refused to extend full faith and credit to this fact
situation.2" And still other courts may or may not give full faith
and credit, depending on the circumstances of the case. 2 '
' In Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961), the parties
appeared in an action to modify a decree which had been effective for six
years. When the trial judge found that both parties admitted that neither
had ever been domiciled, and that they had consequently worked a fraud
on the awarding court, he vacated the decree. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. The requirement of the full faith and credit doctrine is that
a sister state give the decree as much effect as it would be given in the
awarding state. When Alabama vacates its decrees, why not let North Carolina do the same to an Alabama decree on an identical fact situation?
In Hudson v. Hudson, 69 N.J. Super. 128, 173 A.2d 721' (Super. Ct. Ch.
1961), the court refused to examine a decree on the basis'of Hartigan. For
discussions concluding that this approach would be impermissible, see
Comment, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 459, 468-69 (1962); Ross & Crawford,
Greshem's Law of Domestic Relations: The Alabama Quickie, 27 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 224, 246 (1961). See also, Note, 36 TUL. L. REV., 154 (1961).
But cf. Rosenbluth v. Rosenbluth, 34 Misc. 2d 290, 228 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup.
Ct. 1962) which held that a third party could attack an Alabama divorce
decree on this basis and was not precluded by full faith and credit.
For evidence that Alabama is concerned with the fraudulent domicile
problem, see Ross & Crawford, supra at 241-42.
" In both Sherrer and Coe the parties were both present at the proceed-'
ings and represented by counsel. In Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581
(1951), the defendant was represented by counsel. In Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S.
126 (1951), there was no determination of the extent of the defendant's
participation.
1
in re Raynor's Estate, 220 Cal. App. 2d 715, 332 P.2d 416 (3d Dist.
1958) (defendant's sole participation was by signing a notice and waiver);
In re Day's Estate, 7 Ill. 2d 348, 131 N.E.2d 50 (1956); Boxer v. Boxer,
12 Misc. 2d 205, 177 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Supp. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 1001,
184 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1959), aff'd 'mem., 7 N.Y.2d 781, 163 N.E.2d 149 (1959)
(defendant signed a power of attorney); Chittick v. Chittick, 332 Mass. 554,
126 N.E.2d 495 (1955) (sole participation was having lawyer at the proceedings).
" Gherardi De Parata v. Gherardi De Parata, 179 A.2d 723 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. App. 1962); Eaton v. Eaton, 227 La. 992, 81 So. 2d 371 (1955); Pelle
v. Pelle, 229 Md. 160, 182 A.2d 37 (1962); Brasier v. Brasier, 200 Okla.
689, 200 P.2d 427 (1948). Cf. Davis v. Davis, 259 Wis. 1, 47 N.W.2d
338 (1951) where the court required physical participation by the defendant
and refused to grant full faith to the decree, even though the defendant was
represented by counsel at the trial.
2
In New Jersey full faith was denied where the plaintiff obtained a
power of attorney from the defendant and obtained a foreign divorce.
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In Sherrer and Coe there were indications that the decisions
would add certainty to the marital status.2 As the above cases
bear witness, certainty has not resulted. The courts are seizing on
insignificant factual variations to avoid Sherrer and to prevent their
own divorce laws from becoming ineffective.
The Sherrer case and other related decisions by the United States
Supreme Court may be beneficial in that their effect is to allow
quicker divorces which are needed in our modern society. 23 Perhaps
the Constitution demands that the full faith and credit doctrine be
upheld. 4 However it seems that the merits lie elsewhere. It is
questionable that the full faith and credit clause should be used to
defeat a state's divorce laws. The marriage relation is a basic institution of our society, and a state should be able to prescribe its own
laws reflecting this relationship. Other states, for monetary or other
considerations, should not be able to defeat the laws of sister states in
proceedings tainted with fraud. Although the court's reasoning in
Donnell may be faulty, the result nevertheless seems desirable because
such a fraudulent proceeding was nullified. But the practical effect
of Donnell is only that the parties now have to either hire a lawyer,
or be at the trial personally, to be protected by full faith and credit.
What is needed to remedy this situation is clear. The United
States Supreme Court should re-examine and overrule the Sherrer
and Coe cases and return to the Williams decision in order to prevent
this fraudulent circumvention of the individual state's divorce law.
The integrity of our divorce laws should not be defeated by a twisted
and hollow use of the full faith and credit doctrine.
JOHN SIKES JOHNSTON
Staedler v. Staedler, 6 NJ. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951).

But where the defendant got his own attorney, full faith was granted. Hudson v. Hudson,
69 NJ. Super. 128, 173 A.2d 721 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1961), Schlemm v.
Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 158 A.2d 508 (1960).
In the District of Columbia, full faith was denied where the defendant,
in a distraught condition, signed a power of attorney. Ryan v. Ryan, 139
F. Supp. 98 (D.D.C. 1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1956). But full
faith was granted when the defendant signed a notice of waiver and entry
of appearance. Drinkwater v. Drinkwater, 111 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1953).
22 For a discussion of the merits of this "certainty," see 334 U.S. at 363,
368-69 (dissenting opinion).
2 See generally Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce DecreesPresent Doctrine and Possible Changes, 9 VAND. L. REv. 1-4 (1955).
2 334 U.S. at 355.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Insane Persons-Guardianship-Restoration to Sanity After
In re Wilson
In In re Wilson1 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
permanent commitment to a mental hospital without proper notice
and hearing is a violation of due process.2 In addition the court,
by way of dictum, placed a construction on the North Carolina involuntary commitment and guardianship procedure which is the
subject of consideration here.
The North Carolina procedure for involuntary commitment or
hospitalization of insane persons is contained in Chapter 122 of the
General Statutes. Section 122-46' authorizes the clerk of the
superior court to hold an informal hearing upon the certification of
two physicians that a person is in need of observation. At this hearing, which is preceded by notice to the allegedly deranged person,
the clerk must examine any proper witnesses and the certificates and
affidavits of the physicians. He may then issue an order of commitment for an observation period not exceeding sixty days. 4 If this
period should prove to be insufficient, the clerk may order the person
to remain at the hospital for another observation period not exceeding
four months.5 When the observation is completed, the hospital
authorities must file with the clerk a written report stating their
conclusions as to the patient's sanity. Upon the basis of this report
the clerk may either order the person discharged or committed indeterminately, as the facts may warrant.' The subsequent discharge
of a person indeterminately committed is upon certification by the
superintendent of the hospital that the patient has regained his
7
sanity.
The guardianship statutes, quite distinct from the commitment
procedure, are contained in Chapter 35. Mental incapacity" is the
-257 N.C. 593, 126 S.E.2d 489 (1962).

2 This note should be read in connection with Note, 41 N.C.L. Rzv. 141
(1962)
discusses the constitutional issues involved in this case.
8
N.C.which
GEN. STAT. § 122-46 (Supp. 1961).
'If a person committed is found not to be mentally disordered the superintendent must immediately report this to the clerk who shall order his
discharge. Ibid.

'N.C.
I1bid.
T N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 122-46.1 (Supp. 1961).

GEN. STAT.

§ 122-66.1 (1958).

Mental incapacity is the inability to legally manage and understand one's
affairs. It should not be confused with the various medical terms describing
types of mental illnesses.
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only cause for appointment of a guardian under this Chapter.' Section 35-210 requires a jury finding of insanity before the clerk is
authorized to appoint a guardian for one not confined in an institution. "Restoration to sanity"" for such person is also by jury trial
under G.S. § 35412 upon the filing of a petition in his behalf.
- The certificate of the superintendent of a mental hospital declaring
a patient already committed to be insane is sufficient evidence to
authorize the clerk to appoint a guardian. 3 A certificate from the
superintendent may also restore a patient to legal sanity. 4 Upon
discharge from a mental institution the patient for whom a guardian
has been appointed may petition the clerk for the guardian's discharge. 5 A hearing is then held, with or without a jury at the
petitioner's option. One or more physicians are appointed by the
clerk to examine the petitioner and make affidavits as to his mental
state. Upon a determination of legal competency the clerk must discharge the guardian.
It should be noted that guardianship is not a necessary element of
commitment. The two proceedings are complete in themselves.
A person may be committed to a mental institution without the
appointment of a guardian, just as a guardian may be appointed
without commitment.
The 1957 General Assembly,. in an effort to clarify the effect of
involuntary commitment for observation under G.S. § 122-46 on
legal competency, amended the statute by adding the following
paragraph:
Neither the institution of a proceeding to have any alleged
mentally disordered person committed for observation as provided in this section nor the order of commitment by the clerk
as provided in this section shall have the effect of creating
any presumption that such person is legally incompetent for
any purpose. Provided, however, that if a guardian or trustee
has been appointed.., under G.S. 35-2 or 35-3 the procedure
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §35-2 (Supp. 1961). The adjudication of incompetency and appointment of a guardian are merged into one finding.
"°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2 (Supp. 1961).
" "Restoration to sanity" is used in the statutes to mean a return to mental
capacity.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-4 (Supp. 1961),
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-3 (Supp. 1961).
'4 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-5 (Supp. 1961).
"5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-4.1 (1950).
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for restoration to sanity shall be as is now provided in G.S.
35-4 and 35-4.1. x6
It had been expressly held prior to this amendment that the procedure outlined in Chapter 35 did not apply to a person involuntarily
committed to a mental institution under G.S. § 122-46. His remedy
was by habeas corpus, not jury trial."
The construction placed on the amendment by the North Carolina
Supreme Court, however, appears to be contrary to the express
language of the statute and inconsistent with the legislative intent.
The court's dictum in the principal case reads the amendment to
provide that restoration to sanity for one committed under G.S.
§ 122-46 may be had under G.S. §§ 35-3, 35-4, and 35-4.1. They
said that "The amendment removes from G.S. § 122-46 the objection
that a traditional trial by jury is not provided as a means of determining the issue of sanity. Apparently the requirement that a
guardian be appointed and made a party is to give binding effect to
an adverse verdict by the jury."'" The court said a judgment that a
person is lawfully detained and insane exceeds the scope of habeas
corpus. 9 They concluded by saying that:
As a more practical approach, however, a guardian may be
appointed upon the basis of the superintendent's certificate as
provided in G.S. 35-3. A petition, on the application of some
relative or friend, may be filed invoking the procedure under
G.S. 35-4 and have a jury pass upon Mrs. Wilson's sanity.
The guardian should be a party to the end the finding of the
jury, if adverse, may have finality until a material change in
condition occurs.20
This interpretation by the court seems to embrace procedures not
contemplated by the amendment. The basic steps suggested are
".C.
GEx. STAT. § 122-46 (Supp. 1961). Prior to this amendment
there had been some confusion among members of the bar, particularly those
in title practice, as to whether commitment to a mental institution created a
presumption that the patient was incompetent, and thus incapable of disposing
of his property.
"it re Harris, 241 N.C. 179, 84 S.E.2d 808 (1954).
18257 N.C. at 596, 126 S.E.2d at 491.
"This is a departure from In re Harris, 241 N.C. 179, 84 S.E.2d 808
(1954). The court's reasoning seems to be that the writ of habeas corpus
test the legality
of the petitioner's detention assuming he may be
can only Therefore
"insane.
a finding
that petitioner is in fact insane is beyond the
,scope of the writ and may be made only by a jury.
20 257 N.C. at 597, 126 S.E.2d at 492.
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the appointment of a guardian under G.S. § 35-3, followed by a
petition by the patient under G.S. § 35-4 asserting his competency,
thus resulting in a jury trial on the question of his sanity." Analys'is
reveals that this would not accomplish the ends anticipated by the
court. Even if the jury finds the patient competent, the guardian's
removal does not result in the patient's discharge from the hospital.
A court adjudication of incompetency is not a necessary element
for detention in a mental hospital under our statutes.2 2
The strongest argument that can be made against the court's
interpretation of the amendment, however, is that it reads into the
statute a legislative intent to import guardianship procedure into
involuntary commitment procedure, when in fact it was the intent
of the proviso within the amendment to make it clear that G.S.
§ 122-46 would have no effect on guardianship proceedings, and vice
23
versa.
Despite the confusion of the principal case, it serves to point up
two problems worthy of mention. One is the feasibility of a jury
trial in hospitalization procedures, the other the relationship between
hospitalization and guardianship or incompetency proceedings.24
The majority of jurisdictions have dispensed with jury trials in
hospitalization cases since they are not necessary for due process.2
" It is difficult to ascertain exactly what the court envisaged. The appointment of a guardian apparently is to enable the patient to invoke the
procedures under G.S. § 35-4 for restoration to competency by jury trial.
Even so, restoration under G.S. § 35-4 does not affect the patient's status
in the
hospital.
22N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122-46.1 (Supp. 1961).
23 "I should like to state simply that the purpose of the amendment was
to clarify the law in the following particulars, to-wit: . . . (2) To make it
clear that G.S. 12246 would have no effect on guardianship proceedings, and
Again, I should like to state that the question of trial by
vice versa....
jury, the appointment of a guardian and the purpose for such appointment
was not contemplated under G.S. 122-46 by the amendment. It was the sole
specific purpose and intent of the proviso within the amendment to provide
that the procedure for the restoration to sanity for those whose cases come
within the classifications embraced in G.S. 35-2 or 35-3 would be as provided
by G.S. 35-4 and 35-4.1." Letter from Clyde A. Shreve to George C.
Cochran, August 3, 1962. Mr. Shreve was co-introducer of the amendment.
" See generally Curran, Hospitalizationof the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. Rnv.

274 (1953) ; GUTTMACHER &WEIHI0FEN,

PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
LINDMAN AND MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW

(1952) ;
(1961);

Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICn.
L. REv. 945 (1959); Slovenko & Super, The Mentally Disabled, the Law,
and 3the Report of the American Bar Foundation,47 VA. L. REv. 1366 (1961).
E.g., Clough v. Clough, 10 Colo. App. 433, 51 Pac. 513 (1897) ; People
v. Niesman, 356 Ill. 322, 190 N.E. 668 (1934) ; In re Brewer, 224 Iowa 773,
276 N.W. 766 (1937) ; Ex parte Higgins v. Hoctor, 332 Mo. 1022, 62 S.W.2d
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Contemporary writers2 6 on the subject have cited Alaska and Kentucky as the only states that require a jury trial in every case; however, recent statutory changes in these two states now require a jury
trial only if requested by the patient." Thus Alaska and Kentucky
have now joined approximately- thirty per cent of the states which
provide optional jury trials.28
Admission procedures to a mental hospital should be as simple as
possible. As a means to this end authorities, both medical and legal,
have strongly urged dispensing with jury trials.29 The detrimental
effect a trial may have on a mentally unbalanced person is readily
apparent. If he is required to sit through a trial and listen to his
physician, his family, and other witnesses testify against him it may
make psychiatric treatment even more difficult.3" Also, the use of a
lay jury to determine such a highly technical question as insanity has
been compared to "calling the neighbors to diagnose meningitis or
scarlet fever."3
A paranoiac, for example, can be lucid and convincing one instant and completely deranged the next. 2 The
mentally ill person is much more likely to fool a jury than an expert,
while the truly sane person should have no greater difficulty convincing a judge and expert physician of his sanity than he would
a jury.

The relationship between hospitalization and incompetency differs
410 (1933); It re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789 (1904); Ex parte
Dagley, 35 Okla. 180, 128 Pac. 699 (1912). See Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v.
Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226 (1923); Montana Co. v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co.,
152 U.S. 160 (1894). Cf. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900), Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
2'See Ross, supra note 24, at 970.
m ALASKA COm. LAWS ANN. § 51-4-4 (1949) required a jury trial in
commitment proceedings. This was repealed by an Act of Congress, July 28,
1956. The proclamation issued by the Acting Governor of Alaska on June

19, 1957, made this effective July 1, 1957. The new law requires a jury

trial only upon written request at least two days prior to the hearing.
ALASKA Com. LAWS ANN. § 51-4-20h(f) (Supp. 1958). Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 202.080 (1952) required a jury trial in every case. This section was repealed in 1960. Ky. Laws 1960, ch. 67, § 35. Ky. REv. STAT. § 202.140
(1962) now provides that a jury trial is still required in all instances if the
petition requests the person be adjudged incompetent.
8 For a table showing the statutory provisions as to jury trials in the
other states, see LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 58-62.
' See GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 300; LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 27, 41; Ross, suepra note 24, at

970.
81
8

See generally Ross, supra note 24.
STERN, MENTAL ILLNESS: A GUIDE

See Ross, supra note 24, at 970.

FOR THE FAMILY

37 (1952).
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greatly.among the states. 33 There is considerable controversy over
whether a person in need of confinement in a mental hospital is necessarily incapable of managing his own affairs., 4 Incompetency may
bd the result of independent judicial action, as it is in North Carolina,
6r it may be one of the issues decided at a hospitalization proceeding. 5
The appointment of a guardian, however, is a consequence of an
adjudication of incompetency in North Carolina.8" The legislative
,trend appears to be toward complete separation of hospitalization
and incompetency." The Draft Act" prepared by the National Institute of Mental Health states that an order of hospitalization decides
no more than the need for hospitalization. Several states have
adopted modified versions of this act.3 9
The separation of the two procedures is based upon the presumption that a person in need of hospitalization may still be quite capable
of handling certain of his affairs, just as an incompetent may not need
.hospitalization. In support of this view, it has been espoused that
"from a medical viewpoint, there is no necessary relationship beMental disabilities vary
tween commitability and competency." 4
-tosuch a degree that any connection between hospitalization and incompetency seems unjustified.
FRANK W. BuLLocK, JR.
, See Ross, supra note 24, at 980-95; LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit.
supra note 24, at 220, 235-8. Hospitalization and incompetency are two
distinct legal concepts fulfilling different purposes. Although both result in
a loss of rights, hospitalization affects the person's freedom to be at large
•while incompetency results in a loss of civil rights and gives the incompetent
the legal status of a minor.
8 See Ross, supra note 24, at 980-95; LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. Cit.
sitpra
note 24, at 220, 235-8.
0
' Ibid.

"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-2, -3 (Supp. 1961). In some of the states
'which merge hospitalization and incompetency a guardian is not always appointed. Thus the incompetent is in the position of being unable to manage
his own affairs and yet has no one to do so for him. See LINDMAN & McINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 220, 235-8.
IT See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 221.
11 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY,
A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL, SCOPE
oF THE D rArAcr 2, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE PUB. No. 51, 1952. For a

'brief summary of the act by one of its authors, see Felix, Hospitalization of
the MentaUy Ill, 107 Am[. J. PSYCHIATRY 712 (1951). See also Ross, supra
note 24; Slovenko & Super, supra note 24.
"0See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. ci. supra note 24, at 221; Ross, supra
991.
note 24, at 949 n. 19,
' GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 339.

1963]

NOTES AND- COMMENTS

Labor Law-Railway Labor Act--7Use of Union Funds
for Non-bargainable Purposes

The right to work or to be employed is property within the
meaning of due process and is entitled to legal protection.' One
cannot be deprived of the right to work by an arbitrary mandate of
the legislature ;' however, the right is subject to reasonable regulation
under statutes enacted in the exercise of the police power.3 Many
states,4 including North Carolina,' have enacted statutes6 or constitutional provisions 7 providing that no one shall be denied an opportunity to attain or retain employment because he is or' is not
a member of a labor organization. These laws outlaw both union
and closed shop agreements. 8 However, it has been held that
these state laws must yield to federal laws permitting such union
security provisions in a field over which the federal government has

jurisdiction.'
One such federal law is the Railway Labor Act. This act was
amended in 1951 to authorize a labor organization to make agreements with carriers requiring membership in the organization as a
condition of employment.' 0 Membership under such an agreement
'Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
'Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
'Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
"Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Virginia. The "Right to Work"
law in Louisiana is limited to agricultural and certain processing workers.
See Pollitt, Right to Work Law Issues: An Evidentiary Approach, 37 N.C.L.
REv. 233 (1959).
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (1958).
o See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-901 to -09 (1961).
"See, e.g., FLA. CONsT., Declarationof Rights § 12.

'For the effect of these laws on the agency shop, see Johanneson, Recent
Decisions Concerning the Agency Shop, 40 N.C.L. REV. 603 (1962).
'Hudson v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441, cert. denied,
351 U.S. 949 (1956).
10 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. § 152, which provides in part: "any carrier or
carriers as defined in this Chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance
with the requirements of this Act shall be permitted (a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that . . . all

employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their

craft or class. Provided, That no such agreement shall require such condition

of employment with respect to employees to whom membership is not available
upon the same terms and conditions as are generally applicable'to any other
member or with respect to employees to whom membership was denied or

terminated for any other than the failure of the employee to tender the
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cannot, however, be denied or terminated for any reason other than
the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees,
and assessments."'
The constitutionality of security agreements entered into pursuant to the union shop amendment was attacked in Hanson v. Union
Pac. R.R.' 2 In this case the plaintiffs sought to restrain the carrier
and the unions from putting into effect union shop agreements containing provisions expressly authorized by the union shop amendment. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the enforcement
of these contract provisions would deprive the plaintiffs of the freedom to join or not to join in association with others as guaranteed
by the first amendment, and would deprive them of property without
due process of law, as guaranteed by the fifth amendment, by requiring them to pay for many things besides the cost of collective
bargaining. The defendants appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which reversed.1 3 In upholding the constitutionality of the
union shop amendment, the Court stated that it was enacted pursuant
to the power of Congress under the commerce clause,14 and superceded any state law to the contrary by its express terms and, therefore, by force of the supremacy clause of the federal constitution.1"
In Allen v. Southern Ry.'0 the North Carolina Supreme Court
was presented with a similar constitutional question. In this case
non-union employees of the railroad sought an injunction to restrain
.collection from them of dues, fees, or assessments not reasonably
necessary and related to collective bargaining. The trial court enjoined the collections but provided that if the union would present
proof as to what portion would be reasonably necessary to collective
bargaining, such portion could be collected. The defendants appealed
to the North Carolina Supreme Court which, in reversing, stated:
"'the very questions now raised by plaintiffs were before the Court
and decided in Hanson . . . ,'7 The court interpreted Hanson as
holding that a requirement that plaintiffs pay ordinary periodic dues
periodic dues, initiation fees and penalties, uniformly required as a condition
of acquiring
or retaining membership."
11

Ibid.

160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526 -(1955).
Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
",
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
1 U.S. COiST. art. 6, § 2.
' 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125 (1959).
17
Id.at 504, 107 S.E.2d at 133.
12
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and initiation fees uniformly required of all members violates neither
the first nor the fifth amendments.
Plaintiffs, however, contended that the questions raised in Allen
were not decided by Hanson but were, in fact, expressly reserved.
In support of their contention, plaintiffs cite language of Justice
Douglas, who, in writing for the majority of the Court in Hanson,
stated: "If assessments are in fact imposed for purposes not germane
to collective bargaining, a different problem would be presented.""8
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, was of the opinion
that the questions reserved in Hanson would arise only if and when
defendant-unions should undertake to deny membership or to terminate membership because of the failure of plaintiffs to comply with
the various regulations applicable to voluntary members, e.g. refusal
to sign application blanks or failure to attend meetings. 9
After the adverse decision of the North Carolina court, the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing. The petition was allowed, but the
court deferred rehearing pending the decision of the United States
Supreme Court on a case on appeal from the state of Georgia. In
this case, InternatiotalAss'n of Machinistsv. Street,2 0 the plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the enforcement of a union shop agreement entered
into pursuant to the Railway Labor Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the
agreement required as a condition of continued employment that the
employees pay union dues which would be used to support political
and economic programs, and candidates for office opposed by the
plaintiffs. The trial court granted the relief sought, and this was
affirmed on appeal by the Georgia Supreme Court which held
that the union shop agreement violated the plaintiffs' right to freedom of speech and deprived them of their property without due
process of law. The defendants appealed to the United States
Supreme Court which reversed the holding as to the constitutional
issues.2 ' While recognizing that the case squarely presented "the
at 503, 107 S.E.2d at 133, citing from 351 U.S. at 238 (1956).
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Parker felt that the case presented the
very question reserved in Hanson, and that it was not within the concept of
due process to compel a person to contribute dues and fees from his earnings
for the purpose of promoting political and ideological ends to which he is
opposed, and of electing men to public office whose purposes he may distrust,
and if he does not so contribute to discharge him from his job with loss of
seniority.
20215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959).
2 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
19 Id.
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Hanson"2 2

as to the use of
constitutional questions reserved in
exacted funds for political purposes opposed by the employees, the
Court avoided deciding these questions by construing the Railway
Labor Act to deny such use of the funds."3 The case was remanded
to the Georgia Supreme Court for consideration of a proper remedy.24
After the decision of the Supreme Court in Street, a rehearing
was held in the Allen case. This time,2" the court was equally
divided. 6 Thus, the trial court was affirmed without becoming
As a result, the union must prove what portion of the
precedent.
Id. at 749.
In Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), a companion case with
Street, a Wisconsin lawyer brought an action to recover dues paid to the
integrated state bar. He alleged that the bar "has used its.., funds in active
opposition to the adoption of legislation which" he favored. Id. at 822. Although the case arose on a demurrer, a plurality of the Court again refused
to consider the constitutional issues because plaintiff did not indicate "whether
any of his dues were used to support the State Bar's positions." Id. at 846.
See note 30 infra.
24 The United States Supreme Court stated that appropriate remedies in
such a case do not include an ifijtftfction against the enforcement of a union
shop agreement, or an injunction barring the union from collecting any funds
from its objecting members, nor an injunction against all expenditures for
the disputed purposes, even if the injunction is conditioned on cessation of the
improper expenditures. The Court suggested, however, that appropriate
remedies would include (1) an injunction against expenditures, for political
causes opposed by the complaining employee, of a sum which is so much of
the money exacted from him as is the proportion of the union's total expenditures made for such political activities to the union's total budget, or (2)
restitution to an individual employee of that portion of his money which
the union expended for the political causes to which he had advised the
union he was opposed. In the latter remedy, the portion of his money the
employee would be entitled to recover would be in the same proportion that
the expenditures for political purposes which he had advised the union he
disapproved bore to the total union budget.
"Allen v. Southern Ry., 256 N.C. 700, 124 S.E.2d 871 (1962).
28
justice Sharp declined to take part in the consideration of the rehearing
because she had presided at the hearing of the case and had entered an interlocutory order at the superior court level.
" The court cited two North Carolina cases, Schoenith v. Town & Country Realty Co., 244 N.C. 601, 94 S.E.2d 592 (1956) and Ward v. Odell Mfg.
Co., 126 N.C. 946, 36 S.E. 194 (1900), to support the proposition that the
trial court should be affirmed. However, neither of these cases involved a
rehearing. Actually, it would seem that the law in North Carolina is contrary to the result of this decision. See' Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S.
454 (1940) where the United States Supreme Court in commenting on the
history of the case stated: "The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed
and then, being evenly divided on rehearing, allowed the reversal to stand."
311 U.S. at 455. The case was reversed by the Supreme Court on other
grourids.
The few cases which have decided the point elsewhere are in conflict. See
Pitton v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 144 Fla. 462, 198 So. 503 (1940), holding that an
equal. division of the court on rehearing works an affirmance of the previous
28
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exacted funds would be reasonably necessary to collective bargaining.
Otherwise, it would be enjoined from making any further collections
from union members.
A view somewhat analogous to that taken by the North Carolina
trial court was taken by the Supreme Court of Georgia" when considering the Street case on remand from the United States Supreme
Court. Here the Court directed the trial court to determine the
amount being expended for non-bargainable purposes, and to enter
a decree accordingly. If the trial court was unable to make this
determination, it was directed to enjoin the union from spending any
money for political purposes.
The view taken by the North Carolina trial court would seem
to be a desirable one since it would be impractical, if not impossible,
for a union member to prove what portion of his dues and assessments were being expended for non-bargainable purposes. Under
this view the union members would be required only to prove that
some of the union funds were being used for non-bargainable purposes. The court would then enjoin further collections and expenditures until the union could prove how much was being used for
bargainable purposes.
In conclusion, it may only be said that this area of the law remains
in a state of confusion. The Street case, while authority for the
proposition that the Railway Labor Act prohibits compulsory contributions by union members to non-bargainable political purposes,
29
leaves the constitutional issues unanswered. Lathrop v. Donohue,
a companion case with Street, merely adds further confusion to the
law. Although a majority of the members of the Court agreed in
Lathrop that the constitutional issues were properly raised,3 0 the
opinion of the appellate court and not an affirmance of the judgment appealed
from, when the original judgment was reversed and Richards v. Burden, 59
Iowa 723, 13 N.W. 90 (1882), holding that the lower court would be affirmed
insuch a case.
This point of the Allen case will be commented on in the Tenth Annual
Survey of North Carolina Case Law, which will appear in a later issue of
the Law Review.
"8International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 217 Ga. 351, 122 S.E.2d
220 (1961).
°367 U.S. 820 (1961).
Five members of the Court agreed that a constitutional question was
raised. Of these five, two felt that a state can, without violating the constitution, compel a lawyer to pay dues to be used in part for support of legislation
which he opposes. Another member felt that a state may require ''that a
lawyer pay to its designee an annual fee ... as a condition of its grant, or of
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effect of the decision is, perhaps, best summed up by Justice Black,
who, in a dissent, states: "I do not believe that either the bench,
the bar or the litigants will know what has been decided in this
case-certainly I do not."- The problem is further complicated in
North Carolina due to the fact that the court on rehearing the
Allen case did not refer to the constitutional issues in its opinion.
In any event, the court was equally divided and, therefore, the holding of the case, whatever it may be, is not precedent for future
litigation.
JERRY W. Amos
Associate Editor

Torts-Judicial Abrogation of the Doctrine of Municipal
Immunity to Tort Liability
In Holytz v. City of Milwaukee1 an action was brought by a

three-and-one-half year old infant against the defendant municipality
for injuries sustained when a steel trap door, covering a water meter
pit, fell on her hands. An action was also brought by the infant's
father to recover for medical expenses incurred by him as a result
of his child's injuries, and for damages due to loss of her society
and companionship. The injuries occurred while the infant was
using a playground maintained by the defendant for pre-school aged
children. It was alleged that the employees of the defendant had
negligently allowed the trap door to remain open.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, reversing the trial court which
had sustained the defendant's demurrer, held that the municipality
was not immune from liability for its negligent torts. In so holding,
Wisconsin joined at least four other states2 which have abolished by
continuing its grant, to him of the special privilege . . . of practicing law
in the State." Id. at 865. Two members agreed that the powers conferred
on the bar violated both the first and fourteenth amendments. Finally, a
plurality of four members refused to consider the constitutional issues. Cf.,
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948) and United States v. International
Union UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) construing 18 U.S.C. § 610 which prohibits any corporation or labor organization from making "a contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election to any political office....
1"367 U.S. at 865.
'17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
' California,see Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Florida,see Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Illinois, see Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) ; Michigan, see Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
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judicial decision the time-honored and deeply engrained doctrine of
municipal immunity to tort liability.'
While the basic principle of governmental immunity is founded
on the English concept that the sovereign can do no wrong,4 the
judicial basis of municipal immunity from tort claims can be traced
to the English case of Russel v. Men of Devon.' In that case an
unincorporated county was relieved of liability for damages which
were caused by the disrepair of a bridge. As one of the reasons for
its decision, the court stated that "it is better that an individual
should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience."'
There is probably no tenet in our law that has been more universally berated by courts7 and legal writers' than the governmental
immunity doctrine. The criticisms are wide-ranging and highly
varied. Some common examples are: that it is unfair to impose
upon the individual the burden of his damage, rather than upon the
entire community where it justly belongs ;9 that by denying a remedy
for a wrong, the doctrine results in the deprivation of life, liberty,
and property without due process of law; x" and that the doctrine
runs counter to a basic concept underlying the law of torts, that is,
that liability follows negligence."
Why has a rule been adhered to so consistently and with so few
exceptions in the face of virtually unanimous criticism? The answer
to this question is embedded in the traditions of the Anglo-American
philosophy of the common law and the doctrine of stare decisis.
' For other notes dealing with the general subject of municipal immunity
from tort liability see Notes, 4 N.C.L. Rlv. 136 (1926), 12 N.C.L. REv. 172
(1934), and 36 N.C.L. REv. 97 (1957).
" See Borchard, Government Liability in Torts, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924).
2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). There is some argument
that this case relied upon an earlier authority from Brookes Abr., but most
historical analyses agree that Men of Devon is the common law basis of
tort immunity. See 17 Wis. 2d at -, 115 N.W.2d at 620.
municipal
0
Id. at 673, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. Another ground advanced by the court
for allowing immunity was that the defendant was an unincorporated county
and did not have funds to pay damages.
See, e.g., Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 153, 176, 126 N.E.
72, 77 (1919).
' See, e.g., Casner & Fuller, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54
HARV. L. REv. 437 (1941).
' Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480 (1943).'
10Liber

v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 209, 353 P.2d 590, 593 (1960) (dissenting

opinion).
" Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 20,

163 N.E.2d 89, 93 (1959).
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Invariably, in the opinions of the courts upholding the rule of
municipal immunity, one will find a statement to the effect that the
overruling of such a well-established doctrine is a policy question
which should be directed to the legislature and not the court."2 There
are numerous areas of the law, however, where the courts have overruled long-standing common-law doctrines. Most analogous to the
subject under discussion is the judicial abolition of tort immunity
of charitable institutions.1 3 The right of the child to recover from
a third party for alienation of affection and disruption of the family
ciicle,' 4 the recognition of the right of privacy, 5 and the right of
contribution between or among negligent tortfeasors 6 similarly
illustrate areas of the common law which the courts have chosen to
7
change, despite the demands of stare decisis.'

The seemingly invincible barrier to judicial abrogation of
*municipal tort immunity was first broken in the Florida case of
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach."s Subsequently, at least four
other jurisdictions,' 9 including Wisconsin, have joined what now
" See, e.g., Howard v. Tocoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 167, 152
Pac. 1004 (1915), where the court stated that the doctrine had become fixed

as a matter of public policy, and regardless of the reason upon which the rule

was made to rest, any change had to come from the legislature. See also
Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 157 Me. 174, 170 A.2d 687 (1961);
Maffie v. Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
8See, e.g., Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d
276 (1958), where the court, in overruling the doctrine, said that it is a
judicial responsibility to conform to modem concepts and needs, and when
judges of a later generation reach contrary conclusions with those of an
earlier generation, they must take the necessary corrective action. But see
Knecht v. St. Mary's Hosp., 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958), where the court
refused to overrule the doctrine even though judge-made, because it was
firmly fixed in the law of the state, and, therefore, should be abrogated only
by the legislature.
" 1" See, e.g., Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949),
where recovery was allowed. But see Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56
S.E.2d 432 (1949), where recovery was refused.
15 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E.
68 (1905), where the court recognized the right. But see Brunson v. Ranks
Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955), where it was held that
such right should be provided by the legislature and not by the court.
S1 See, e.g., Knell v. Felton, 174 F.2d 662 (D.D.C. 1949), allowing contribution between negligent tortfeasors. But see Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Chapman, 167 Ore. 661, 120 P.2d 223 (1941), following the common-law rule of
ho contribution in the absence of a statute.
17 Generally speaking, the one field in which the courts adhere
strictly to
the doctrine of stare decisis is that of real property, where stability is felt
to be a necessity in order to protect vested rights. See, e.g., Starnes v. Hill,
1, 16 S.E. 1011 (1893).
112 N.C.
I1 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
" California, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
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appears to be a definite trend. In overruling this well-established
common-law rule,- these courts were faced with similar obstacles:
First, in all five jurisdictions as in the great majority of jurisdictions in the United States, the common law had been adopted as the
law of the state either by statute" or by constitutional provision.2 .
Thus, the question arose as to whether the courts were invading the
province of the legislature when they attempted to abolish a particularcommon-law rule. In two of the cases 22 specific reference was made
to this question, but both courts emphatically rejected it as being an
obstruction to the discarding of an unjust rule that the courts themselves had created.'
The existence of legislative enactments24 waiving the immunity
in certain specific circumstances presented another formidable problem. Once again, proponents of the immunity rule argued that the
legislature had pre-empted the field and that judicial action was forbidden. Two cases 25 dealt expressly with this point, but neither
accepted it as grounds for retention of the rule. One court reasoned
that the series of statutes created a trend toward full abrogation
which the court carried to its ultimate,28 while the other simply
visualized them as sporadic efforts to relieve the harshness of the
rule, rather than as comprehensive legislation designed to cover the
field.
The extent to which the abrogation of the doctrine would apply in
the future presented additional problems. The court in the principal
case attempted to anticipate and to resolve these issues. First, the
court extended the abolition only to harms which are torts, and no
" E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5.
2
2

E.g., WIS. CONST. art. 14, § 13.

"Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 255, 111 N.W.2d 1, 23;
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26,-, 115 N.W.2d 618, 624 (1962).
2 In Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 22, the Wisconsin court in
disallowing this argument stated: "The doctrine of governmental immunity
having been engrafted upon the law of the state by judicial provision, we
deem that it may be changed or abrogated by judicial provision."
" E.g., in California: CAL. ED. CODE § 903 (liability of school district for
negligence of employees); CAL. Gov. CODE § 50140 (public agency liability
for damage by mobs); CAL. Gov. CODE § 53051 (public agency liability for
dangerous or defective condition of public property); CAL. VER. CODE
9 17001 (public agency liability for negligent operation of motor vehicles).:
25
Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 218, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89, 93, 359 P.2d 457, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ; Williams v. City of Detroit, 364
N.W.2d 1, 22 (1961).
Mich.Williams
231, 253,v.111
City of Detroit, supra note 25.
T
' Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 218, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89,
93, 359 P.2d 457, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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liability was imposed upon municipalities in the exercise of their
legislative, quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacities. However,
the abolition was not limited to acts of commission but was made to
apply broadly to all torts, including those of omission. 8 Although
the principal case related specifically to a city, the court considered
the abrogation to encompass all public bodies-the state, counties,
cities, villages, towns, school districts, and all other political subdivisions of the state-whether they be incorporated or not. Finally,
the effective date of the decision was set some forty days after the
rendering of the opinion, in order to give governmental units the
opportunity to make financial arrangements to meet the new liability
implicit in the holding. However, the ruling was made to apply to
the principal case so as to prevent the announcement of the new
rule from being dictum, and further, to give the plaintiffs the benefit
of their efforts and expenditures in challenging the old rule.
No doubt, in the near future the North Carolina Supreme Court
will be afforded the opportunity to abolish judicially the rule of
municipal tort immunity. If the court should decide to follow the
trend set by the above-mentioned cases, it will be faced with the
same problems as to judicial abolition of the rule. North Carolina
has, by a reception statute,29 expressly declared that the common
law is in full force in the state, thus presenting the problem of
whether or not this deprives the court of the power to alter the rule.
In the past the North Carolina court has, in numerous cases, steadfastly refused to abolish many common-law doctrines.3 0 As the
court made no specific reference to the reception statute in these cases,
it is impossible to determine if this was a factor in its decision. However, these decisions are significant in that they illustrate the court's
reluctance to overrule deeply engrained common-law rules.
The North Carolina Supreme Court will also be faced with pre8At

least one court limited the abrogation to acts of commission.

Mc-

Andrew v. Mularchuck, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1953).
" E.g., Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (952), upholding rule of no recovery by unemancipated child in suit against parents for
negligent torts; Elliot v. Elliot, 235 N.C. 153, 69 S.E.2d 224 (1952), uphold-

ing rule that the obligation of father to support minor child is not a property
right but is a personal duty terminated by death of father; Sholten v. Sholten,
230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949), upholding rule of no recovery by hus-

band for loss of consortium; Rabb v. Covington, 215 N.C. 572, 2 S.E.2d

705 (1939), upholding rule of implied warranty in sale of food by retailer to
consumer.
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existing legislation on the subject, which will require a decision as
to whether this is indicative of the extent of abrogation desired by the
legislature. The North Carolina Tort Claims Act31 in one fell swoop
abolished the defense of governmental immunity for "negligent
acts"8 2 in suits against state agencies and employees. 83 In addition,
there are several other statutes that waive the defense of immunity
in certain instances.34 On the basis of these statutes the court might
well hold that the legislature has indicated the extent of abrogation
desired by it, thus precluding judicial invasion of this field. But the
line of reasoning adopted by those courts which have overruled the
doctrine offers a sound solution to problems entailed in the judicial
repudiation of municipal tort immunity, and it is believed that North
Carolina, by following this line, can rid itself of an unjust and
anachronistic rule of law.3 5
JAMES M. TALLEY, JR.

GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1958). This statute is commented upon in
A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolinait 1951, 29 N.C.L. REv.
81N.C.

351, 416 (1951).

" The term "negligent torts" has been interpreted by the North Carolina
Supreme Court as including only acts of commission. See, e.g., Flynn v.

State Highway Comm'n, 244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E.2d 571 (1956), discussed in
Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 352 (1958).

" A few other states have a similar statute, but only in New York has
it been construed to waive immunity as to all state agencies and political subdivisions, including municipalities. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8. In Bernadine v.
City of New York, 182 Misc. 609 (Sup. Ct. 1943), rev'd, 268 App. Div. 444,
51 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1st Dept. 1944), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604
(1945), the court in construing the act held that the civil divisions of the
state were answerable equally with individuals and private corporations for
wrongs of officers and employees, since the act waived the state's immunity,
and the legal irresponsibility previously enjoyed by these governmental units
was nothing more than an extension of the exemption of liability that the
state had possessed. In Turner v. Gastonia City Bd. of Educ., 250 N.C.
456, 109 S.E.2d 211 (1959), the North Carolina court held the act not
applicable to employees of local units, such as city and county boards of education, because they are not employees of the state.
"IE.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-53 (Supp. 1961), waiver of governmental
immunity by city and county boards of education by securing liability insurance; N.C. GEN.STAT. § 143-300.1 (1958), Industrial Commission to hear
tort claims arising out of negligence of driver of school bus or school transportation service vehicle, when salary is paid out of State Nine Months
School Fund;.N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-54 (1952), duty of governing authorities of municipality to keep streets and bridges in proper repair, governmental
immunity being no defense; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-191.1 (1952), waiver of
governmental immunity by municipality for negligent operation of motor
vehicles by securing liability insurance, waiver being only to extent of amount
of insurance so obtained. This last statute is commented upon in A Survey
of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1951, 29 N.C.L. REv. 351, 421

(1951).

"The oft-quoted statement made by the Washington court in overruling
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-Torts--R.idroads" Liability at Dangerous Highway.Crossing-Statutory Construction of That Duty.
In Southern Ry. v,.>Aker'Motor Lities, Inc.' the Stipreh1d Court
6f North Carolina; byits interpretation of a stattite, in effect abolished
'the common-law duty of a railroad to erect, after due notice, any type
of warning device or-signal 'at',dangerous grade crossings. In Akers
plaintiff railways6ught damages arising ott of a collision between
Thabe
Ufs train and the deehdant's tractor-trailer. It based its claim oil the
alleged .neglignce of tfie truck driver' in failing to keep a proper
lookout when approaching a grade crossing. The defendant motor
lines filed a cross- action against the plaintiff, basing its claim on the
failure of the-'railroad to maintain"gates, gongs or other such safety
devices at the crossing which the railroad should have known was
'dangerous. 'With rdspect to the cross action, the judge instructed
:the jury as to the defendant's contention of negligence on the part
of the railroad in failing to maifitain warning devices at the crossing.
,On appeal,'the court held it was error to so charge, because the'trial
court had failed to take notice of the provisions of G.S. § 136720.2
The court stated that by the enactment of this statute, the legislature
'has taken from the railroads all authority and duty to erect safety
devices at 'railroad crossings, 'and has vested in the State Highway
.Commissioni "excltisive 'discretionary authority... to determine when
"and under what conditions such signalling devices are to be erected
'and maintained by railroad companies." 8
The statute involved, G.S. § 136-20, is a comprehensive statute
'dealing with the safeguarding, and in some cases the elimination, of
grade crossings. In essence, this statute.provides that where a rail-road and a public highway intersect, the Highway' Commission, if
it feels such crossing is dangerous to the public, has authority to order
the railroad to alter the crossing in such a way as to eliminate any
dingerbus conditions.' The costs of such changes are to 'be apporthe doctrine of tort immunity of charitable institutions seems to best represent
the rationale of courts that have abolished outmoded common law principles:
"We have closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and we can
likevise 'open them." Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43
Wash. 162, 178, 260 P.2d 765, 774 (1953).
... 242 N.C. 676, 89 S.E.2d 392 (1955).
".N.C.GEN. STAFF. § 136-20 ('Supp. 1961),
8242 N.C.at 680, 89 S.E.2d at 394-95. The court admits that this statute
woiks a radical change in the law.
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tioned as the Commission may determine. Subsection (f) provides:
"The jurisdiction over and control of said grade crossings and safety
devices upon -the State highway system herein given the Commission
shall be exclusive." 4 This subsection was the primary basis for the
Akers decision. The court interpreted it as taking away all authority
of a railroad to erect safety devices at crossings on their own initiative, thereby, in effect, doing away with the common-law duty to
maintain necessary safety devices.
G.S. § 136-20 is not a unique statute. There are many other
states which have similar, and in some instances almost identical,
statutes.
A Minnesota statute, comparable to G.S. § 136-20, also exclusively authorizes the Highway Commission to designate what
safety devices are needed at crossings, and to order the railroad to
install them. 5 Minnesota was faced with almost the identical problem
in Licha v. Northern Pac. Ry.' that the North Carolina court encountered in Akers. In a previous case the court had concluded that
their statute was comprehensive and dealt with the entire matter of
safety devices at railroad crossings, thus indicating the legislative
intent "to occupy the entire field." 7 This decision waB overruled by
the Licha decision.' In Licha, the plaintiff collided with a train while
proceeding across the defendant railway's tracks which, due to the
terrain, was a blind crossing. The railroad had complied with the
Commission's requirements as to the necessary signs at the crossing;
however, the plaintiff alleged that the reflector signs so provided in
compliance with the order of the Commission were insufficient, and
that the defendant should have placed some other type of warning
device commensurate with conditions at the crossing. The railroad
took the position that by installing the reflector signs in compliance
with the Commission's order, it was absolved of any further duty
to give additional warning. In rejecting the railroad's contention,
the court recognized its error in the earlier case of Olson v. Chicago,
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-20(f) (Supp. 1961).
8 15 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 219.24 (1947): "When.

..

the commission finds

that conditions exist at any grade crossing which in its opinion require any
safeguards for the protection of life and property, such as crossing gates or
other suitable devices, the commission is authorized to specify the nature
of the devices required and to order the railway company operating the railroad at such crossing to install the same."
8201 Minn. 427, 276 N.W. 813 (1937).
"Olson v. Chicago, Great W. Ry., 193 Minn. 533, 259 N.W. 70 (1935).
'201 Minn. at 439, 276 N.W. at 819.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

Great W. Ry.' and consequently overruled that prior decision.
The court thus held that the exclusive authority of the Commission,
given by the statute, to order a railroad to comply should be deemed
to be a revocation of a similar authority previously given to municipalities.'0 Thus a railroad must take such precautions in management and operation as public safety requires, even though such precautions may be in addition to those required by statute or order of
the Commission. Compliance with the Commission's order was
regarded as only the minimum duty of the railroad.'1
Similarly, Connecticut has a statute, closely paralleling G.S.
§ 136-20, which gives the Commission power to order warning
devices to be installed at railroad crossings which the Commission
deems .dangerous.2 In Pratt, Read & Co. v. New York, N.H.
& H.R.R. 3 the Connecticut court was called upon to determine the
effect of the statute. There, the defendant railroad had complied
with all the statutes requiring warning signs at railroad crossings.
While the statute in question gave the Commission power to order
additional automatic signals to be installed, no such order had been
given. The plaintiff, who was injured at a blind crossing, alleged
that the railroad had a duty to provide additional warning devices
even though it had not been so ordered by the Commission. The
trial court charged the jury that the railroad was not guilty of
negligence as a matter of law for not providing such devices, because
the legislature had assumed the regulation of such installation and
could order such installation when it deemed it necessary. On appeal,
the Connecticut Supreme Court held the instruction erroneous. The
court said that merely because those to whom the legislature has
delegated the authority of ordering installation of warning devices
' 193 Minn. 533, 259 N.W. 70 (1935).
10 201 Minn. at 435, 276 N.W. at 817. Prior to the Minnesota statute, the

legislature had authorized municipalities to order railroads to ameliorate

dangerous crossings; the court construed the new statute as a revocation of
such municipal power, vesting such power exclusively in the Commission.
11 Id. at 435, 276
N.W. at 817; Blaske v. Northern Pac. Ry., 228 Minn.
444, 37 N.W.2d 758 (1949); Koop v. Great No. Ry., 224 Minn. 286, 28
N.W.2d 687 (1947) ; Massmann v. Great No. Ry., 224 Minn. 170, 282 N.W.
815 (1938); Munkel v. Chicago, M., St. P. R.R., 202 Minn. 306, 278 N.W.
41 (1938).
11 3 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 16-159 (1958): "If the Commission upon such
hearing finds that public safety requires it, the Commission shall order such
company to install and maintain, at such crossings, gates, a flagman or such
electric signals or other signal device as may be approved by the commission ....
1 102 Conn. 735, 130 Atl. 102 (1925).
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at crossings have failed to so order, no presumption can arise, as a
matter of law, that reasonable care on the part of the railroad would
not require such protection. It is still a question of fact for the jury
as to whether or not it was the duty of the railroad to have provided
14
any safeguard.
A parallel Arizona statute gives the Commission the same powers
as conferred upon the North Carolina State Highway Commission by
G.S. § 136-20.1 This statute was considered by the Arizona court
in Canion v. Southern Pac. Co.'
In that case the plaintiff
was driving his truck over the defendant's tracks, following another
truck. The lead truck raised so much dust that the plaintiff was
unable to see the approaching train. A collision resulted, and the
plaintiff sued for damages. As one of the alleged grounds of negligence, the plaintiff contended that the defendant railway failed to
maintain a watchman or automatic safety signal at the crossing.
The defendant relied upon the absence of an order of the Commission
to install any safety device, contending that such absence absolved it
from any negligence on that theory as a matter of law. As in the
Licha and Pratt cases, the court rejected this contention, holding
that the railroad might still be liable on a theory of negligence in not
installing safety devices, even if not ordered to do so by the Commission, if reasonable care would require such warning to be maintained.
If any one conclusion can be deduced from this investigation, it
is that no other jurisdiction now regards a statute such as G.S.
§ 136-20 as abolishing the common-law duty of a railroad at
dangerous crossings to use due care toward the travelling public.
It appears that North Carolina stands alone in its novel interpretation of the statute as propounded in the Akers case.
Without any evidence of the intention of the legislature in regard
to this common-law duty in enacting G.S. § 136-20, two possibilities
exist: (1) that the legislature did in fact intend to take from the
" Id. at 751, 130 AUt. at 107; Trombly v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
137 Conn. 465, 78 A.2d 689 (1951); Markar v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
77 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1935).
" 12 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 40-337 (C) (1956): "The commission shall have
the exclusive power to prescribe the character of crossings to be constructed
and maintained by railroads where their lines cross public roads or streets
of a town or city."
52 Ariz. 245, 80 P.2d 397 (1938).
11Id. at 253, 80 P.2d at 401;
Southern Pac. R.R. v. Mitchell, 80 Ariz. 50,
292 P.2d 827 (1956).
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railroads all duty and authority to erect safety devices at crossings,
vesting such duty and authority exclusively in the Highway Commission; or, (2) that the legislature never intended to delimit the
railroads' common-law duties with regard to dangerous crossings,
and that the court in Akers misinterpreted G.S. § 136-20.
The North Carolina statute is almost identical to statutes of
numerous other states. In not one of those states has it been interpreted as an intention on the part of the legislature to absolve a railroad of any of its common-law duties. The possibility that North
Carolina, by the enactment of so similar a statute, intended to exempt
railroads from any common-law duty is, therefore, remote.
If the legislature never intended to abolish the railroads' commonlaw duties at dangerous crossings, it follows that the North Carolina
Supreme Court misinterpreted G.S. § 136-20, and that the rule laid
down in the Akers decision is erroneous. In particular, the court
construed subsection (f) as vesting exclusive authority in the Highway Commission to determine when and where safety devices are to
be constructed, thus relieving the railroad of all authority to erect
such devices on their own. Apparently the words "herein given the
Commission" were forgotten by the court when it interpreted subsection (f). These words would seem to delegate to the Commission
the sole authority to order construction, reparation, and maintenance
of facilities at grade crossings, to the exclusion of like authority
being exercised by municipalities, counties, or other state agencies.18
The only agency authorized to exercise the powers "herein given the
Commission" is the Highway Commission itself, the only purpose of
subsection (f) being to delegate to a single agency the power to
order the railroad to erect such safety devices if it deems such action
-necessary for the protection of the public. If this is the correct inter:pretation of G.S. § 136-20, it should not in any way be construed as
-a bar to a railroad's erecting its own safety devices or an abolition of
-the railroad's common-law duties to the public.
The Akers decision is the only occasion in which the court has
had to apply its interpretation of G.S. § 136-20. The apparent result
of the decision is to leave the injured plaintiff with no recourse
"8Prior to the enactment of G.S. § 136-20, such authority was frequently
exercised in North Carolina by municipalities through powers given in their
charters and by ordinances. See City of Durham v. Southern Ry., 185 N.C.
240, 177 S.E. 17 (1924) ; Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 155

N.C. 356, 71 S.E. 514 (1914).
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against-the railroad when the sole basis of his action is failure of the
railroad to provide safety devices which have not been prescribed by
the Highway Commission. Such a result appears to be entirely inconsistent with the rule laid down in other states which have similar
statutes. 19
If the legislature did not intend to abolish the railroads' commonlaw duties to erect safety devices at dangerous crossings, the best
possible remedy to the problem would be an amendment to G.S.
§ 136-20 by the legislature. It should specify that nothing in G.S.
§ 136-20 should be construed to absolve a railroad from any commonlaw duty to the public, whether or not any action has been taken
by the Highway Commission under the powers granted by G.S.
§ 136-20.
-

ARcH K. ScftOcH IV

Torts-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Doctrine of Exclusive Control
of the Instrumentality
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence applied
where, under the circumstances of the case, the mere fact that the
accident occurred is of itself circumstantial evidence of negligence on
the part of someone.1 In application of the doctrine to actual fact
situations the courts have developed certain "elements" which might
be termed conditions precedent to its invocation. These elements
1
57 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1202, Pennington v. Southern Pac. Co., 146
Cal. App. 2d 605, 304 P.2d 22 (1956); Jenson v. Southern Pac. Co., 129 Cal.
App. 2d 67, 276 P.2d 703 (1954) ; Lloyd v. Southern Pac. Co., 111 Cal. App.
2d 626, 245 P.2d 583 (1952); ILL. ANN. STAT. 111% § 62 (1954), Baltimore
& O.R.R. v. Felgenhauer, 168 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1948); Bales v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 347 Ill. App. 466, 107 N.E.2d 179 (1952); Lauer v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry.,
305 Ill. App. 200, 27 N.E.2d 315 (1940) ; Willett v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R.,
284 Ill. App. 307, 1 N.E.2d 748 (1936); Wagner v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 352
Ill. 85, 185 N.E. 236 (1933); 5 Mass. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 160, § 147
(1959), Peterson v. Boston & M.R.R., 310 Mass. 45, 36 N.E.2d 701 (1941) ;
Mannino v. Boston & M.R.R., 300 Mass. 71, 14 N.E.2d 122 (1938) ; Hubbard
v. Boston & A.R.R., 162 Mass. 132, 38 N.E.2d 366 (1894); 49 Orio REv.
CODE ANN. § 4907.47 (Supp. 1961), Evans v. Erie R.R., 213 Fed. 129 (6th
Cir. 1914) ; 17 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 84 (1951), Slowik v. Chicago, M., St. P.
& Pac. R.R., 89 F. Supp. 590 (D. Minn. 1950); Kansas City So. Ry. v. State,
195 Okl. 424, 158 P.2d 699 (1945); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Prince, 145 Old.
194, 291 Pac. 973 (1930).
1The Latin phrase "res ipsa loquitur" means "the thing speaks for itself."
It was first used in Byrne v. Boadle, 2 Hurl. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299
(Exch. 1863), although the idea that negligence could be proven by circumstantial evidence had existed prior to that time. PRossER, TORTS § 42, at 201

(2d ed. 1955).
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are: (1) the instrumentality causing the injury must be inherently
harmless;2 (2) the party charged must have had exclusive control
of the instrumentality at the time of the injury; and (3) there must
be no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff or third
parties.3
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Wright v. Huntley
FurnitureCo." was called upon to apply the North Carolina doctrine
of exclusive control. In this case the plaintiff was injured when he
opened the door of a sealed boxcar and was struck by a crate which
fell from the top of the cargo being shipped.' Since the boxcar had
2 If the instrumentality is inherently harmless, it is reasoned that any harm
resulting from the instrumentality would be caused more likely than not by
negligence in making or using it than by the thing itself. 9 WIGMoRE, EviDENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940).
3
Wigmore states that the final shape of the elements cannot be so easily
predicted. They should be limited to: "(1) The apparatus must be such
that in the ordinary instance no injurious operation is to be expected unless
from a careless construction, inspection, or user; (2) Both inspection and
user must have been at the time of the injury in the control of the party
charged; (3) The injurious occurrence or condition must have happened
irrespective of any voluntary action at the time by the party injured." The
justice of this doctrine seems to rest in the fact that evidence of the actual
negligence, if there is any, is often more accessible to the party charged
than to the party injured. 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2509, at 380-84 (3d ed.
1940). This is shown in Williams v. Field Transp. Co., 28 Cal. 2d 696, 116
P.2d 884 (1946), where a metal pipe rolled from a truck driven by the
defendant and injured the plaintiff. Defendant was presumed liable since
negligence was evident and the most logical conclusion was that the negligence was defendant's. The court held that because of his superior knowledge defendant must rebut the logical inference.
Note that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur concerns the presentation of
circumstantial evidence, whereby the plaintiff tries to infer negligence on
the part of the defendant. At no time need the plaintiff prove the specific
negligence of the defendant; indeed it has been held in some jurisdictions
that the attempt to do so will bar the use of the doctrine. See, e.g., Whitcher
v. Board of Educ., 233 App. Div. 184, -, 251 N.Y. Supp. 611, 612-13
(1931) where the court stated: "That doctrine does not apply in this case ....
'The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although it provides a substitute for direct
proof of negligence where plaintiff is unable to point out the specific act of
negligence which caused his injury, is a rule of necessity to be invoked only
when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available ....

Hence the presumption or inference arising from the

doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has full knowledge and testifies as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of
the injury complained of.' 45 C.J. 1206."
'299 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1962).
'The shipment of goods was in interstate commerce and the injury
occurred in Massachusetts. Ordinarily, under these circumstances the law
of the state in which the injury occurred would control. However, in the
principal case both parties agreed that the Massachusetts rules of negligence,
contributory negligence, and damages were the same as the North Carolina
rules. The cases cited in support of the exclusive control theory were North
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been under the control of the shipper at the. time of loading and
sealing, the plaintiff brought action against the shipper on the theory
of res ipsa loquitur. Interference by a third party in this case would
have been impossible. The evidence clearly indicated that any negligence could only have been that of the defendant. The court, however, held for the defendant under North Carolina law requiring
exclusive control by the defendant at the time of injury.6
Those jurisdictions which strictly apply the element of control
have interpreted the word "control" literally, requiring proof that
the defendant was in actual physical possession of the instrumentality
at the time of the injury.7 The reason for the element of exclusive
control is that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires the inferred
negligence to be more probably that of the defendant than of another..
When this basis is viewed in relation to the strict requirement of
control, it is readily seen that any attempt to apply the element
strictly to every factual situation without exception can do grave
injustice. In the most infamous example of its strict application a
customer was denied recovery where she entered defendant's store
and sat down in a chair which collapsed. It was decided by the court
that the plaintiff was in possession of the chair at the time of the
injury. 9 Regardless of plaintiff's physical possession the logical inference of defendant's negliffence is readily seen.
Many courts have become aware of the injustice which may occur
Carolina cases. Wright v. Huntley Furniture Co., 197 F. Supp. 117
(M.D.N.C. 1961). The court has recently restated its strict exclusive control
rule in Phillips v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 256 N.C. 728, 125 S.E.2d 30
(1962).
"At the time of the accident complained of, the shipment was under the
exclusive control of the plaintiff and his employer. The doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur does not apply 'when the instrumentality causing the injury is not
under the exclusive control or management of the defendant.' Lane v.
Dorney, 250 N.C. 15, 108 S.E.2d 55 (1959)." 299 F.2d at 906.
"These jurisdictions include Colorado, Iowa, Massachusettts, Mississippi,
North Carolina and Rhode Island. See Hansen v. Phagan, 146 Colo. 484,
361 P.2d 977 (1961); Ruud v. Grimm, 252 Iowa 1266, 110 N.W.2d 321
(1961); Banaghan v. Dewey, 340 Mass. 73, 162 N.E.2d 807 (1959); Denman
v. Denman, 242 Miss. 59, 134 So. 2d 457 (1961) ; Springs v. Doll, 197 N.C.
240, 148 S.E. 251 (1929) ; Coia v. Eastern Concrete Prods. Co., 85 R.I. 128,
127 A.2d 858 (1956). See generally 38 Am. JuR. Negligence § 300 (1941).
See also Moms,
82 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs § 19.7, at 1085 (1956).
TORTS § 8, at 133 (1953). Other causes need not be altogether eliminated.
Rocona v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 173 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1949). Their probability need be only reduced to such a degree as to point the finger at the
party charged. Mintzer v. Wilson, 21 Cal. App. 2d 85, 68 P.2d 370 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1937).
Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 52 R.I. 151, 158 Atl. 720 (1932).
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through the use of the strict element of control. Some have created
exceptions to the basic strict rule while others have reshaped the
element of control itself. Generally, these departures have been
designed to meet fact situations in which- it is evident the strict rule
will not be reliable.
The most just approach discards the idea of control altogether,
and requires only "that the apparent cause of the accident must be
such that the defendant would be responsible for any negligence
connected with it."'" The plaintiff must indicate negligence on the
part of someone and a resulting injury to himself. He then proves
the absence of intervening factors and contributory negligence. 1 By
following a process of elimination he removes everyone but the
defendant.1 2 He must also introduce evidence which shows that the
apparent cause of the accident is such that the defendant would be
responsible for it.1 3 In -jurisdictions which adopt this application of
res ipsa loquitur exclusive control by the party charged ceases to be
a prerequisite element and becomes merely one factual method of
See Stolle v. Anheuser" PROSSER, ToRTs § 42, at 206 (2d ed. 1955).
Busch, Inc., 307 ILfo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925); Sasso v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 243 App. Div. 552, 275 N.Y. Supp. 891 (1934); Minotti v. State,
7 Misc. 2d 252, 166 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Ct. Cl. 1957) ; Leach v. Joyce Prods. Co.,
66 Ohio L. Abs. 296, 116 N.E.2d 834 (Ct. App. 1952) ; Fick v. Pilsener Brewing Co., 39 Ohio Op. 158, 86 N.E.2d 616 (C.P. 1948).
" See Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 339 Mass. 177, 158 N.E.2d
342 (1959); Rinkel v. Lee's Plumbing & Heating Co., 257 Minn. 14, 99
N.W.2d 779 (1959), 59 Mica. L. REv. 136 (1960); Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg."Co.,
226 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954).
Since
of every effect there is a cause, where negligence exists, some
one must have been the responsible author .... Inferentially some one was
negligent .... By a process of elimination we get back to the manufacturer,
who set the dangerous agency in motion, and upon whom the blame ought
inferentially to be fastened." Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga.
App. 762, 763, 73 S.E. 1087, 1088 (1912).
This approach seems
1 PROSSER, ToRTs § 42, at 206 (2d ed. 1955).
to be an expansion of the third element of res ipsa loquitur. See note 3 supra
and accompanying text. From the proof of this element, plus the introduction
of circumstances which point to the defendant, his negligence becomes
apparent. This method of proof might have brought about a different
answer on the question of defendant's negligence in the principal case, since
(a) there was an accident which would indicate negligence on the part of
someone; (b) the plaintiff was injured; (c) and since the boxcar was sealed,
negligence on the part of the railroad was disproved; (d) thus by elimination,
the possibility of negligence was narrowed to the plaintiff and defendant.
The court concluded from further evidence that defendant was not guilty of
negligence of any sort; however, plaintiff was found guilty of contributory
negligence. 299 F.2d at 907 (1962). Quaere: Is contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff possible without original negligence on the part
of the defendant? A finding of negligence under res ipsa loquitur would
have reconciled the later holding of contributory negligence.
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This more
establishing the necessary circumstantil evidence.' 4
flekible rule has been applied to such varied subject matter as ex:
pl6ding bottles,' sealed containers holding foreign matter,' 6 faucets,' 7
d ih.ahite, 8 appliandes,' 9 and exploiting heaters and oil burners.20
.A few courts have used the above approach to go one step farther.
Until recently it was thought that there could not be multiple defendants in cases where res ipsa loquitur was used. 2 ' The reasoning
was based on the fact that where there is more than one defendant,
the instrumentality could not have been in the "exclusive control" of
any one of them.2 2 However, where the courts have abandoned the
requirement of actual physical possession they have found that res
ipsa loquitur can be more fully implemented. Once this was accomplished .the courts felt it necessary to permit multiple defendants.
"' Thus, where the plaintiff was shocked by a refrigerator which she had
owned for almost three years she was allowed to recover from the manu-

facturer when she showed that there was no intervening negligence on the
part of third parties which could have caused the 'short circuit, and proved
the faulty wiring was in a component part which was sealed at the factory.

Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenburg, Co., 226 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954).
1" Florence Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Sullivan, 259 Ala. 56, 65 So. 2d 169
(1953); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hicks, 215 Ark. 803, 223 S.W.2d 762
(1949); Zentz v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P.2d 344
(1952) ; Hughs v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 155 Fla. 299, 19 So. 2d 862
(1944); Bradley v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282, 118 P.2d
601 (1941); Johnson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 235 Minn. 471, 51 N.W.2d
573 (1952); Honea v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968
(1944) ; Ferrell v' Royal Crown Bottling Co., 144 W. Va. 465, 109 S.E.2d 489
(1959).
1" Rutherford v. Huntington Coco-Cola Bottling Co., 142 W. Va. 681, 97
S.E.2d 803 (1957), 60 W. VA. L. REV. 110 (glass in bottle under control of
the plaintiff).
17Minotti v. State, 7 Misc. 2d 252, 166 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Ct. CI. 1957), 7
BUFFALO L. REV. 330 (1958) (no mixing valve on hot and cold water faucets
being used in a school for the blind).
18 Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960)
(Texas law applied) (stick of dynamite exploded while in plaintiff's possession).
18 Peterson v. Minnesota P. & L. Co., 207 Minn. 387, 291 NAV. 705 (1940)
I(electrical shock from stove).
Chandler v. Automatic Heating, Inc., 40 Ga. App. 280, 149 S.E. 287
(1929); Plunkett v. United Elec. Serv., 214 La. 145, 36 So. 2d 704 (1948);
Peterson v. Minnesota P. & L. Co., 207 Minn. 387, 291 N.W. 705 (1940);
Schafer v. Wells, 171 Ohio St. 506, 172 N.E.2d 708 (1961), 30 U. Ci-N. L.
REV. 543; Rafferty v. Northern Util. Co., 73 Wyo. 287, 278 P.2d 605 (1955).
"1Sanders v. Nehi Bottling Co., 30 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Tex. 1939);
Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry., 134 Cal. 549, 66 Pac. 787 (1901); Wolf v.
American Tract Soc'y, 164 N.Y. 30, 58 N.E. 31 (1900). See generally
Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 905 (1954).
"' See Actiesselskabet Ingrid v. Central R.R., 216 Fed. 72, 79 (2d Cir.
1914).
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This seems to have resulted for two different reasons: (1) the courts
realize that it may be possible for a plaintiff to suffer injury from the
concurring negligence of two or more parties, thus creating the
difficulty of apportioning damages ;3 (2) the plaintiff cannot in every
case pick the negligent party from several persons who may have had
control. 4 It is foreseeable the plaintiff might know that several persons had some control over the instrumentality. Because of evidentiary problems25 he may decide to join them all as defendants,
relying on the court to require them to prove their own innocence.
The problem then becomes how many potential defendants plaintiff
should be allowed to join.2" Looking at the problem solely from
the plaintiff's point of view it is sufficient for present purposes to
say the more defendants which are joined the weaker the inference of
actionable negligence by any one defendant becomes. There is a
point where that inference ceases to exist and res ipsa loquitur will
not be available to the plaintiff. Thus, he must weigh the availability
21
of evidence against the desire to use the doctrine.
"3See Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir.
1960) (Texas law applied). A driller injured by an exploding blasting cap
was allowed to use the doctrine against three separate manufacturers who
made the component parts.
" Thus, where a patient was injured while under sedation, and evidence
showed that he was under the care of several parties at different times, each
of the defendants was called upon to prove his innocence. Ybarra v.
Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). This case provoked extensive comment. See, e.g., 40 ILL. L. REv. 421 (1946); 18 So. CAL. L. Rxv.
310 (1945). For the application of res ipsa loquitur to malpractice cases, see
generally Klein v. Arnold, 203 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Pendergraft
v. Royster, 203 N.C. 384, 166 S.E. 285 (1932); Davis v. Kerr, 239 Pa. 351,
86 Atl. 1007 (1913) ; Dux v. Shaver, 105 Pa. Super. 344, 161 Atl. 481 (1932).
" These problems may disturb either party in an action at law. Certain
defendants may find it impossible to show their innocence. If indiscriminate
joinder is allowed parties actually innocent may find themselves held liable
due to the inability to prove it. On the other hand plaintiffs often labor under
an impossible burden of proving negligence from facts inaccessible to them.
The difficulty of weighing these two possibilities may be afactor retarding
the acceptance of this approach by more jurisdictions.
" In allowing joinder of these defendants the courts have to consider the
existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff, as well as
other requirements of the jurisdiction concerning joinder, such as concert of
action, concurrence of the negligent acts, separability of injuries, etc. Extensive exploration of the problem of separating defendants from the point of
view of the court is beyond the scope of this note.
"' Note that the inference created from the evidence will not carry against
everyone who had control, e.g., in the principal case the boxcar being sealed
would negative any inference of negligence on the part of the railroad company. This arises from the fact that the type of control which the railroad
had was not that type of control which would allow it to either apply its own
negligence to the instrumentality or to alter any negligence of the shipper.
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Other innovations in the use of the element of control are nothing
more than exceptions. The first of these has been styled the "right
to control" maxim.2" It does not require that the instrumentality be
under the actual physical control of the defendant, but refers to his
right to control from the time of the alleged negligence to the time
This creates another problem since it applies only
of the injury.'
where the defendant's legal relation to the instrumentality is such
that he alone has the right of possession and control. ° It would be
of little value in deciding cases in which a third party or plaintiff had
not only possession but ownership as well.3 1 A second exception
has been made which answers the problem created by complexities
of title. In this exception the control required does not refer to
control at the time of the injury, but to control at the time of the
alleged negligent act.3 2 This approach is illustrated by the case of
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 3 where a waitress was injured
when a bottle of carbonated drink broke in her hand. In Escola the
defendant company argued that the bottle was not in its possession or
ownership at the time of the injury, therefore recovery on the ground
of res ipsa loquitur was not available to the plaintiff. The court
answered that the doctrine may be applied on the theory that the
defendant had control at the time of the negligent act, although not
" "[T]he requirement that the instrumentality be under the management
and control of the defendant does not mean . . . actual physical control, but
refers rather to the right of control at the time the negligence was committed." McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 535, 46 S.W.2d 557, 560 (1932).
'" See Van Home v. Pacific Ref. & Roofing Co., 27 Cal. App. 105, 148
Pac. 951 (Dist. Ct. App. 1915), where an owner had installed piping prior
to certain work being done by the plaintiff who was later injured because of
faulty installation. The owner was held liable since he had the right to
control the piping at the time of the negligence.
"In all the cases defendant has been the holder of legal title to the instrumentality. See Wright v. Southern County Gas Co., 102 Cal. App. 656,
283 Pac. 823 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929); McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46
S.W.2d 557 (1932); Hart v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 233 Mo.
App. 312, 118 S.W.2d 509 (1938). But the exception should apply equally
to cases where the defendant is a lessee, cestui que use, bailee, etc.
" The right to control theory has appeared in North Carolina only once
in a dissenting opinion by Clarkson, J., in Armstrong v. Acme Spinning Co.,
205 N.C. 553, 556, 172 S.E. 313, 314 (1934).
"As stated in a recent case, "'[I]t is not necessary that the instrumentality causing the injury be within the physical control of the person
sought to be held liable under the doctrine' ... . [I]t is only necessary that
the instrument be under the control of the defendant at the time of the negligent act causing the injury." Haas v. Carrier Corp., 339 S.W.2d 727, 730
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960), 15 Sw. LJ. 464 (1961).
"24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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at the time of the accident."
However, the plaintiff must show
that the condition of the instrumentality was not altered by intervening forces."
These two exceptions are the primary steps to the
final recognition of the fact that the requirement of control cannot be
strictly applied.
North Carolina has invented a unique exception to the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. The requirement of strict control by the defendant at the time of the injury will be waived where the plaintiff
can show other "similar instances," i.e., that substantially similar
occurrences involving defendant's products have taken place within
a reasonable proximity in time.3
In the cases where this "similar
instances rule" has been applied res ipsa loquitur by name 7 has been
denied because defendant was not in control of the instrumentality
at the time of injury. The court allows the case to go to the jury
on the grounds that the similar instances are evidence of negligence
on the part of the defendant. However, the evidence remains circumstantial and the plaintiff need not prove defendant's specific
negligence.38
The rule recognized by the Fourth Circuit in the principal case
was first stated in North Carolina in 1841. 3" Since that time North
" Id. at 455, 150 P.2d at 438.
"Ibid. Accord Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal. 2d 614, 140 P.2d 369
(1943); Dunn v. Hoffman Beverage Co., 126 N.J.L. 556, 20 A.2d 352 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1941).
" North Carolina's sister state to the south also seems to have been inclined to adopt this rule. Boyd v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 126
S.E.2d 178 (S.C. 1962).
",The distinction, if any, between the "similar instances" rule and res ipsa
loquitur is so tenuous and shadowy as to be insubstantial. "0 1be some other
name: What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name
would smell as sweet.... " SHAKESPEARE, Romeo & idiet, Act II, Sc. ii, 1.
424.
" The rule as stated by Devin, J., in Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 228
N.C. 32, 34, 44 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1947), was: "As tending to show actionable
negligence on the part of the defendant, it is competent for plaintiff to show
that products produced by the defendant under substantially similar conditions
and sold by it at about the same time contained the same defects, such similar
instances being allowed to be offered as some evidence of defendant's
negligence at the time of plaintiff's injury 'when accompanied by proof of
substantially similar circumstances and reasonable proximity in time.'" See,
e.g., Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 175, 145 S.E. 14
(1928).
Under circumstances similar to those in Escola, plaintiff, injured by an
exploding bottle, was refused the right to plead res ipsa loquitur but allowed
to recover against the manufacturer on a pure negligence theory because he
could show other "similar instances." Styers v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 239 N.C. 504, 80 S.E.2d 253 (1954).
" Ellis v. Portsmouth & R.R.R., 24 N.C. 138 (1841).
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Carolina has continued to limit the use of res ipsa loquitur to those
cases where the defendant is in control of the instrumentality at both
the times of negligence and injury.4" With the exception of the
"similar instances rule" there has been no deviation. 4 In many of
the North Carolina cases control was no problem since the evidence
was quite conclusive as to whose negligence, if any, was the cause of
the injury.42 In other cases where the negligence was not so readily
laid to the defendant the court balked at expanding the use of the
control element as other jurisdictions have seen fit to do.4" Absent
the availability44 of the "similar instances rule," North Carolina has
refused to allow the use of the doctrine in the "exploding bottle"
cases where the plaintiff had possession of the bottle.4 5 The doctrine
has also been denied where foreign substances in packaged goods have
caused injury. The subject matter of these foreign substances has
run the gamut from fishhooks to mice,4" yet unless the defendant
has recently made the same mistake there has been no recovery. In
" E.g., where the defendant's boiler exploded killing the plaintiff's intestate
who was standing nearby, recovery was allowed on the theory of res ipsa
loquitur.
Harris v. Mangum, 183 N.C. 235, 111 S.E. 177 (1922).
"1But see Lane v. Dorney, 252 N.C. 90, 113 S.E.2d 33 (1960). The
court held res ipsa loquittir not applicable in a case concerning a skidding
automobile. It appeared from further language in the decision that the plaintiff was allowed recovery by offering negative circumstantial evidence of
defendant's negligence. It would appear that use of res ipsa loquitur in these
cases may become possible in the near future. For an excellent discussion of
this 2decision and its implications see Note, 39 N.C.L. Rav. 198 (1960).
" E.g., Jones v. Bland, 182 N.C. 70, 108 S.E. 344 (1921).
"'Compare the North Carolina view as stated in Phillips v. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co., 256 N.C. 728, 125 S.E.2d 30 (1962), with the views stated in
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) and
Bradley v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282, 118 P.2d 601
(1941).
"'A circumstance more likely than not. It would be difficult to conceive
of a rule more conducive to wild imagination. Imagine the prospective plaintiff who has been told by his attorney that he will not have a case unless they
can uncover a witness who has also found a mouse in his bottled drink.
Plaintiff informs his friends of the state of the law. Suddenly everyone's
drink begins to taste strange. Fortunately, two days later plaintiff's nephew
finds what he believes to be a mouse in his drink. What a coincidence!
"' See Phillips v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 256 N.C. 728, 125 S.E.2d 30
(1962); Styers v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 239 N.C. 504, 80 S.E.2d
253 (1954) ; Dail v. Taylor, 151 N.C. 284, 66 S.E. 135 (1909).
" Caudle v. F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105, 16 S.E.2d 680
(1941) (fishhook in plug of chewing tobacco); Tickle v. Hobgood, 216 N.C.
221, 4 S.E.2d 444 (1939) (foreign substance in bottled drink); Enloe v.
Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180 S.E. 582 (1935) (dead
mouse in a bottled drink); Gill v. Ceases' Lunch System, Inc., 194 N.C. 803,
139 S.E. 925 (1927) (per curiam) (plaintiff's intestate died after eating at
defendant's lunch room); Lamb v. Boyles, 192 N.C. 542, 135 S.E. 464
(1926) (injurious substance in ale).
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other cases the opportunity to adopt a less stringent control rule was
foregone by questionable statements that our rigid requirement
47
was met.
In Schueler v. Good FriendN.C. Corp.4 8 North Carolina easily
disposed of a classic "collapsing chair" case using the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur simply by stating that our control requirement was
met.4" Yet who could actually contend that the defendant had anything more than ownership without possession? In Eaker v. InternationalShoe Co." an employee of the defendant was working a revolving drum to process hides. The employee stopped the drum,
reached inside, whereupon the clutch became engaged injuring him.
The court applied res ipsa loquitur against the defendant with no
discussion of control. The rule of strict control is strongly voiced in
North Carolina, but uniformity of its application is wanting.
In North Carolina res ipsa loquitur creates at most an inference
of negligence on the part of the defendant. 1 The burden of proof
remains on the plaintiff and does not shift to the defendant. "2 Under
such protection for the defendant a generous application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a whole and the control element in
particular could be allowed in this state. 3 A change would be
desirable in view of the problems of control just discussed. That
other jurisdictions have squarely faced these problems is evidenced
by the trend toward expansion of the control rule to encompass the
"'See Turner v. Southern Power Co., 154 N.C. 131, 69 S.E. 767 (1910).
Plaintiff was shocked when turning on an overhead light. Res ipsa loquitur
was held applicable even though a third party had furnished the appliances
for distributing the current to the different lamps. In McAllister v. Pryor,
187 N.C. 832, 123 S.E. 92 (1924), plaintiff was injured by high voltage
coming through her iron. Res ipsa loquitur was applied even though a third
party had attached the iron to the current.
48231 N.C. 416, 57 S.E.2d 324 (1950).
Compare the North Carolina view and the Rhode Island view discussed
in text accompanying note 9 supra.
80 199 N.C. 379, 154 S.E. 667 (1930).
Cl See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Munn, 99 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1938);
Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941). See generally
Prosser, The ProceduralEffect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REv. 241
(1936).
" The party charged is merely required to go forward with the evidence
in an attempt to rebut the inference. The credibility of the evidence remains
with the jury and it may find for the defendant. Mitchell v. Saunders, 219
N.C. 178, 183, 13 S.E.2d 242, 246 (1941).
,5For an excellent discussion of the evidentiary problems facing plaintiffs
in the area of inference, prima facie case, etc., see Note, 41 N.C.L. Rav. 124
(1962).
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difficulties of an advanced society. As our community continues'
to develop, the individuals of which it is composed become more
interdependant. This creates the necessity for liberality in the
field of law concerning liability for injuries caused by harmful instrumentalities. Early in the twentieth century the law of implied
warranties was forced to yield to the realities of modern life."4 The
time may now be ripe for a similar advance in the doctrines of implied
negligence. Where circumstantial evidence appears in such an
abundance as to show probable negligence of a defendant, it would
seem improper to remove a plaintiff from court solely on the ground
that he alone was in control of a harmful device. Although plaintiff
was in physical possession and perhaps had ownership, he may not
have had such control as would alter a hidden defect caused by the
defendant's negligence.
ARNOLD

T. WOOD

Wills-Dissent Statute-Constitutionality of Husband's
Right to Dissent From Wife's Will
Prior to July 1, 1960 a husband could not by will deprive his
widow of her dower and other intestate rights in his estate if, pursuant to the privilege given surviving wives by legislation originating
in 1784, she duly filed a dissent to his will.' On the other hand, no
right of dissent was extended to the husband, and his wife could
make a will disinheriting him from any share in her estate.'
The General Assembly at its 1959 session enacted new laws governing intestate succession by which the estates of dower and curtesy
were abolished.'
Correlated sections permitted either husband or
wife to dissent from the will of the deceased spouse where the
survivor does not receive one-half or more in value of all the property
passing upon the death of the testator.4 The latter enactments were
" MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
'N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 93, §§ 37, 38. A history and explanation
of this legislation will be found in Hunter v. Husted, 45 N.C. 97 (1852).
2
Gomer v. Askew, 242 N.C. 547, 89 S.E.2d 117 (1955); Hallyburton v.
Slagle, 132 N.C. 947, 44 S.E. 655 (1903). See DOUGLAS, ADMINISTRATION
OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA §§ 18, 48, 158 (1948).

'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-4 (Supp. 1961).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1961). These sectiofs were rewritten and amended by the 1961 amendment, effective July 1, 1961, for the
most part in particulars not material here, except that the right of a surviving
spouse to dissent was limited by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (a) (Supp. 1961)
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designed to guarantee to the surviving spouse, whether husband or
wife, absolute title to an equal forced share in the other's estate.'
The survivor is entitled upon dissent to receive his intestate share up
to a maximum of one-half of the estate' except that where the dissenter is the second or successive spouse of a decedent who is survived
by issue, none of whom are also issue of the dissenter, he or she may
only take one-half of what they would have received had there been
no will.

7

In Dudley v. Staton,8 the first case to arise under the new dissent
statute, the testatrix devised all her property, consisting of four tracts
of land, to her only son by a former marriage and his wife to the
exclusion of her husband. The husband duly filed a dissent from the
will of his deceased wife, and commenced a special proceeding for
partition, alleging that by virtue of his dissent he was the owner of
a one-fourth undivided interest in the four tracts of land.' The clerk
of the superior court adjudged the husband and son to be tenants in
common and ordered an actual partition of the land. On appeal to
the superior court judge, the parties stipulated that the sole isstie
was whether the provisions of article I, chapter 30 of the General
Statutes of North Carolina, 10 insofar as it permits a husband to
dissent from his deceased wife's will and take a share of her real
and personal property, is in conflict with the provision of article X,
§ 6 of our state constitution. The constitution provides:
The real and personal property of any female in this State
acquired before marriage, and all property, real and personal,
to which she may, after marriage, become in any manner
entitled, shall be and remain the sole and separate estate and
property of such female, and shall not be liable for any debts,
to those instances where (1) he receives less than his intestate share, or (2)
in event the deceased spouse is not survived by a child, children, or any
lineal descendant of a deceased child or children, or by a parent, he receives
less than one-half of the net estate. Otherwise the substance and effect of
the 1959 act was not altered for purposes of the question herein discussed.
See generally Bolich, Election, Dissent and Renunciation, 39 N.C.L. REV. 17
(1960).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14 (Supp. 1961).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(a) (Supp. 1961).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(b) (Supp. 1961).
p257 N.C. 572, 126 S.E.2d 590 (1962).
9Petitioner is entitled only to a one-fourth interest in the land because the
respondent son was issue of the decedent by a prior marriage. N.C. GEN.

(Supp.
§ 30-3(b)
STAT.
1*N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§

1961).
30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1961).
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obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be
devised and bequeathed, and, with the written assent of her
husband, conveyed by her as if she were unmarried.
The judge held that the right of dissent given by the statute was in
all respects constitutional, and affirmed the clerk's order.
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
language of the constitutional provision left no room for interpretation and clearly showed an intention not only to remove the common
law incapacity of a married woman to dispose of her property by
will, but also to secure to her the right to dispose of her property by
will as if she were unmarried, so as to put it beyond the power of
the General Assembly to impair or abridge such right."
The court in Dudley expressly relied on a dictum" in Tiddy v.
Graves'3 in which the court, after concluding that a husband may only
be a tenant by the curtesy after the death of his wife intestate, stated:
"With this explicit provision in the Constitution, no statute and no
decision could restrict the wife's power to devise and bequeath her
property as fully and completely as if she had remained unmarried."' 4
It was acknowledged by the court in Tiddy that in the absence of
constitutional inhibition the legislature can abrogate the power to
devise inasmuch as it is not a natural right; however, the court felt
that since the constitution of 1868 gave married women the unrestricted power to devise and bequeath their property such power
could not be limited.
By following the rationale of Tiddy the court in effect overruled
the more recent case of Flannerv. Flanner'5 where it was contended
11 Prior

to this decision North Carolina had held that since the grant of

testamentary capacity to married women in the constitution of 1868, a wife

could by will deprive her husband of this common-law right of curtesy in her
separate estate. Watts v. Griffin, 137 N.C. 572, 50 S.E. 218 (1905); Hallyburton v. Slagle, 132 N.C. 947, 44 S.E. 655 (1903); Walker v. Long, 109
N.C. 510, 14 S.E. 299 (1891) ; see I MORDECAI, LAW LECTURES 387-89 (2d ed.

1916).
1

The court stated: "Even if we concede that the statement in Tiddy v.
Graves... is obiter dictum, it is sufficiently persuasive to be followed here."
257 N.C. at 581, 126 S.E.2d at 597.
126 N.C. 620, 36 S.E. 127 (1900).
21 Id. at 623, 36 S.E. at 128.
13

15160 N.C. 126, 75 S.E. 936 (1912). The court in
the opinion in the Flanner case was filed, the writer of
v. Graves .. . was Chief Justice. Why that case and
were not mentioned in the Flannercase, we can never
580, 126 S.E.2dat 596.

Dulley said: "When
the opinion in Tiddy
Walker v. Long ...
know." 257 N.C. at
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that a statute, which provides that a testatrix dies intestate as to an
after-born child who is not provided for in the parent's will, was
an unconstitutional abridgment of a married woman's right to
dispose of her property by will as if she were unmarried. In holding
the statute constitutional the court in Flanner pointed out that the
will was valid except as to such after-born child. After declaring
that the defendant's contention involved a misconception of the meaning of article X, § 6, the court stated:
[The] right to dispose of property by will is a conventional
rather than an inherent right, and its regulation rests largely
with the Legislature except where and to the extent that same
is restricted by constitutional inhibition ....
Being properly advertent to this principle, a perusal of the
section relied upon will disclose that its principal purpose in
this connection was to remove to the extent stated the common-law restrictions on the right of married women to convey
their property and dispose of same by will, and was not intended to confer on them the right to make wills freed from
any and all legislative regulation. The right conferred is not
absolute, but qualified."8
Whatever might be said about the apparent conflict between
Tiddy and Flanner,the decision in Dudley raises serious questions
as to the constitutionality of the after-born child statute as it applies
That section is as much an abridgment of the
to married women.
wife's constitutional power to make a devise as if feme sole as is
the statute giving both husband and wife reciprocal rights of dissent,
subject to certain statutory qualifications. The effect of either is
to diminish her estate disposed of by her will to the extent of the
intestate share of the person in whose favor the statute operates;
but in other respects the will stands.' On the other hand, it would
at 129, 75 S.E. at 937. (Emphasis added.)
'ld.
7

" N.C.

§ 31-5.5(a) (Supp. 1961) provides: "A will shall not
be revoked by the birth of a child to or adoption of a child by the the [sic]
testator after the execution of the will, but any such after-born or afteradopted child shall be entitled to such share in testator's estate as it would be
GEN. STAT.

entitled to if the testator had died intestate . ..."

(Supp. 1961) (quoted in note 17
(Supp. 1961) which provides: "If
the surviving spouse dissents from his or her deceased spouse's will and
takes an intestate share as provided herein, the residue of the testator's net
estate... shall be distributed to the other devisees and legatees as provided
18See

N.C. GEN.

STAT. §31-5.5(a)
STAT. § 30-3(c)

sspra), and N.C. GExN.
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indeed be sad if the language in Dudley has the effect of barring an
after-born child, inadvertently left out of its mother's will, from
sharing in the estate of the deceased parent.
Married women in North Carolina had no general power to make
a will prior to the constitution of 1868, except when such a power
was given them in the same instrument by which the property was
vested in them."9 It seems manifest that the specific purpose of
article X, § 6 was to remove the common law incapacity of a married
woman and, as respects the disposition of her property by will, place
her on a par with men and femes sole. The language of the stated
provision professes to go no further than its clear import. It is the
view of the writer that such language does not confer on married
women the right to make a will free of any or all legislative regulation; but rather, inherent therein is recognition that the Legislature
is sovereign over the disposition of a decedent's property, except to
the extent that same is restricted by constitutional inhibition, and
that it can abridge, qualify or restrict the power of a married woman
to devise her separate estate.2" That this is so seems clear since
the framers of our constitution have bestowed testamentary capacity
on married women only to the extent of that possessed by femes
sole, 2 and there is little doubt that the legislature may, at its pleasure,
regulate the power of an unmarried woman to dispose of property by
will. 22 Seemingly the only constitutional inhibition on the power of
in the testator's last will, diminished pro rata unless the will otherwise provides."
1 Newlin v. Freeman, 23 N.C. 514 (1841) ; see MORDECAI, op. cit. supra
note 11, at 371.
"li re Garland's Will, 160 N.C. 555, 76 S.E. 486 (1912); Hodges v.
Lipscomb, 128 N.C. 57, 38 S.E. 281 (1901). The court in the principal
case distinguished Thomason v. Julian, 133 N.C. 309, 45 S.E. 636 (1903)
from Flanner on its facts; however, the general rule that the right to make
a will is given by statute and may be modified or revoked by statute, for
which this case was apparently referred to in Flanner was not dealt with.
I Article X, § 6 expressly provides that a married woman may devise and
bequeath her property and, with the written assent of her husband, convey
the same "as if she were unmarried." N.C. CONsT. art. X, §6; restated in
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-1 (1950).
" .g., Peace v. Edwards, 170 N.C. 64, 86 S.E. 807 (1915) citing with
approval the leading case of Pullen v. Commissioners of Wake County, 66
N.C. 361 (1872) where the court said: "The right to give or take property
is not one of those natural and inalienable rights which are supposed to precede all government, and which no government can rightfully impair. There
was a time, at least as to gift by will, it did not exist; and there may be a time
again when it will seem wise and expedient to deny it. These are the uncontested powers of the Legislature upon which no article of the Constitution
has laid its hands to impair them. If the Legislature may destroy this right,

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

the General Assembly in this respect is that the right of a married
woman to make a will cannot be abrogated since it is conferred upon
her by the constitution.3
However, article X, § 6 contains not only a grant of testamentary
disposition to married women but also an explicit constitutional prohibition against conveyance by the wife of her separate property without the joinder of her husband.2 4 The holding of the principal case
is difficult to reconcile with the construction given by the North
Carolina Supreme Court to statutes dispensing with the necessity
of the husband's joinder in conveyances by the wife of her property
and making her a free trader in certain instances.2" These enactments have been upheld as valid legislative limitations on article X,
§6 on the grounds that this was a beneficent provision and not intended to disable, but rather to protect the married woman.2 6 This
interpretation, in the face of such a specific prohibition, would seem
to dispel any notion that all legislative power to regulate the separate
property rights of married women was withdrawn by this constitutional provision. Yet, the court in Dudley distinguished the instant
statute from the free trader acts and condemned the former for the
reason that it was not a protection, but rather an abridgment of
the widow's constitutional right.' This seems to be a rather specious
ground on which to base the constitutionality of a statute. Especially
is this so in view of the fact that the court could easily have saved
may it not regulate it?" Id. at 363-64. It is interesting to note that this
pronouncement was made just four years after the adoption of the Constitution
of 1868. See generally 57 Am. JUR. Wills § 52 (1948); 94 C.J.S. Wills
§ 3 (1956) ; II MonREcAx, LAw LECTURES 1138 (2d ed. 1916).

. 2 Itcould be argued that despite the right given married women to make
a will by Article X,-§ 6, such right in no way exceeds that extended to femes
sole which, subject to the grace of the Legislature, may be regulated to the
point of destruction.
" N.C. CONST. art. X, § 6 states: "The real and personal property of any

female in this State ...may be devised and bequeathed, and, with the written
of her husband, conveyed by her as if she were unmarried."
assent
25 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1950) (where separated by divorce or deed;
where husband declared insane); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (1950) (where
wife abandoned or turned out of doors by husband).
2
Where the husband is a lunatic, the wife may convey her separate
estate without the joinder of her husband for the free trader statutes are a
valid exercise of legislative power. Lancaster v. Lancaster, 178 N.C. 22,
100 S.E. 120 (1919). If a husband abandons his wife, there is no constitutional inhibition on the power of the legislature to declare where and how she
may become a free trader. Keys v. Tuten, 199 N.C. 368, 154 S.E. 631 (1930) ;
Bachelor v. Norris, 166 N.C. 506, 82 S.E. 839 (1914); Hall v. Walker, 118
N.C. 377, 24 S.E. 6 (1896).
257 N.C. at 581, 126 S.E.2d at 597.
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the dissent statute, had it-been so inclined, by adherence to the literal
wording of article X, § 6.28
The policy of the new act was, in keeping with the modem
tendency, to provide for the survivor's support by giving either
spouse a non-barrable right to an equal forced share in the other's
estate, which is protected against testamentary disposal by reciprocal
rights of dissent.29 The effectiveness of this policy is largely dependent upon the according of equal treatment to both husband and
wife. The decision in the principal case will permit a wife, at her
whim or caprice, to cut her husband out of all interest and estate
in her property."0 The rationale of the court will not only seriously
jeopardize other unrelated statutes3 l but will destroy the symmetry
of the new Intestate Succession Act.32
If the court adheres to its. present position, we are faced with
the paradoxical situation of having to restore the rights of downtrodden husbands, either by corrective legislation or by a revision of
article X, § 6 of our state constitution which would equalize the
rights of a husband with those of his wife.,
J. .HAROLD THARRINGTON
Wills-G.S. § 41-6-Doctrine of Worthier Title
In Scott v. Jackson' the lestator devised land to his niece in fee
simple, and in the event she dies without issue, then to the heirs of
the testator. Plaintiffs, heirs of the testator's niece who had died
without issue, contended that G.S. § 41-62 was controlling, and conse" The general rule is that every presumption will be made in favor of the
constitutionality of a legislative act unless its repugnance to the constitution
is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the courts may resort to
implication to sustain an act, but not to destroy it. ERg., Morris v. Holshouser, 220 N.C. 293, 17 S.E.2d 115 (1941); State v. Brockwell, 209 N.C.
209, 183 S.E. 378 (1936).
" See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1.2, 180.8 (Supp. 1961) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1.1, 1.5 (1950). See generally 3 VERNIER, AZiERIcAN FA ILy LAW § 216 (1935) ; Bolich, supra note 4, at 21-24.
"ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 61, § 18 (1960) gives only widows the right
to dissent from the will of their deceased spouse. This has been criticized
as investing married women with a "super-right" capable of creating havoc
in the settlement of the husband's estate. 3 ALA. L.J. 30 (1927).
" E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-20 (1958) (right to impose inheritance tax
lien on testator's estate); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5 (Supp. 1961) (right of
after-born child to take his intestate share).

"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1 to -30 (Supp. 1961).
1257 N.C. 658, 127 S.E.2d 234 (1962).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6 (1950) provides: "A limitation by deed, will or
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quently, the limitation over should be construed to mean "to the
children" of the testator. Since the testator died without children
surviving, the plaintiffs argued that the limitation over was void,
and they were therefore entitled to the land.' The North Carolina
Supreme Court held that G.S. § 41-6 was not applicable and the heirs
of the testator would take.
While it seems that G.S. § 41-6 was intended to modify the
common-law rule that no one is the heir of a living person,4 the
precise limits of the statute have been a source of litigation and
speculation for a number of years. It was held in the early case of
Starnes v. Hill' that the Rule in Shelley's Case was unaffected by the
statute because the rule "has nothing whatsoever to do with limitations to the heirs of a person unless there is a precedent limitation of
a freehold estate to that person .

. .

."'

Therefore, the statute can

never apply where there is a precedent freehold estate in the ancestor
of the heirs designated in the instrument.
It remains undecided whether the statute is applicable where
the limitation is made to the heirs of an ancestor holding a precedent
estate of less than freehold, for example, where T devises land to A
for ten years, remainder to the heirs of A. It would seem that the
statute should be applicable in such a case because of the court's pronouncement in Starnes that the statute would not apply where
there is a precedent freehold estate granted to the ancestor of the
heirs mentioned in the instrument. An intervening contingent interest between the freehold estate and the limitation to the heirs would
not alter this holding. 7 Likewise the statute does not change the
formulas for the creation of fee simple' and fee tail estates.9
other writing, to the heirs of a living person, shall be construed to be the
children of such person, unless a contrary intention appear by deed or will."
s Quaere whether this contention has merit. See 1 SImEs, FUTURE IgTERESTS

§179 (1936).

' Starnes v. Hill, 112 N.C. 1, 16 S.E. 1011 (1893). For an application of
the common-law rule, see Timberlake v. Harris, 42 N.C. 188 (1851).
5112 N.C. 1, 16 S.E. 1011 (1893). In this case G deeded land to A
for life, and in the event B outlive A, then to B for life, then to the heirs
of B. The court held that B took a contingent remainder for life, and that
until the contingency occurred the Rule in Shelley's Case could not operate
to vest a fee simple in B. As to the applicability of the statute to the Rule
in Shelley's Case see: Jones v. Ragsdale, 141 N.C. 200, 53 S.E. 842 (1906);
Marsh v. Griffin, 136 N.C. 333, 48 S.E. 735 (1904).
112 N.C. at 20, 16 S.E. at 1013. In addition the court found that it was
impossible to believe that the drafters of the statute would have omitted any
reference to the Rule in Shelley's Case had they intended to abolish the rule.
See Hartman v. Flynn, 189 N.C. 452, 127 S.E. 517 (1925), where there
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The statute has been applied where the limitation in a deed was
to the heirs of the grantor after a preceding estate in another,1" where
the conveyance was directly to the heirs of a third person, and
where the limitation was to the heirs of a third person after an inter,vening estate.'" However, where the gift or devise is defeated by
the failure of heirs of the first taker, the statutes does not apply. Thus,
where T devised land to A and his heirs, and if no heirs at his death,
the land was to return to the nearest relations of A, the court held
that G.S. § 41-6 would not apply to the words of defeasance because
the proper construction of the defeasance clause should be "if A die
without issue."' 3
In addition to the limitation placed on the statute by Starnes, the
statute itself contains the limitation that "unless a contrary intention
appear by deed or will,"' 4 heirs will be construed to mean children. '
Just when a contrary intention appears is difficult to determine.' 6
was a deed to A for life, then to A's bodily heirs, but if A dies before his
wife, the wife shall hold so long as she remains single. The court held

that the contingent estate in the wife did not prevent the operation of the
Rule in Shelley's Case; and therefore, the statute could not apply.
'Starnes v. Hill, 112 N.C. 1, 22, 16 S.E. 1011, 1017 (1893) (dictum).
The Bank of Pilot Mountain v. Snow, 221 N.C. 14, 18 S.E.2d 711
(1942). Accord, Whitley v. Arenson, 219 N.C. 121, 12 S.E.2d 906 (1941);
Paul v. Paul, 199 N.C. 522, 154 S.E. 825 (1930); Jones v. Ragsdale, 141
N.C. 200, 53 S.E. 842 (1906). A fee tail estate is converted into a fee
simple by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (1950).
10 Ellis v. Barnes, 231 N.C. 543, 57 S.E.2d 722 (1950), where G reserved
a life estate in himself, then to A for life, and at his death to issue surviving;
and if A die without issue, then to the heirs of G. See also Thompson V.

Batts, 168 N.C. 333, 84 S.E. 347 (1915).

1 Graves v. Barrett, 126 N.C. 267, 35 S.E. 539 (1900), where G made
a deed to the heirs of A.
" Smith v. Brisson, 90 N.C. 284 (1884), where G deeded land to A and
the heirs of his body, but if A die without such heirs, then to the heirs of B.

See Lide v. Wells, 190 N.C. 37, 128 S.E. 477 (1925), where there was an
intervening tventy year trust.
" Massengill v. Abell, 192 N.C. 240, 134 S.E. 641 (1926).
Williamson v. Cox, 218 N.C. 177, 10 S.E.2d 662 (1940).
1

Compare

,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6 (1950).

For a discussion of the problems involved in this construction, see

Bolich, Some Common Problems Incident to Drafting Dispositive Provisions
of Donative Instruments, 35 N.C.L. REv. 17 (1956).
"°Therrell v. Clanton, 210 N.C. 391, 186 S.E. 483 (1936), where G
conveyed to her daughter and her husband for their joint lives and for life
to the survivor of them, remainder to the daughter's children of such marriage, and if no children, then in fee simple to the "right heirs" of the grantor.
The court, looking at the entire instrument and to the fact that the daughter
was the only child of the grantor, found that the words "right heirs" in this
context showed a contrary intention and that "heirs" was not to mean
"children." This case is discussed in 15 N.C.L. Rnv. 59 (1936). In Ellis v.
Barnes, 231 N.C. 543, 57 S.E.2d 722 (1950), G reserved a-life estate in
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In general the court has consistently said that technical construction
of a deed or will must not be allowed to defeat the intention of the
'grantor or testator;"1 however, there have been occasional departures.'
In the principal case"9 the court relying both on the rationale
of the Starnes case and the limitation contained within the statute,
held that the limitation to the heirs of the testator after a prior defeasible fee was not affected by G.S. § 41-6. The reasons were: (1)
if the purpose of the statute is to avoid the common law construction
that there are no heirs of a living person, then there is no necessity
for application of the statute since the heirs are determined upon
the death of the testator, the testator necessarily being dead when the
will becomes operative; (2) the testator had no children when the
will was executed, and to place a limited construction on the word
"heirs" would deliberately do violence to the intention of the testator.
The effect of G.S. § 41-6 on the doctrine of worthier title 20 has
been the subject of much discussion.2 ' This doctrine which has its
roots in the feudal land law" is applicable to both inter vivos conveyances and testamentary dispositions.23 The question of applicaherself, then to A for life and at A's death to issue surviving, and if no
issue survive A, then to the heirs of G. The court held that the statute
applied making "heirs" of G read "children" of G.
"In Williamson v. Cox, 218 N.C. 177, 10 S.E.2d 662 (1940), the court
stated: "The cardinal principle in the interpretation of wills is that the intention of the testator as expressed in the language of the instrument shall
'prevail, and that the application of technical rules will not be permitted to
defeat an intention which substantially appears from the entire instrument."
Id. at 179, 10 S.E.2d'at 663.
" In Whitley v. Arenson, 219 N.C. 121, 12 S.E.2d 906 (1941) where G
conveyed to W and her heirs by'H, the court held this to be a fee tail
special now converted into a fee simple by G.S. § 41-1. Justices Clarkson and
Seawell dissented contending that the court must look to the intent of the
grantor as drawn from the entire instrument rather than to technical construction. The dissent felt that the clear intention of the grantor was to
have "heirs" construed as "children."
19257 N.C. 658, 127 S.E.2d 234 (1962).
"The doctrine of worthier title is stated by Simes as follows: "[I]f an
owner of land in fee simple sought to convey a life estate or an estate tail,
.with a remainder to the grantor's heirs, the remainder was void and the
grantor had a reversion in fee simple. A like rule obtained also as to wills,
so that, if a testator devised to an heir the precise interest in land which the
latter would have inherited in the absence of the provision in the will, the
heir was regarded as acquiring the land by descent and not by purchase." 1
SImES, FUTURE INTERESTS
'

§ 144 (1936).

See, e.g., Note, 14 N.C.L. REv. 90 (1935).
See 1 SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 144 (1936).
Ibid.
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tion of the statute to the doctrine in North Carolina first arose as to
an inter vivos conveyance in the case of Thompson v. Batts,2 4 where
the grantor deeded land to his wife for life, the tract to descend to the
issue of such marriage in fee simple, and on failure of issue, the tract
was to go to the heirs of the grantor. The court held G.S. § 41-6
applicable, thereby making the ultimate limitation read "to the children" of the grantor. Thus, the doctrine of worthier title was inapplicable because a class of remaindermen was created which might
25
have differed from the heirs general.
The Thompson case was qualified somewhat in Therrell v.
Clanton8 where the ultimate limitation was to the "right heirs" of
the grantor after a preceding life estate in the daughter who was the
only child of the grantor. The court found from viewing the whole
instrument that "right heirs" in the limitation over could not be
taken to mean "children" since a life estate had already been granted
to the only child of the grantor. Although the court did not mention
G.S. § 41-6, it is thought that the court probably considered the
issue and found that the limitation in the statute "unless a contrary
intention appear" took the point out of consideration because the
court felt it clear that the grantor could not have intended to mean
"children. '27 It seems, therefore, that the doctrine of worthier title
as it pertains to inter vivos conveyances is destroyed by the statute
.except where the court can find that the grantor intended that the
limitation should not be construed as "children."
The doctrine of worthier title applies to testamentary dispositions
whenever a devise gives to the heir the same nature and quality of
estate as he would have taken by descent. 28 Thus if a devisor devised
lands to an heir who would have taken the same estate and in the
same manner by descent had the devisor died intestate, the doctrine
of worthier title would strike the words of gift from the will and the
heir would take by descent. The effect of G.S. § 41-6 on the testamentary branch of the doctrine of worthier title has never been
2'168 N.C. 333, 84 S.E. 347 (1915).
" In the inter vivos branch of the doctrine of worthier title, heirs must be
used in the general, technical sense. Thus, when any remainderman or class
of remaindermen is indicated which might differ from the heirs general, the
doctrine is not applicable and the land will not pass by descent but by purchase. 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §147 (1936).
210 N.C. 391, 186 S.E. 483 (1936).
" See Note, 15 N.C.L. RZv. 59, 61 (1936).
" For a discussion of the operation of this branch of the doctrine, see 46
HARV. L. Rav. 993 (1933).
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expressly declared by our court. It has been suggested that the
statute would not apply in the case of a will where the limitation was
to the heirs of the testator because when the will takes effect, the
testator is dead and his children could not be classified as "the heirs
of a living person."2 9 Although the principal case was not expressly
concerned with the doctrine of worthier title, the court did state that
"the statute applies only when the conveyance is to the heirs of a
living person. Here the contingent and ultimate beneficiaries could
not be the heirs of a living person because nothing was given prior
to the death of

. .

. the devisor.""0

Even if the court had applied

G.S. §,41-6 to the limitation to the heirs of the testator, the statute
would not necessarily prevent the operation of the doctrine of
worthier title if the "children" had taken the same nature and quality
of estate as they would have taken by descent."'
Although G.S. § 41-6 does not seem to affect the doctrine of
worthier title as it applies to a testamentary disposition, the status
of, the doctrine is nevertheless in doubt. At common law there were
two areas in which the doctrine was significant: (1) the doctrine of
ancestral property, and (Z) the rights of creditors of the estate of
the testator.32 The doctrine of ancestral property applied on failure
of lineal descendants or issue of the person last seized, and the in82
heritance descended to the collateral relations of the first purchaser.
Estates taken by purchase 3 descended to the nearest relatives irrespective of the blood line, since the acquisition of the land by purchase
was deemed to break the line of descent. 4
In North Carolina both the doctrine of ancestral property and
the doctrine of worthier title were incorporated into the fourth canon
of descent.3 5 The joinder of these two doctrines was necessary
, Note, 14 N.C.L. R.v. 9D, 94 (1935). 236 (1962).
:0257 N.C. 658, 660, 127 S.E.2d 234,

"ISee Note, 14 N.C.L. Rav. 90, 94 (1935).
" ATKINSON, WILLS § 6, at 39 (2d ed. 1953).
"s"Purchase" as used here means acquiring the property other than by
inheritance. Property is taken by purchase through the acts of the parties
than through inheritance which is by operation of law.
rather
3
ATxINSON, WILLS § 21, at 77 (2d ed. 1953).
3 N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-1(4) (1950) provides: "On failure of lineal
descendants, and where the inheritance has been transmitted by descent from
an ancestor, or has been derived by gift, devise, or settlement from an
ancestor, to whom the person thus advanced would, in the event of such
ancestor's death, have been the heir or one of the heirs, the inheritance shall
descend to the next collateral relations, capable of inheriting, of the person
last seized, who were of the blood of such ancestor, subject to the two preceding rules." Notice that worthier title is embodied and extended in the

1963]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

because it was considered important that the estates be deemed to
pass by descent rather than purchase so that the ancestral lines were
preserved. Thus where the testatrix devised property "to her heirs
at law" which property had come to the testatrix by descent, and in
this particular case the "heirs at law" would have taken the same
nature and quality of estate under the will which they would have
taken by descent if the testatrix had died intestate, the devise was
void, and the heirs took by descent. Since the testatrix had no lineal
heirs, the fourth canon of descents applied; therefore, the collateral
heirs of the blood line of the testatrix's father took. 6 The new Intestate Succession Act,3

7

which became effective on July 1, 1960,

abolished the canons of descent, including the fourth canon of descent.
Ancestral property also was abolished;3 and since, as pointed out
above, the doctrine of worthier title was incorporated into this canon,
it might be argued that the doctrine is no longer applicable in North
Carolina. On the other hand, it could be argued that the doctrine
is a part of the common law of this state and would be unaffected
by the abolition of this canon.
The second significant area of the doctrine of worthier title pertains to the rights of the creditors of the estate of the testator.3 9 At
common law land which passed by descent was subject to pay the
debts of the estate before land specifically devised; consequently, land
devised to an "heir" of the devisor would be deemed to have passed
by descent under the doctrine of worthier title, and the "heir's" land
would be subject to pay debts before land devised to persons who
were not heirs.4" It is thought that this application of the doctrine,
as it pertains to creditors of the estate, has been abolished by statute
in North Carolina. G.S. § 28-9541 provides that children and issue
statute "where the inheritance has been transmitted by descent from an
ancestor, or has been derived by gift, devise, or settlement from an ancestor,
to whom the person thus advanced . .. would have been the heir or one of
the heirs .... "
" Yelverton v. Yelverton, 192 N.C. 614, 135 S.E. 632 (1926).
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1 to -30 (Supp. 1961).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-3 (Supp. 1961).
" See Note, 14 N.C.L. REv. 90, 95 (1935).
" 1 SimES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 144, at 260 (1936).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-95 (1950) provides: "If upon the hearing of any
petition for the sale of real estate to pay debts, under this chapter, the court
decrees a sale of any part that may have been specifically devised, the devisee
shall be entitled to contribution from other devisees, according to the principles of equity in respect to contribution among legatees. And the children
and issue provided for in this chapter shall be regarded as specific devisees in
such contribution."
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shall be regarded as specific devises and contribution may be enforced
against other devisees.
It is submitted that for all practical purposes the testamentary
branch of the doctrine of worthier title has been abrogated in North
Carolina since both areas of the law where the doctrine was significant have apparently vanished.
Tom D. EFiRD

